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On one hand, it is readily assumed that the government must keep some 
information secret for the security of the state and the safety of people; on the 
other, as the ultimate sovereign, the people require access to information through 
government transparency. One area where this tension between secrecy and 
transparency is highly pertinent is continuity of operations plans. Continuity plans 
contain highly sensitive information that, if not protected from disclosure under 
open records laws, may reveal vulnerabilities for potential exploitation by 
malicious actors. How can confidentiality and disclosure needs for government 
information in continuity of operations plans be reconciled? Using a hybrid 
method that includes historical, legal, political, and disciplinary research and 
contextual analysis, this thesis investigates the tension between the meaning and 
goals of secrecy and transparency in the political context, analyzes exposures in 
the current legal and practical frameworks, and considers approaches for 
balancing the legitimate interests of secrecy and transparency in achieving 
security and accountability. Based on analysis and application, this thesis 
proposes a practical solution in the form of a uniform protective security 
approach for confidentiality and disclosure through a modified understanding of 
risk and a specific responsive risk-balancing model. 
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Focusing primarily on succession planning and continuity of government in 
the event of a catastrophe, continuity planning has been a part of the 
preparedness landscape since at least the Cold War.1 After the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, the government specifically mandated that all federal 
agencies have a continuity of operations (COOP) plan.2 To be viable and 
effective, a COOP plan has to be highly detailed, and complete. As a result, 
these plans can contain particularly sensitive data that reveal strategies, 
personnel, and resources needed to continue the essential functions that protect 
life, property, vital information, and support continuity of government operations.  
The public has an interest in knowing whether and how well its 
government is prepared to respond in the event of disaster. However, when 
made public, information in these plans can be reverse engineered, not only to 
purposefully endanger the lives and privacy of federal and state employees but 
also to expose agencies to initial and secondary attack or disruption.  
There is no demonstrable universal agreement, clear delineation, nor 
detailed federal guidance respecting the confidentiality of COOP plans. The 
confidentiality of certain matters related to national security and law enforcement 
are procedurally addressed through most freedom of information laws. However, 
there is a dearth of analysis of the conflicts between maintaining confidentiality or 
disclosing specific content of agency continuity plans under existing requirements 
of open records. 
Therefore, this thesis addresses the need for a uniform policy for 
protecting this information while balancing the public’s right to know. This thesis 
                                            
1 Harold C. Relyea, Continuity of Operations (COOP) in the Executive Branch: Background 
and Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. RS21089) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2005), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL32752.pdf.  
2 White House, National Security Presidential Directive-51/Homeland Security Presidential 
directorective-20 (NSPD-51/HSPD-20) (Washington, DC: White House, 2007), http://fas.org/irp/
offdocs/nspd/nspd-51.htm.  
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answers the question: How can confidentiality and disclosure needs for 
government information in continuity of information plans be reconciled? 
To address the question, Chapter II briefly addresses continuity of 
operations and the intersection of secrecy and transparency as political and 
ethical concepts. Chapter III considers the current legal and practical frameworks 
respecting secrecy and transparency with regard to open government law and 
policy. Chapter IV reviews contextual approaches to resolving the philosophical 
and practical tensions between confidentiality and disclosure through the concept 
of protective security, and as implemented in the state of Texas.  
Chapter V then proposes a model framework based upon the analysis of 
the literature, law, concepts, and applications relevant to secrecy and 
transparency objectives. The resulting model is based on the concept of 
protective security (a holistic approach to information classification and 
disclosure processes) with a risk management focus, which I refer to as risk 
balancing.  
The risk balancing model is designed upon three interdependent aspects: 
a foundational risk management framework, an expanded definition of risk, and a 
focus on generative thought. The application of the principles, framework, 
processes, and outcomes set forth in the proposed model result in a protective 
security approach that balances secrecy and transparency by ensuring that two 
primary goals of those concepts, security and accountability, are simultaneously 







This thesis answers the question: How can confidentiality and disclosure 
needs for government information in continuity of information plans be 
reconciled? 
A. BACKGROUND 
The United States is a nation founded on the concepts of self-government, 
that government is responsible for the people, and accountable to the people. 
The inherent tensions between secrecy and transparency, concepts that appear 
to be in binary opposition, is a vexing problem in the theory of the democratic 
state. How can the conflict between the control of sensitive information and the 
public’s need to know the activities of its government be resolved? On the one 
hand, it is readily assumed, either through maintenance or expansion of authority 
or power, that state actors must control certain types of information for the 
security of the state and the safety of people. On the other hand, the 
contemporary democratic state is based upon an equally pedigreed assumption 
that despotism, corruption, and collusion of and by state actors must be 
countered through oversight of the public as the ultimate sovereign.3 The grey 
area between these two assumptions is complex and subject to the rhetoric of 
the extremes. As Aftergood notes: 
There is no disagreement in any domain that robust public access 
to government information is an essential characteristic of a vital 
democracy. Nor, on the other hand, is there any dispute that some 
types of government information require protection on national 
                                            
3 Louis Brandeis is routinely quoted in this context: “Publicity is justly commended as a 
remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric 
light the most efficient policeman.” Louis D. Brandeis, “Other People’s Money (1913),” Brandeis 
School of Law, accessed January 31, 2016, https://louisville.edu/law/library/special-collections/
the-louis-d.-brandeis-collection/other-peoples-money-chapter-v.  
2 
security grounds. Beyond these points, however, consensus gives 
way to confusion, inertia, and the weight of past practice.4  
Balancing the interests of the public in a secure state, while at the same 
time ensuring the maximum visibility of the state apparatus, is a uniquely 
dependent analysis and cannot easily be constrained through a static or 
simplistic calculus. An understanding of the fundamental objectives of secrecy 
and revelation, of transparency and discretion, is therefore necessary to 
formulate targeted solutions to specific issues through a consistent and flexible 
framework. 
In this thesis, I consider the conflict between secrecy and transparency 
specifically in the context of government continuity of operations plans. Drawing 
on research and my direct experience with the state of Texas,5 I propose the 
application of a risk balancing model for achieving secrecy and transparency 
objectives within a statutory confidentiality and disclosure framework for state 
and federal continuity planning. 
B. PROBLEM SPACE 
In the event of a catastrophe or disaster, consequences of an incident 
may interrupt essential operations of government entities. The practical effect of 
these events is an adverse impact on the clients of government entities, whether 
these are other governmental units or the general public. To prepare for such 
interruptions, government entities have various available protocols for plans to 
                                            
4 Steven Aftergood, “Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works,” Yale Law & 
Policy Review 27, no. 2 (2009): 404.  
5 The author is the current State Risk Manager for Texas (SORM) and Executive Director of 
the State Office of Risk Management, serving from 2001 in prior capacities as Deputy General 
Counsel, General Counsel, and Deputy Executive Director. 
3 
respond to those events and resume essential functions, each with a potentially 
different emphasis and level of detail and complexity.6  
In this thesis, I consider continuity of operations plans. As defined in the 
National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan (NCPIP),7 a continuity of 
operations (COOP) plan is essentially a blueprint for the implementation and 
management of continuing essential operations in the event of a crisis. The 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) promulgates COOP standards 
applicable to the federal government, but it also provides guidelines that can be 
used by state, local, tribal, and territorial entities. In essence, these plans are 
detailed instruction guides for continuing operations. 
To be viable and effective, a COOP plan has to be highly detailed and 
complete. As a result, these plans can contain particularly sensitive data that 
reveal the vulnerabilities, sensitivities, specific strategies, personnel, and 
resources needed to continue essential government functions that protect life, 
property, vital information, and continued operations. As discussed herein, the 
confidentiality of certain matters related to national security and law enforcement 
are procedurally addressed through most freedom of information laws, but there 
is no universal policy agreement or clear legal delineation respecting the 
interplay of confidentiality (secrecy) and disclosure (transparency) of continuity of 
operations plans.  
When made public, information in these plans can be reverse engineered, 
not only to purposefully endanger the lives and privacy of federal and state 
employees, but also to expose agencies to initial and secondary attack or 
disruption. The public also has an interest in knowing whether and how well its 
                                            
6 Examples of available plans in use include, but are not limited to, business continuity plans, 
continuity of operations plans, continuity of government plans, crisis communications plans, 
critical infrastructure protection plans, cyber incident response plans, disaster recovery plans, 
information system contingency plans, emergency operations plans, occupant emergency plans, 
and others. 
7 Homeland Security Council, National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan (Washington, 
DC: Homeland Security Council, 2007), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1384886826028-
729844d3fd23ff85d94d52186c85748f/NCPIP.pdf. 
4 
government is prepared to respond in the event of disaster. Therefore, this thesis 
addresses the need for a uniform policy for protecting this information while 
balancing the public’s right to know. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Continuity planning ensures that government entities are preparing for and 
strengthening homeland security for resiliency against deliberate and non-
deliberate catastrophes or attacks. The existence of these continuity plans 
should serve to raise the level of confidence for the general public in the 
government’s ability to respond to crises. Government transparency has a similar 
public objective to help to ensure accountability and that important information is 
made available to the community about government operations and readiness, 
whether in a crisis or in general. However, the public disclosure of continuity 
planning information may reduce security, and thus the public’s ultimate 
confidence in the ability of government entities to continue operations in service 
of that same public. 
The philosophical debate is one of secrecy versus transparency.8 
However, there is a deficiency of academic research specifically addressing the 
need for confidentiality of government continuity of operations plans. Most major 
literature on the topic of government information disclosure centers on the 
concept of open government in the form of freedom of information policies or 
specifically with respect to confidentiality of information in the form of withholding 
(or, alternatively, classification or redaction) on the basis of national security or 
law enforcement exceptions.  
I argue that a uniform and effective statutory confidentiality approach is 
required to ensure the appropriate balance is struck between maintaining 
necessary secrecy and encouraging appropriate transparency for continuity of 
                                            
8 Clare Birchall, “Introduction to ‘Secrecy and Transparency:’ The Politics of Opacity and 
Openness,” Theory, Culture & Society 28, no. 7–8 (2011): 7–25, http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/
28/7-8/7.short.  
5 
operations concerns. This research is significant in that it proposes a model 
framework to be used by all levels of government to achieve an appropriate 
balance between secrecy and transparency, specifically in continuity planning.  
D. METHOD 
The following sections describe the object, selection, limits, output, and 
structure of this thesis: 
(1) Object 
There is no demonstrable universal agreement or clear delineation 
respecting the confidentiality of COOP plans. This thesis analyzes the tension 
between secrecy and transparency in the continuity planning context within 
federal and state jurisdictions and proposes a risk management balancing 
approach. 
(2) Selection 
Secrecy and transparency concepts are generalized policy considerations 
involving political science, philosophy, and ethics, among other domains. After an 
abbreviated contextual review of relevant historical and contemporary normative 
and concept literature as well as general open government law and continuity of 
operations planning concepts, an analysis of open government legal application 
is considered, including a brief comparative analysis of state jurisdictional issues. 
This is followed by a discussion of the risk balancing method used by the state of 
Texas.  
(3) Limits 
This thesis analyzes the contextual tension in political secrecy and 
transparency theory but will primarily address practical statutory and regulatory 
approaches respecting government continuity plan confidentiality. The 
conceptual modeling for solutions respecting COOP may be extendable in other 
domains, but those are not within the immediate scope of the thesis. 
6 
(4) Output 
It is expected this research will result in a model strategic framework that 
can be used by government(s) to provide transparency and accountability while 
ensuring ongoing security and confidentiality of sensitive continuity information. 
The primary audiences for this research are federal, state, local, tribal, and 
territorial policymakers and stakeholders from the general public and the private 
sectors. 
(5) Structure 
Chapter II briefly addresses continuity of operations and the intersection of 
secrecy and transparency as both political and ethical concepts. Chapter III 
considers the current legal and practical frameworks respecting secrecy and 
transparency with regard to open government law and policy. Chapter IV reviews 
contextual approaches to resolving the philosophical and practical tensions 
between confidentiality and disclosure through the concept of protective security, 
and in the state of Texas. Chapter V proposes a model framework appropriate for 




II. REVIEW: LITERATURE AND CONSTRUCTS 
After a general overview of continuity and continuity planning, this chapter 
briefly addresses secrecy and transparency as political and ethical concepts, 
along with appropriate conditions for the succeeding analysis. This section is not 
intended as an exhaustive review of extended specialized literature, nor does it 
purport to be a full deconstructive analysis or resolution of inherent tensions 
identified herein. Rather, this overview is for the purpose of delineating context 
for the succeeding analysis on open government mechanisms, continuity of 
operations goals and exposures, implemented approaches, and final 
recommendations for balancing secrecy and transparency in government 
continuity of operations planning. 
A. CONTINUITY 
Fore-warned, fore-armed; to be prepared is half the victory. 
—Miguel de Cervantes9 
Continuity planning, focusing primarily on succession planning and 
continuity of government in the event of a catastrophe,10 has been a part of the 
preparedness landscape since at least the Cold War; however, it was not until 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 that the government specifically 
mandated all federal agencies have a COOP plan.11 The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) was tasked with COOP standardization and issued 
Federal Continuity Directive 1/Continuity Guidance Circular 1 (FCD-1/CGC-1) as 
                                            
9 Cervantes continues, “I know, by experience, that I have enemies both visible and invisible, 
and I know not when, nor from what quarter, nor at what time, nor in what shape, they may attack 
me.” Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, Adventures of Don Quixote de la Mancha, trans. Charles 
Jarvis (London: G. Rutledge & Co., 1856).  
10 Harold C. Relyea, Continuity of Operations (COOP) in the Executive Branch: Background 
and Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. RS21089) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2005), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL32752.pdf.  
11 White House, National Security Presidential Directive-51/Homeland Security Presidential 
directorective-20 (NSPD-51/HSPD-20) (Washington, DC: White House, 2007), http://fas.org/irp/
offdocs/nspd/nspd-51.htm.   
8 
guidance for federal and non-federal entities in 2009, followed by Federal 
Continuity Directive 2/Continuity Guidance Circular 2 (FCD-2/CGC-2) in 2010.  
Continuity plans are required to contain detailed strategies, personnel, and 
resources needed to continue the essential functions that protect life, property, 
vital information, and support continuity of government operations. In summary, a 
minimum viable COOP plan must contain the following information:  
1. The most critical self-identified operations of an entity (essential 
functions). 
2. Identification of who assumes critical offices during an emergency 
(orders of succession). 
3. Identification of who has authority to make decisions at all levels of 
an entity, where, and for how long (delegations of authority).  
4. Secondary or alternate locations where continuity activities will take 
place (continuity facilities).  
5. Which individuals and entities will be part of or notified to support 
continuity activities and how (continuity communications).  
6. The identification and actual location of electronic and hard copy 
documents, references, records, information systems, data 
management software, and equipment needed to support essential 
functions (vital records).  
7. The employees and other personnel responsible to continuity 
operations (human resources).  
8. Specific information on an entity’s testing, training, and exercises 
(tests, training, and exercises).  
9. How essential function responsibilities are transferred and to whom 
(devolution of control and direction). 
10. Detailed information of resumption of normal operations at the 
primary facility or facilities (reconstitution).12 
Specific appendices and annexes of continuity plans and associated supporting 
documentation contain detailed information on these core elements, as well as 
                                            
12 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Continuity Capabilities,” last modified 
November 12, 2015, https://www.fema.gov/continuity-capabilities.  
9 
additional vulnerability assessments, access controls and authorizations, and 
other related plans.  
Not the NCPIP, the National Security Presidential Directive-51 (NSPD-
51)/Homeland Security Policy Directive-20 (HSPD-20),13 nor the Federal 
Continuity Directives (FCDs) 1 and 2 for federal entities,14 nor the Continuity 
Guidance Circulars (CGCs) 1 and 2 for state, local, tribal, and territorial entities,15 
nor even the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 (CPG)16 address the 
issue of confidentiality or protection of the continuity plans from public disclosure. 
At the federal level, the only document that purports to address confidentiality is 
FEMA’s Continuity of Operations Plan Template for Federal Departments and 
Agencies, which suggests that agencies classify their plans as “For Official Use 
Only” (FOUO) and provides that portions of documents may be exempted under 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).17  
While FEMA references these FOUO notifications, authority for the 
assertion that COOP plans, or portions thereof, may be designated as FOUO is 
not furnished, nor is any philosophical or legal analysis provided for considering 
                                            
13 White House, NSPD-51/HSPD-20.  
14 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Continuity Directive 1 (Washington, DC: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/
1386609058779-b084a7230663249ab1d6da4b6472e691/2012-Federal-Continuity-Directive1.pdf; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Continuity Directive 2 (Washington, DC: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/
1386609058811-b084a7230663249ab1d6da4b6472e691/FCD2-Signed-.July-2013.pdf.  
15 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Continuity Guidance Circular 1 (Washington, 
DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/
1386609058803-b084a7230663249ab1d6da4b6472e691/CGC-1-Signed-July-2013.pdf; Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, Continuity Guidance Circular 2 (Washington, DC: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/
1386609058826-b084a7230663249ab1d6da4b6472e691/Continuity-Guidance-Circular2.pdf.  
16 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 




17 Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], Continuity of Operations Plan Template 




the conflicts between maintaining confidentiality or disclosing specific content of 
agency continuity plans under existing open records requirements. Before 
addressing this analysis, however, I first consider the underlying concepts of 
secrecy and transparency relevant to a political perspective as will be applied to 
government continuity of operations planning. 
B. SECRECY 
You see, a secret is not something untold. It’s something which 
can’t be told. 
—Terence McKenna18 
First, what is secrecy? Generally, something that is secret is defined as 
“[n]ot known or seen or not meant to be known or seen by others.”19 Depending 
on whether one has the information or lacks it, desires it or is burdened by it, a 
secret can be something of power, of weakness, of pride, of shame, or any 
number of other asymmetries. A secret, by its very nature, implies a fundamental 
separation or disparity in content, context, knowledge, knowability, or control. In 
seeking a balance between secrecy and transparency, how are we to understand 
the nature of secrecy in government and the tensions it evokes with the aims of 
transparency? 
Understanding the secret as a political concept is, of course, a 
fundamental starting point to the inquiry of transparency, and in particular its 
application to security concerns like continuity planning. In this section, I briefly 
outline three conceptual constructs of secrecy, with a focus on government 
secrecy: technique, type, and taxonomy. A significant amount of sociological, 
psychological, political, and other scholarship has considered the nature of the 
secret (as content) and secrecy (as process) at both the individual and 
                                            
18 ‘‘Terence McKenna—Under The Teaching Tree,” YouTube video, posted July 10, 2011, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0HpIyFQxzgU. The comment is at 48:02-48:09. 
19 Oxford Dictionary, s.v., “Secret,” http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/
american_english/secret.  
11 
community levels.20 This scoping is not intended as an exhaustive review of this 
literature, and it is specifically constrained to frame three relevant perspectives 
helpful in the context of balancing secrecy and transparency in the political 
sphere, as applied here to continuity of operations planning.  
1. As Technique 
A first useful construct in understanding political secrecy are the logics, or 
systems, of secrecy as suggested persuasively by Eva Horn as mysterium, 
secretum, and arcanum.21 Mysterium describes information that is deeply 
enigmatic or even unknowable—a theological or providential knowledge reserved 
only for the chosen in the sense of a sacred approbation or of something creating 
fascination or wonder.22 In a political context, power may be professed from 
divine knowledge, but that underlying knowledge, by its very nature, is publicly 
inaccessible.23 In contrast, the second more secular concept of secretum 
describes access to general rather than divine knowledge and, most importantly, 
emphasizes a relationship between the known and unknown, or who knows and 
who does not.24 A secret in this framework is an exclusion from knowing of a 
secret or knowing its content but not an unknowability. The third secrecy 
dimension, most important here, is exemplified in the arcanum. Unlike 
mysterium, as an inaccessibility of the knowledge itself, or secretum, as a 
relationship between who knows and who does not, arcanum is essentially 
                                            
20 For other excellent discussions of the philosophies and analyses of secrets and secrecy 
generally, see Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (New York: 
Vantage Books, 1989); Georg Simmel, “The Secret and the Secret Society,” American Journal of 
Sociology 11, no. 4 (1906): 441–4498, http://www.d.umn.edu/cla/faculty/jhamlin/4111/Readings/
SimmelSecrecy.pdf; Eviatar Zerubavel, The Elephant in the Room: Silence and Denial in 
Everyday Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
21 Eva Horn, “Logics of Political Secrecy,” Theory, Culture & Society 28, no. 7–8 (2011): 108, 
doi:10.1177/0263276411424583.  
22 Tanya Marie Luhrmann, “The Magic of Secrecy,” Ethos 17, no. 2 (1989): 131–165.  
23 Horn, “Logics of Political Secrecy,” 108.  
24 Ibid., 109.  
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procedural.25 Thus, in the political context, secrets of the modern secular state 
are capable of being both understood and revealed. In essence, the arcanum is 
the fundamental dimension of political secrecy applied through the discretion of 
representative governing. In this context, it is the arcanum, which illustrates the 
nature of state secrecy and defines the parameters within which any proposed 
balancing solutions must exist. 
2. As Type 
The second construct for understanding the secret in the political context 
is a typification of potential categories of government secrecy. In the context of 
government, Aftergood identifies three potential types of state secrecy:  
1. “Security secrecy” (wherein disclosure would undoubtedly threaten 
the security of the country). 
2. “Bureaucratic secrecy” (wherein information that could potentially 
cause harm is kept secret out of an abundance of caution).  
3. “Political secrecy” (wherein information is kept secret to avoid 
accountability or controversy or for other selfish reasons, such as 
avoiding embarrassment).26  
In considering continuity of operations, it is security and bureaucratic secrecy that 
are the primary typifications, with the last type, political secrecy, relevant insofar 
as accountability is addressed.27 
3. As Taxonomy 
The third relevant secrecy construct deals with a continuum of secrecy. 
Pozen notes that the criticism levied against the “unknown unknown” remarks 
                                            
25 In tracing the origin of and applying the concept of arcanum imperii, Horn observes that the 
state secret “concerns something that precedes the decision between truth and falsehood or 
justice and injustice: namely, the decision between silence and speaking.” Horn, “Logics of 
Political Secrecy,” 107.  
26 Aftergood, “Reducing Government Secrecy,” 402–403.  
27 Some acknowledgement of political secrecy is necessary in consideration of transparency 
aims; however, this is not a primary focus in this thesis, given the nature of the continuity 
documentation addressed.  
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made by Donald Rumsfeld in 200228 actually overlooks an important secrecy 
taxonomy.29 Building on the work of Scheppele,30 Pozen categorizes secrets in 
terms of depth, identifying two essential poles of secrets: deep secrets (where 
the existence of a secret and the act of concealing it are both hidden) and 
shallow secrets (where the existence of a secret and the act of concealing it are 
both known).31 These two poles lay at the ends of a continuum of government 
secrecy, wherein Horn’s arcanum imperii is manifest as technique, and the 
considerations of Aftergood’s secrecy typology can be most fully considered. 
While some scholars have argued that shallow secrecy also represents a 
significant threat, particularly in the area of illegal acts,32 Pozen maintains it is the 
deep secret that represents the most significant danger.33 The important issue in 
this construct is the delineation between keeping the existence of a secret itself a 
secret or withholding the information itself, but not the knowledge of its existence. 
Respecting continuity planning, it is Pozen’s shallow secret that is our inquiry. 
Having now specifically framed three relevant dimensions of government 
secrecy to this continuity planning inquiry—technique, type, and taxonomy—I 
                                            
28 Responding to questions about Iraq and weapons of mass destruction, Rumsfeld famously 
replied, “[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are 
known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are 
also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.” “Secretary Rumsfeld and 
Gen. Myers,” Department of Defense News Briefing, February 12, 2002, 
http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636.  
29 David E. Pozen “Deep Secrecy,” Stanford Law Review 62, no. 2 (2010): 259.  
30 Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common Law (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988), 21–22, 75–79, 84–85.  
31 Pozen “Deep Secrecy,” 260. See also Heidi Kitrosser, “Secrecy and Separated Powers: 
Executive Privilege Revisited,” Iowa Law Review 92, no. 2 (2007): 489, 514–15, 542–43. 
Additionally, contrast a corollary concept of dark secrecy respecting Aftergood’s third reputational 
category. Vikand Anand and Christopher C. Rosen, “The Ethics of Organizational Secrets,” 
Journal of Management Inquiry 17, no. 2 (2008): 97–101, doi: 10.1177/1056492607312785; Carl 
Keane, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. Secrets—Their Use and Abuse in Organizations,” Journal of 
Management Inquiry 17, no. 2 (2008): 107–110.  
32 Jenny-Brooke Condon “Illegal Secrets,” Washington University Law Review 91, no. 5 
(2014): 1099–1168, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2509328.  
33 In fact, Rumsfeld seems to intuitively acknowledge this: “And if one looks throughout the 
history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category [of unknown unknowns] that 
tend to be the difficult ones.” “Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers,” Department of Defense 
News Briefing.  
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now move briefly to the revelation of information through the theory and 
mechanism of transparency.  
C. TRANSPARENCY 
[T]he more strictly we are watched, the better we behave. 
—Jeremy Bentham34 
What is transparency? Definitionally, something that is transparent 
“allow[s] light to pass through so that objects behind can be distinctly seen.”35 As 
with secrecy, the political and social implications here defy easy categorization, 
but framing the scope of consideration is necessary when considering the 
application of transparency to continuity planning. Birchall traces the lineage of 
the concept of government transparency from Kant and Rousseau to Bentham, 
and in the United States, to Wilson and Brandeis among others.36 Hood traces 
transparency’s lineage even further, in ideals as far back as ancient China and 
Greece.37 At its most succinct, Fenster describes the logic of transparency as 
follows:   
                                            
34 Jeremy Bentham, “Farming Defended,” quoted in Michael Quinn, ed., Writings on the Poor 
Laws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 276, 277.   
35 Oxford Dictionary, s.v. “Transparency,” http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/
american_english/transparent.  
36 Birchall, “Introduction to ‘Secrecy and Transparency,’” 8.  
37 Christopher Hood, “Transparency in Historical Perspective,” in Transparency. The Key to 
Better Governance?, ed. Christopher Hood, and David Heald, 3–23 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006).  
15 
Government institutions operate at a distance from those they 
serve. To be held accountable and to perform well, the institutions 
must be visible to the public. But in the normal course of their 
bureaucratic operation, public organizations—sometimes 
inadvertently, sometimes willfully; sometimes with good intent, 
sometimes with unethical or illegal intent—create institutional 
impediments that obstruct external observation. These obstructions 
must be removed in order for the institutions to be visible and, 
ultimately, transparent.38 
For the purposes of relevancy above, I have framed secrecy’s scope 
based on three relevant constructs: technique, type, and taxonomy. Drawing 
largely on Schauer’s analysis in Transparency in Three Dimensions,39 I now 
consider transparency by focusing on three constructs that are helpful in the 
context of balancing secrecy and transparency in the political sphere, as applied 
to continuity of operations planning: democracy, regulation, and epistemology.40  
1. As Democracy 
As democracy, transparency is what Schauer calls the “embodiment of 
public control.”41 Echoing Brandeis, Aftergood observes that transparency “is 
essential to the vitality of democratic governance.”42 Whether transparency is 
codified under the banner of sunshine, freedom of information, open government, 
public information, or some other terminology, the policies, preambles, and 
statutes each recite a fundamental philosophy that transparency itself is an 
                                            
38 Mark Fenster, “Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor,” Administrative Law Review 
62, no. 3 (2010): 619, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1562762.  
39 Frederick Schauer, “Transparency in Three Dimensions,” University of Illinois Law Review 
2011, no. 4 (2011): 1339, http://heinonline.org/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/
unilllr2011&section=47.  
40 The three dimensions referenced by Schauer are the variables that define and outline the 
degree of transparency: 1) who has the information, 2) what the information is, and 3) who wants 
the information. The three constructs emphasized here are part of an analysis therein exploring 
the general goals of transparency, identified as democracy, regulation, efficiency, and 
epistemology. I exclude efficiency herein as a primarily market focus, but elements could be 
applicable in other domains. Schauer, “Transparency in Three Dimensions.”  
41 Ibid., 1349.  
42 Aftergood, “Reducing Government Secrecy,” 399.  
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underlying tenet of democracy.43 In fact, these concepts are arguably tied to the 
very birth and evolution of the nation, from the Declaration of Independence to 
the Constitution, and in certain correspondence of Madison,44 Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg Address,45 and scores of others.46 In essence and highly relevant to 
any balancing inquiry, the concept of transparency in terms of visibility of 
governance is inextricably interwoven into the very essence of the American 
political experiment. 
                                            
43 For example, see Title 5, Texas Government Code, Chapter 552 (§ 552.001, Policy; 
Construction): (a) Under the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of 
representative government that adheres to the principle that government is the servant and not 
the master of the people, it is the policy of this state that each person is entitled, unless otherwise 
expressly provided by law, at all times to complete information about the affairs of government 
and the official acts of public officials and employees. The people, in delegating authority, do not 
give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not 
good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control 
over the instruments they have created.). 
Also see Statement by the President upon Signing S. 1160 (San Antonio, TX: Office of the 
White House Press Secretary, July 4, 1966), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/ 
Document%2037.pdf It states, “This [FOIA] legislation springs from one of our most essential 
principles: a democracy works best when the people have all the information that the security of 
the nation permits.” The latter example is quite interesting, and subsequent statements have 
been substantially more enthusiastic.  
44 The following is very often quoted: “A popular Government, without popular information, or 
the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge 
will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm 
themselves with the power which knowledge gives.” Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry 
(Aug. 4, 1822), quoted in Saul K. Padover, ed., The Complete Madison: His Basic Writings (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), 337.  
Interestingly and despite routine invocation of this historical support, some scholars point out 
that Madison was not actually addressing transparency but rather referring to the need for public 
education. Michael Doyle, “Misquoting Madison,” Legal Affairs, July–August 2002, 
https://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2002/scene_doyle_julaug2002.msp, 16–18.  
45 The recognizable phrase “government of the people, by the people, and for the people” 
condenses the concept of representational government as opposed to state sovereignties (or 
despotism) succinctly. According to some scholars, the phrasing was taken from a sermon in 
which Lincoln highlighted the following phrase: “Democracy is direct self-government, over all the 
people, for all the people, by all the people.” William H. Herndon and Jesse W. Welk, Abraham 
Lincoln: The True Story of a Great Life, Vol. II (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1892), 65.  
46 Horn, “Logics of Political Secrecy,” 108.   
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2. As Regulation 
There are two notable facets to understanding transparency as regulation 
or control. The first, as a technical (or technocratic) concept,47 is effectuated by 
laws and procedures48 and second, as a metaphorical concept, effectuated by an 
actor regulating his or her own behavior.49 Thus, transparency is a means for 
controlling behavior by mandating the technical disclosure of decisions and 
actions, and it is intrinsically tied to a metaphorical form of potential shaming of 
actors, theoretically ensuring that inappropriate behavior is avoided because of 
the knowledge that those actions will be subject to public scrutiny. 
3. As Epistemology 
Drawing on his own work and others in free speech theory, Schauer also 
argues that another aim of transparency is related to the marketplace of ideas—
to “facilitate the identification of truth (and falsity) and consequently produce 
more knowledge and greater progress.”50 In this modern construct, transparency 
becomes not just a mechanism but also an independent theory of knowledge 
through evolution from freedom of information, as an extension of freedom of 
                                            
47 According to Fenster, “[Transparency] constitutes a technical concept that, when properly 
implemented in law and regulation, produces goods deemed essential for a democratic society: 
an effective administrative state; a knowledgeable citizenry that can hold the government 
accountable; and an active, deliberative polis.” Fenster, “Seeing the State,” 628.  
48 According to Fenster, “In implementing this understanding of the concept, constitutions and 
legislatures impose transparency through legal and administrative commands and institutional 
design…” Fenster, “Seeing the State,” 628.  
49 Schauer, “Transparency in Three Dimensions,” 1347–1348. Schauer argues information is 
a form of power, and therefore awareness that information will be disclosed influences, or 
regulates, behavior.  
50 Ibid., 1350. Schauer invokes a broad coalition from Milton, Mill, and Holmes to the modern 
open source movement in support of this proposition, and explains “The free availability of 
information inclines towards knowledge, it is said, even if it does not guarantee it, and thus the 
claim is that transparency is somewhere between a highly desirable and a necessary pathway on 
the road to truth.” See also Condon, “Illegal Secrets.”  
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speech and expression, and ultimately to a fundamental human right.51 
Transparency takes on existential proportions, wherein secrecy can be cast as a 
threat to human progress itself, and those mechanisms for ensuring information 
is free become philosophically and morally imperative.52 It is in this context that 
the tensions between secrecy and transparency become their most strained and 
where balancing interests of confidentiality and disclosure become most 
complex. 
D. CONDITIONS 
Two final comments on scoping from a construct and definitional 
standpoint are in order before moving on to the legal and balancing analysis in 
subsequent chapters.  
1. Inapposite Opposites 
First, where I have concluded the scoping discussion above draws a 
potentially stark contrast between secrecy and transparency, implying that they 
are (in essence, and at least for some) antonyms. For the purposes here, it is 
important to clarify that I am not assuming and do not consider them to be so. 
One essential element of this thesis in suggesting that balancing the two 
concepts is possible is precisely because they are not fundamental antitheses. A 
focus on this caveat is especially critical at the outset. As Hansen, Christensen, 
and Flyverbom observe:  
                                            
51 See, for example, the 2003 Geneva Declaration of Principles from the UN World Summit 
on the Information Society. It affirms freedom of expression as a universal right and identifying 
access to information and knowledge as essential elements of society. The fascinating 
intersection of information and information tools in the modern age has had significant impact on 
the development of transparency theory and its initiatives but is outside the scope of this focused 
thesis. United Nations World Summit on the Information Society, Declaration of Principles: 
Building the Information Society: a global challenge in the new Millennium (Document WSIS-03/
GENEVA/DOC/4-E), 2003, http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/md/03/wsis/doc/S03-WSIS-DOC-
0004!!PDF-E.pdf.  
52 According to Birchall, “Open government is the new mantra and modus operandi. It’s 
championed not only for the access to, and participation in, governance it affords the public, but 
for the ‘transparency capital’ it bestows upon the organization or individual advocating it. 
Transparency has become a sign of cultural (as well as moral) authority.” Birchall, “Introduction to 
‘Secrecy and Transparency,’” 8–9.  
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Crucially, the issue of transparency when considered a family 
resemblance concept is that it has no single essence that unifies all 
its different usages. Also, the language games in which the 
transparency concept is invested are simultaneously sites for the 
mobilization of powerful antonyms such as opacity, concealment, 
distortion, manipulation, secrecy, closure, mistrust, red tape, 
inefficiency, corruption, and privacy.53 
Therefore, it should be made clear that in balancing secrecy and 
transparency herein, I consider the concepts to be inapposite opposites, and 
where the goals and objectives of confidentiality and disclosure conflict is 
precisely where the balancing method proposed is focused. My purpose in 
defining the breadth of those aims is to illustrate how the framework and 
solutions address those inherent conflicts. 
2. Accountability 
Second, it bears further emphasis that I draw a necessary distinction 
between transparency and accountability as a salient condition of the proposed 
model.54 These concepts are clearly related,55 but it is important to note that they 
are not, for all purposes, the same idea or even the same paradigm.56 Given the 
emphasis in broader transparency theory on holding public entities accountable, 
it is necessary here to draw a working distinction between transparency as a 
                                            
53 The same, of course, can be said of secrecy. Hans Krause Hansen, Lars Thøger 
Christensen, and Mikkel Flyverbom, “Introduction: Logics of Transparency in Late Modernity 
Paradoxes, Mediation and Governance,” European Journal of Social Theory 18, no. 2 (2015): 
119, http://est.sagepub.com/content/18/2/117.short.  
54 Identifying the use of transparency term a largely synonymous with accountability in the 
research domain. Carolyn Ball, “What Is Transparency?,” Public Integrity 11, no. 4 (2009): 299.  
55 The literature is replete with discussion in which transparency and accountability are 
referenced either synonymously or in tandem. According to Senator Richard Shelby, 
“Transparency and accountability in government are two principles crucial to securing the public 
trust.” Richard Shelby, “Accountability and Transparency: Public Access to Federally Funded 
Research Data,” Harvard Journal on Legislation 37, no. 1 (2000): 369, 370.  
56 According to Samaha, “[C]ore elements in a genuine program of popular accountability 
need a system for disclosing information about government [emphasis added].” Here, Samaha 
illustrates a critical distinction between transparency as a mechanism and accountability as a 
result, as well as acknowledges the importance of process. Adam M. Samaha, “Government 
Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention,” UCLA Law Review 53, rev. 
909 (2006): 909, 917.  
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process or concept and accountability as a goal or an effect. I do not seek to 
resolve here a bright line distinction between the two except to recognize a 
relational distinction and that the interrelationship may be viewed in a very similar 
manner to the secrecy/transparency tension. For example, Hood observes that 
both are presumed to be aspects of good governance but posits three different 
possible theoretical relationships between transparency and accountability: 
Siamese twins (entwined as one inseparable whole), matching parts 
(complementary, and conditioned upon one another), or awkward couple 
(separable and sometimes at odds with one another).57 This distinction becomes 
highly relevant in considering the mechanisms for ensuring accountability goals 
from within the transparency mechanism but should not be confused herein or 
conflated as the same concept.58 
With the relevant constructs outlined and the foregoing clarifications 
disclosed, I now move to the consideration of the current legal and practical 
frameworks respecting secrecy and transparency in the continuity planning 
context. 
                                            
57 Christopher Hood “Accountability and Transparency: Siamese Twins, Matching Parts, 
Awkward Couple?” West European Politics 33, no 5 (2010): 990, doi:10.1080/
01402382.2010.486122.  
58 Nor can it be claimed that complete transparency per se correlates with public perception 
of accountability. As noted here, transparency and accountability are undeniably related, but 
should not be confused as the same thing. As will be further discussed later in looking to New 
Zealand for lessons regarding strong confidentiality protections existing in concert with broad 
open government aspirations, we see that it is ranked at fourth on Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index for 2015 (indicating a high level of confidence in openness and 
accountability), well ahead of the United States at sixteenth. Transparency International, 
“Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,” 2015, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table. 
Transparency International measures multiple factors for corruption perception, including access 
to information. See Transparency International, “Access to Information,” accessed September 5, 
2015, http://www.transparency.org/topic/detail/accesstoinformation.  
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III. ANALYSIS: LAW AND POLICY 
In the event of a catastrophe or disaster, consequences of an incident 
may substantially interrupt essential operations of government entities. The 
practical effect of these events is a potential adverse impact on the ultimate 
clients of the entity, whether other governmental units or the general public. As 
defined in the NCPIP, a continuity of operations plan is designed to address that 
potential by providing a blueprint for the implementation and management of 
continuing essential federal operations in the event of such a crisis. In the right 
hands, these plans are technical schematics of government operations 
containing essential and detailed information necessary for continued 
functioning. In the wrong hands, this information can be used to systematically 
and dramatically dismantle those operations. 
This chapter focuses primarily at the federal level for general analysis, 
with notations as appropriate to the state level. It concludes with a final review of 
state level open records correlations. 
A. EXPOSURES 
The fundamental design of a COOP plan lends itself to dangerous 
vulnerabilities should the plan be available to the public. The obvious ability to 
reverse engineer the sensitive data and information poses a significant threat to 
endangering privacy and lives, and creating additional exposures to federal and 
state entities and employees.59 There are a number of possibilities for a 
malicious party or parties. For instance, they could target both the primary facility, 
as well as identified secondary and tertiary continuity facilities in a coordinated 
                                            
59 I note here that rather than espionage or leaking of sensitive data, it is the legal 
dissemination of confidential information that is the focus of consideration here. This thesis does 
not address the involuntary disclosure of sensitive or classified information, vis-a-vis malicious 
intent, whistleblowing, or Wikileaks-type disclosures. Rather, this discussion pertains to required 
and voluntary disclosure, illustrated by Schauer: “Secrecy, privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality 
also have their virtues, and we can all understand why transparency is a far more desirable 
attribute for sunroom windows than it is for bathroom doors.” Schauer, “Transparency in Three 
Dimensions,” 1342.  
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attack to ensure essential functions could not be resumed. Other possibilities 
include identifying and targeting key individuals to disrupt necessary decision 
making and command structures, or perpetrators identifying vulnerabilities for 
exploitation, including targeting vital information sources and repositories, 
physical or digital. Still another possibility is purposefully disrupting co-location or 
dependency relationships with both other government entities and necessary 
support entities (contractors, emergency vendors, etc.). Finally, other malicious 
acts could be undertaken to interrupt, delay, or terminate performance. 
It is often simply assumed that the information in continuity plans is 
protected because it is potentially sensitive, and there appear to be available 
protections in place. I argue that this assumption bears far closer scrutiny. 
1. The Law and Continuity 
FOIA was enacted in 1966 as a replacement for the Administrative 
Procedure Act.60 There are nine exemptions specified in the FOIA, and three law 
enforcement related exclusions.61 Of these exemptions and exclusions, none 
specifically and unambiguously apply to continuity plans or the breadth of all 
potentially sensitive data contained within those plans. Instead, an analysis of 
whether any of the exemptions may apply in certain circumstances is crucial for 
each specific case. 
As discussed above, federal guidance does not directly address the issue 
of confidentiality or protection of continuity plans from public disclosure. At the 
federal level, the only document that purports to address confidentiality is 
FEMA’s Continuity of Operations Plan Template for Federal Departments and 
Agencies.62 While FEMA references FOUO notifications, the authority for the 
                                            
60 Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89–554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966).  
61 “5 United States Code §552,” Government Printing Office, 2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/USCODE-2014-title5/html/USCODE-2014-title5-partI-chap5-subchapII-sec552.htm.  
62 As noted, FEMA suggests that agencies classify their plans as “For Official Use Only” 
(FOUO) and provides that portions of documents may be exempted under the Freedom of 
Information Act. FEMA, Continuity of Operations Plan Template.  
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assertion that COOP plans or portions thereof to be designated as FOUO is not 
furnished. Any such designation must be determined to have been made 
appropriately. Given this reference to classification, it appears authority is being 
asserted by FEMA pursuant to FOIA Exemption 1. That exemption states: 
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are— 
(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an 
Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense 
or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to 
such Executive order….63 
Therefore, the initial questions to ask are whether continuity of operations 
plans meet this national defense or foreign policy interest standard and, if so, 
whether they have been properly classified pursuant to executive order. Even 
assuming affirmative responses to these questions, a second and largely 
overlooked question is whether there is a distinction between COOP as a 
national security or homeland security concern. Since they are required pursuant 
to the Directive on National Continuity Policy (NSPD-51/HSPD-20),64 could a 
FOIA exemption properly apply to general agency COOP plans?65 
B. EXAMINATION 
Freedom of information requests are made directly to federal agencies for 
disclosure of information, and requestors appeal agency determinations to the 
agency itself. If dissatisfied, the requestor may appeal to a court for a final 
determination. In the United States, there is no central information office or final 
arbiter to process, oversee, or make uniform determinations regarding FOIA 
disclosures. However, there is the Office of Government Information Services 
                                            
63 “5 United States Code §552,” Government Printing Office.  
64 White House, NSPD-51/HSPD-20.  
65 The instant analysis is applicable only to FOIA. Regarding the several states, the same 
confidentiality (privacy/security) statement section is provided in the non-federal template, despite 
non-applicability of the FOIA. State continuity directives and open records/public information laws 
vary widely both in the breadth of mandated continuity planning and in the scope of information 
covered and available exemptions. FEMA, Continuity of Operations Plan Template. See also 
Appendix A. 
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(OGIS) and the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO). The OGIS, like an 
ombudsman, mediates disputes between requestors and agencies,66 and ISOO, 
part of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), standardizes 
classified and controlled unclassified information management.67 Ultimately, the 
determination of what is and is not subject to disclosure ends up the subject of a 
lawsuit and the resolution of withholding or disclosure is far from predetermined 
or precise respecting continuity of operations, as discussed above.  
1. National Security 
At first blush, a COOP plan does not appear on its face to be in the direct 
interest of national defense or foreign policy. However, FOIA Exemption 1 is 
commonly known as the “national security” exemption. National security, as it is 
known today, can be traced to Truman and the Cold War threat with the passage 
of the National Security Act of 1947, which among other aspects created the 
Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA).68 In an environment of global unease at that time, the 
focus of national security was highly targeted toward military defense and foreign 
intelligence, and it was used for classification purposes in executive orders.69 
In 1966, responding to media and public pressures, FOIA was passed 
over Johnson’s overt recalcitrance.70 It replaces provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, which had allowed government information to be withheld to 
                                            
66 Office of Government Information Services, “The Office of Government Information 
Services,” accessed June 31, 2016, https://ogis.archives.gov/. 
67 It is outside of the scope of this limited review to discuss at length the CUI process and 
procedural developments; however, the ISOO has proposed federal rules to be incorporated as 
32 CFR 2002 to address standardization. Information Security Oversight Office, “The Information 
Security Oversight Office (ISOO),” accessed June 31, 2016, https://www.archives.gov/isoo/. See 
also 80 Fed. Reg. 89 (May 8, 2015), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-05-08/pdf/2015-
10260.pdf.  
68 National Security Act of 1947, Public L. No. 235, 61 Stat. 496 (1947). 
69 Exec. Order. No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R. 790 (September 27, 1951).  
70 The final issued statement, Statement by the President upon Signing S. 1160, is available 
at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/Document%2037.pdf. For a brief history of 
politics surrounding the passage of FOIA, see National Security Archive, “Freedom of Information 
at 40,” July 4, 2006, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/.  
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protect “any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public 
interest.”71 As noted, Exemption 1 of FOIA refers specifically to national defense 
and foreign relations, not to national security, and it is specific respecting 
necessary classification pursuant to executive order. In 1974, Nixon attempted to 
walk back some of the FOIA inroads respecting disclosure, but continued to use 
this national security phrasing, specifically as a collective reference to the 
national defense and foreign policy exception.72  
This tradition continues today at the executive and agency levels 
(including the Department of Justice) as a kind of blanket shorthand for 
Exemption 1.73 This shorthand is not without definitional import and thereby 
arguable interpretive precedent, but it remains that it is not the authentic statutory 
language, nor notably was the distinction without a difference to Congress at the 
time.74 
2. Exemption by Classification 
Nonetheless, assuming national defense and foreign affairs could be 
properly justified under the inclusive banner of national security for the purposes 
of meeting Exemption 1, could a COOP plan thereby be properly classified 
pursuant to executive order?  
Current Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, 
provides: 
                                            
71 Administrative Procedure Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946).  
72 Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 339 (March 8, 1972); 50 U.S.C. 401, at 3678 (Supp. IV) 
(1974).  
73 See Department of Justice, Exemption 1 (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/exemption1_1.pdf.  
74 Representative John Moss (a vocal champion of FOIA), noted after the passage of FOIA: 
“We decided to use [national] defense and then go on directly to a specific field, foreign policy, 
not national security, because we were convinced that national security would be so broadly 
construed as to be a catchall for that everything, that it was like having no qualifications of any 
kind.” Hearings on United States Government Information Policies and Practices-Security 
Classification Problems Involving Subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act, 92nd 
Cong. (1972), 2485. 
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Section 1.1. Classification Standards. (a) Information may be 
originally classified under the terms of this order only if all of the 
following conditions are met: 
(1) an original classification authority is classifying the information; 
(2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the 
control of the United States Government 
(3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of 
information listed in section 1.4 of this order; and 
(4) the original classification authority determines that the 
unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be 
expected to result in damage to the national security, which 
includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original 
classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage 
[emphasis added].75 
Section 1.4 of the executive order lists the following categories: 
Sec. 1.4. Classification Categories. Information shall not be 
considered for classification unless its unauthorized disclosure 
could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable 
damage to the national security in accordance with section 1.2 of 
this order, and it pertains to one or more of the following: 
(a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations; 
(b) foreign government information; 
(c) intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence 
sources or methods, or cryptology; 
(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, 
including confidential sources; 
(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the 
national security; 
(f) United States government programs for safeguarding nuclear 
materials or facilities; 
                                            
75 White House Office of Press Secretary, “Executive Order 13526 Classified National 
Security Information,” press release, December 29, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/executive-order-classified-national-security-information.  
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(g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, 
infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the 
national security [emphasis added]; or 
(h) the development, production, or use of weapons of mass 
destruction.76 
Of these categories, 1.4(g) has the potential to incorporate general continuity 
plans evolving from the homeland security project, but, again, the subject 
information is required to be specifically related to national security and delimited 
to vulnerabilities and capabilities. This creates another circular dilemma.77 
3. Homeland Security 
The foundational question must be addressed, then, of whether the 
concept of homeland security is the same as, incorporates, is incorporated in, or 
is separate from, the concept of national security. In the aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks, President Bush issued Executive Order 13228, creating 
the cabinet level Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council 
and outlining expectations for a new homeland security focus.78 The order drew a 
distinction between foreign security and domestic security concerns “within the 
United States,” established the separate Homeland Security Council alongside 
the existing National Security Council, and outlined an advisory relationship with 
the extant national security apparatus, such as the CIA.79 Thus, the national 
defense/foreign relation function of the existing national security apparatus was 
retained with a new domestic security function created as a new homeland 
                                            
76 Ibid.  
77 Even assuming the tenuous applicability of FOIA and other existing open records 
exemption arguments, the United States lacks a cohesive policy for integrating classification 
schema with freedom of information laws, exacerbating ambiguity and convoluting the underlying 
perceived tensions between secrecy and transparency. John Fitzpatrick [Director, ISOO], and 
Melanie Pustay, [Director, DOJ], Revised Guidance regarding Controlled Unclassified Information 
and the Freedom of Information Act [memorandum], Information Security Oversight Office, July 3, 
2014, https://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/policy-guidance/registry-documents/2014-doj-oip-cui-
joint-issuance-on-foia.pdf.  




security apparatus. This was later modified with the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security under the Homeland Security Act of 2002.80 
As Morag observes, the concept of homeland security is “uniquely 
American” and is distinguishable based on its domestic versus foreign focus.81 
Where homeland security developed in relation to terrorism and continuity 
concerns within the borders of the United States, national security had developed 
long before in response to Cold War era concerns in global affairs. Thus, as a 
purely logical simplification (and necessarily where the arguments above are 
accepted), I define national security as national defense/foreign relations, and 
homeland security as homeland defense/domestic relations. The concepts are, of 
course, far more amorphous, and interrelated in such a way that defies such 
easy categorization. There is one country, but there are innumerable threats. 
What is the difference between the nation and the homeland?  
4. Exemption by Statute 
One last matter lends further support to the claim that continuity plans are 
not clearly protected under Exemption 1 of FOIA, or made confidential by 
classification schema applicable thereto. However, this recognition actually 
results in the opening of another avenue of a potential solution respecting COOP 
plans.  
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 contains the Critical Infrastructure 
Information Act of 2002 (CIIA),82 which exempts homeland security-related 
critical infrastructure information through application of Exemption 3 of FOIA: 
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are— 
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 
section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires 
                                            
80 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public L. No. 107–296 (2002).  
81 Nadav Morag, “Does Homeland Security Exist Outside the United States?,” Homeland 
Security Affairs 7 (September 2011), https://www.hsaj.org/articles/69.   
82 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public L. No. 107–296 (2002).  
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that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to 
leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular 
criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be 
withheld83 
Critical infrastructure has been variously defined, but is broadly 
incorporated by reference as described by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 as:  
[S]ystems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the 
United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems 
and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national 
economic security, national public health or safety, or any 
combination of these matters.84  
There are 16 sectors of critical infrastructure identified by PPD-21, 
Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience: 
chemical; commercial facilities; communications; critical manufacturing; dams; 
defense industrial base; emergency services; food and agriculture; government 
facilities; healthcare and public health; information technology; nuclear reactors, 
materials, and waste; transportation systems; and water and wastewater 
systems.85  
The Homeland Security Act defines critical infrastructure information as: 
[I]nformation not customarily in the public domain and related to the 
security of critical infrastructure or protected systems—(A) actual, 
potential, or threatened interference with, attack on, compromise of, 
or incapacitation of critical infrastructure or protected systems by 
either physical or computer-based attack or other similar conduct 
(including misuse of or unauthorized access to all types of 
communications and data transmission systems) that violates 
federal, state, or local law, harms interstate commerce of the United 
States, or threatens public health and safety; (B) the ability of 
critical infrastructure or protected systems to resist such 
                                            
83 “5 United States Code §552,” Government Printing Office.  
84 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56 (2001).  
85 White House Office of Press Secretary, “Presidential Policy Directive—Critical 




interference, compromise, or incapacitation, including any planned 
or past assessment, projection or estimate of the vulnerability of 
critical infrastructure or a protected system, including security 
testing, risk evaluation thereto, risk management planning, or risk 
audit; or (C) any planned or past operational problem or solution 
regarding critical infrastructure...including repair, recovery, 
reconstruction, insurance, or continuity to the extent it relates to 
such interference, compromise, or incapacitation.86  
Applying these provisions specifically to general continuity plans, a federal 
entity wholly within in a critical infrastructure sector might arguably be exempt 
under Exemption 3 of FOIA, but only as to the information specified and only to 
the extent of relationship to attack or conduct along with other limitations above. 
Three observations are therefore notable at this stage of the analysis.  
First, the determination that it was necessary to explicitly exempt critical 
infrastructure information from disclosure under FOIA makes clear that all 
homeland security-related information was not pro forma contained within the 
national security exception, otherwise such a carve-out would not have been 
necessary. Second, the debate respecting how to protect critical infrastructure 
information reported to the government and address the concerns of 
transparency advocates about a government “shroud of secrecy” has a clear 
corollary to and is illustrative of the issues considered here.87 Third, and most 
important to my recommendations, qualifying critical infrastructure information is 
protected by a statutory exemption, not by using national security and 
classification. This is important because this statutory exemption approach 
suggests one viable potential mechanism for a potential balancing solution to the 
secrecy/transparency tension. 
At this point, it should be entirely clear that this analysis is principally, and 
intentionally, illustrative. Beyond the difficulty of determining what either national 
                                            
86 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public L. No. 107–296 (2002).  
87 See Gina Marie Stevens, Homeland Security Act of 2002: Critical Infrastructure Information 
Act (CRS Report No. RL31762) (Washington: DC: Congressional Research Services, 2003), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL31762.pdf. It discusses the provisions of the act and the conflict 
between securing sensitive information and open government concerns underlying the act. 
31 
security or homeland security actually is, and what information may or may not 
be arguably contained within critical infrastructure information designation, what 
this analysis fundamentally demonstrates is the existence of essential uncertainty 
and ambiguity respecting what information is intended to be exempted under 
FOIA and other open records provisions, especially respecting continuity of 
operations.88 
Before moving to the considerations of potential approaches to addressing 
these exposures and ambiguities, I address one further matter in the next 
section. Since most of the preceding analysis focuses primarily on the federal 
aspect of freedom of information protection, but because the final 
recommendations herein are intended to apply to both the federal and non-
federal domain, I briefly address the non-federal domain. 
C. NON-FEDERAL 
Of course, the situation threatens to become even more convoluted at the 
state, local, tribal, and territorial levels. There are a myriad different open records 
laws in the several states. Each has its own set of jurisdictional approaches and 
scoping issues involving various exemptions, exceptions, exclusions, and 
requirements, even before consideration of the labyrinthine intersection of federal 
and state law in the national and homeland security domains.  
Included in the appendices are a jurisdictional sampling of state and 
territorial laws respecting continuity planning and open government regulations,89 
followed by a summation of which of those laws might be applied in a COOP 
                                            
88 It bears some emphasis that the Department of Homeland Security does not list examples 
of use for Exemption 1 on its FOIA exemption page. However, DHS does note that critical 
infrastructure information may be withheld under Exemption 3, which exempts from disclosure 
information that other statutes make confidential (in this case, the Critical Infrastructure 
Information Act of 2002), the subject of the following section. Department of Homeland Security, 
“FOIA Exemptions,” September 24, 2015, https://www.dhs.gov/foia-exemptions.  
89 See Appendix A.  
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confidentiality or withholding analysis.90 My conclusions from this research is as 
follows: 
1. Where protections are provided, like FOIA, those protections are 
delimited to portions of records. Disclosure relies upon redaction 
practices, which may expose sensitive information through lack of 
standardization and error, and which further, through the process of 
redaction, frustrates the scope of transparency theory. 
2. Jurisdictional provisions contain an unnecessarily limited 
qualification of justification (e.g., where withholding is justified by 
reference to “criminal terrorist acts”) and further constrained in both 
intent (e.g., “disruption”) and mens rea (e.g., “manifest 
indifference”). These provisions appear to provide clarity through 
justification of withholding, but they do not resolve a determination 
of confidentiality prior to information about the nature and intent of 
an unknown actor. 
3. Jurisdictional provisions include conditional requirements for 
anticipatory consequence (e.g., “substantial likelihood”). Again, 
whether an event or intent has a particular consequence is an 
unknown prior to the action. 
4. State laws are constrained specificity to identified aspects of 
suspected-known harmful information (e.g., personally identifiable 
information, vulnerability assessments, information technology 
information). These subset details, while providing some 
constraints on protectable data, leave open by exclusion other 
subset details.  
5. Lack of specificity in the types and quality of documentation within 
the scope of the disclosure exceptions and the variability of plan 
implementations amplifies the exposure of non-specific subsets.91 
As can be seen in the variability of application and contingent nature of 
confidentiality protections, this interpretive reliance introduces a fundamental 
ambiguity. This ambiguity increases the potential of substantial resource costs 
                                            
90 See Appendix B.  
91 The tentative conclusions here, and the draft research upon which those conclusions are 
based, is the subject of a separate but related analysis regarding continuity oversight operations 
of the State Office of Risk Management. That data and its interpretation is included here for full 
disclosure and to ensure a balanced consideration of state and federal emphasis, and is not 
intended or claimed to be authoritative or final. I gratefully acknowledge here the assistance of K. 
M. in the compilation and verification of the sampling dataset. 
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(financial, regulatory, legal, and time), in addition to exposing government entities 
and the general public to significant harm. On balance, as at the federal level, a 
number of these existing laws may be interpreted on a case-by-case basis to be 
broad enough to protect some aspects of COOP plans, depending on content 
and application; some leave little doubt of the immense exposure of potential 
damaging sensitive information subject to dissemination; and all, save one, are 
ambiguous.  
The one statute than leaves no doubt as to the protection of continuity 
plans is in the state of Texas. The basis and implementation of its model is the 
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IV. CONCEPT: PROTECTIVE SECURITY AND RISK 
BALANCING 
We have no future because our present is too volatile. We have 
only risk management. The spinning of the given moment’s 
scenarios. Pattern recognition. 
—William Gibson92 
 
In considering the tensions between the concepts of secrecy and 
transparency in the context of current statutory approaches respecting COOP, 
the state of Texas, utilizing a risk balancing model, implemented a statutory 
solution based on the concept of protective security. The basis and 
implementation of this model is the subject of this chapter. 
A. BACKGROUND 
As noted above, FEMA promulgates COOP standards applicable to the 
federal government, but it also provides guidelines that can be used by state, 
local, tribal, and territorial entities. The central agency in Texas with general 
oversight responsibility for continuity of operations in the state enterprise is the 
State Office of Risk Management (SORM).93 In 2007, the 80th Texas Legislature 
passed Senate Bill 908, which mandated that all Texas state agencies to work 
with SORM to develop business continuity plans.94 As at the federal level, these 
                                            
92 William Gibson, Pattern Recognition (New York: Penguin Putnam, 2002).  
93 The State Office of Risk Management was created in 1997 by the 75th Texas Legislature 
by House Bill 2133, merging the responsibilities of the Risk Management Division of the Texas 
Workers’ Compensation Commission under Chapter 412, Texas Labor Code, with the duties of 
the Workers’ Compensation Division of the Attorney General’s Office under Chapter 501, Texas 
Labor Code. SORM’s responsibilities have been expanded by the Texas Legislature over time, 
including in 2001, when the 77th Texas Legislature passed House Bill 1203, expanding SORM’s 
mission to include serving as a full service risk and insurance service manager to reduce property 
and liability losses, later expanded to include oversight of continuity of operations for the state. 
Texas Legislature Online, “An Act,” accessed September 1, 2016, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/
tlodocs/75R/billtext/html/HB02133F.htm. 
94 Texas Legislature Online, “S.B. No. 908, an Act,” accessed September 1, 2016, 
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/80R/billtext/pdf/SB00908F.pdf 
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plans were eventually required in response to concerns raised after the events of 
September 11, 2001. They have a similar focus as evinced in the NCPIP and 
other federal government efforts to keep agencies operational in the event of 
“disruptions to production, finance, administration, or other essential 
operations.”95 The State Office of Risk Management was tasked with assisting in 
development and receiving and reviewing each of these plans for compliance.96 
However, two issues with the legislation delayed immediate implementation of 
the statutory provisions. First, the bill did not establish a specific or single 
statewide standard applicable to all entities; and second, relevant here, 
confidentiality of the plans was not addressed by the law.  
After significant study and statewide negotiation and coordination, the 
leadership of the Texas Department of Public Safety (which includes the Texas 
Office of Homeland Security and the Texas Department of Emergency 
Management), the Texas Department of Information Resources, and the State 
Office of Risk Management jointly issued the Texas State Agency Continuity 
Planning Policy Guidance Letter in 2013.97 Distributed to all state entities, this 
advisory document identifies COOP as the de facto state standard and includes 
an interim position on confidentiality of those plans.98 
Thereafter, long-term efforts were undertaken by a number of state 
officials, including the author, to resolve these outstanding standards and 
                                            
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Steve McCraw, Karen Robinson, and Jonathan Bow, “Texas State Agency Continuity 




98 According to the “Texas State Agency Continuity Planning Policy Guidance Letter,” “Due to 
their sensitive nature, state agency continuity plans and supporting documents should be labeled 
‘For Official Use Only.’ § 552.101 of the Texas Government Code exempts information from 
public disclosure if considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by 
judicial decision. Chapter 418 of the Texas Government Code provides that certain information, 
including information relating to risk or vulnerability assessments, critical infrastructure, and 
security systems, is confidential in specific circumstances.” McCraw, Robinson, and Bow, “Texas 
State Agency,” 3.  
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confidentiality matters through legislative consideration. In 2015, the 84th Texas 
Legislature passed House Bill 1832, officially establishing the state standard as 
COOP and formally exempting those plans from disclosure under Chapter 552, 
Texas Government Code (the Texas version of FOIA). To do so, it was 
necessary to understand how similar issues have been framed and addressed 
elsewhere and to look for instructive lessons in developing appropriate solutions 
for Texas. This concept was ultimately identified as protective security.  
B. PROTECTIVE SECURITY 
The corollary to COOP in many jurisdictions, like in Texas initially, is 
commonly known as business continuity planning (BCP) or business continuity 
management (BCM).99 Based on similar intent regarding continuity and freedom 
of information, but a differing implementation, I selected New Zealand as a 
representative international comparative model that was relevant to the issues 
under consideration in Texas.  
Business continuity management in New Zealand is part of its governance 
mandatory requirements100 for a protective security requirements framework,101 
required to ensure that critical services and associated assets remain available to 
assure the “health, safety, security, and economic wellbeing” of New Zealand 
and the effective functioning of government.102 As in Texas and with the United 
                                            
99 Note: In the United States, the COOP distinction is made to denote the government-based 
focus of continuity planning regarding the continuation of essential public services versus a 
private-based BCP focus of business continuation (inclusive of revenue/profit protection). This 
distinction is not merely semantic, and it is notable for its framing. 
100 Protective Security Requirements [New Zealand], “Summary of Governance Mandatory 
Requirements Summary” [GOVT 10], access July 2, 2016, https://protectivesecurity.govt.nz/
home/mandatory-requirements/summary-of-governance-mandatory-requirements#GOV10.  
101 Protective Security Requirements [New Zealand], “What You Need to Know,” accessed 
July 1, 2016, https://protectivesecurity.govt.nz/home/what-you-need-to-know/. 
102 Ibid.  
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States’ federal approach, continuity management is a required policy for all New 
Zealand government entities.103  
Two acts in New Zealand govern access to government information. The 
first is the Official Information Act of 1982 (OIA), which applies to ministers and 
central government agencies), and the other is the Local Government Official 
Information and Meetings Act of 1987 (LGOIMA), which applies to local 
government agencies. New Zealand replaced the Official Secrets Act of 1951 
with the Official Information Act of 1982 (the New Zealand version of the United 
States’ FOIA).104 The move ostensibly reversed the government position on the 
release of government information, which had been theretofore categorized an 
offense,105 and it established a reverse presumption that “information shall be 
made available unless there is good reason for withholding it.”106 
This principle of availability is the central tenet of the OIA and of 
transparency theory, and on the surface, it is shared with the United States’ 
                                            
103 Protective Security Requirements [New Zealand], “Strategic Security Objectives, Core 
Policies and the Mandatory Requirements for Agencies, Section 3.9, Business Continuity 
Management,” accessed July 1, 2016, https://protectivesecurity.government.nz/home/what-you-
need-to-do/strategic-security-objectives-core-policies-and-the-mandatory-requirements-for-
agencies/#business-continuity-management. 
104 Steven Price, The Official Information Act 1982: A Window on Government or Curtains 
Drawn? (Wellington, New Zealand: Victoria University of Wellington, 2005), 
http://www.medialawjournal.co.nz/downloads/OP_Price.pdf.  
105 Government of New Zealand, New Zealand Official Secrets Act, 1951, http://www.nzlii.org/
nz/legis/hist_act/osa19511951n77183.pdf. Note: As in the United States, local jurisdictions have 
slightly different requirements, in this case specifically under the New Zealand Local Government 
Official Information and Meetings Act of 1987. Parliamentary Counsel Office, “New Zealand 




However, with each state overseeing its own individual FOI/open records legislation, the 
United States is not centralized for this purpose. It is outside the scope of this review to discuss 
the complexities of the United States federal, state, local, tribal and territorial interplay, though it is 
to be noted that this complication is highly significant for any potential national policy revision. 
106 New Zealand Legislation, “New Zealand Official Information Act, Section 5, Principle of 
Availability,” accessed July 6, 2016, http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1982/0156/latest/
whole.html#DLM65363. 
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current position both in the FOIA and at executive level policy directive.107 
However, with regard to the subject of continuity, New Zealand’s approach 
sought to balance secrecy and transparency in a different way than the United 
States has by utilizing the concept of protective security108 and authoritatively 
tying continuity to risk analysis and security risk management. In this manner, 
continuity plans (as well as other government information respecting operational 
security) in New Zealand are not as susceptible to the same disclosure U.S. 
agencies are that would compromise the security of personnel, essential 
equipment, services, and systems, or otherwise impact the ability of government 
to perform its essential functions. 
C. RISK BALANCING 
A comprehensive protective security framework in Texas would have 
represented an immense change in state governance and required significant 
time and resources for full resolution. Nor would addressing the matter of 
classification have been an immediately effective approach from a purely state 
perspective, since, as in Texas, classification systems are variant and not 
universally implemented.109 Therefore, SORM applied a risk management 
approach, similar to that underlying the New Zealand model, with a specific focus 
on determining a balance between secrecy and transparency in continuity of 
operations planning.110  
                                            
107 White House, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
transparency-and-open-government.  
108 This concept is also common to the British, Australian, and other territories in the general 
government operations context, but is primarily used in the United States to refer to physical 
security and military defense applications. 
109 See for example, Texas Department of Information Resources, Data Classification Guide 
(Austin, TX: Texas Department of Information Resources, 2014), 
http://publishingext.dir.texas.gov/portal/internal/resources/DocumentLibrary/
Data%20Classification%20Guide.docx.  
110 As noted above, the author is the current Risk Manager for the state of Texas and 
Executive Director of the State of Risk Management, responsible for overall continuity of 
operations planning oversight in Texas.  
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1. Framework 
Underscoring the New Zealand protective security approach is the 
Australia Standard/New Zealand Standard 4360 (AS/NZS 4360) risk 
management standard,111 thereafter refined, adopted, and published as 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 31000:2009 by the ISO in 
Geneva in 2009 to address the nature of, process for, and benefits from risk 
management activities.112 Hundreds of experts from 28 countries worked more 
than four years to develop consensus-based principles, a framework, a process 
for managing risk, and agreement upon a consistent vocabulary.113 The final ISO 
standard and its related vocabulary manuscript (known as ISO Guide 73:2009), 
set forth the principles, framework, and processes for enterprise risk 
management based on a persistent, generic, risk agnostic, and scalable 
methodology; it is intended to be applied to any type of risk without regard to 
industry or sector.114 
It is not merely the specifics of the risk management tools and analyses 
employed by ISO 31000 that made it the chosen standard, although the New 
Zealand experience provided ample support for my utilization of the standard in 
multiple domains.115 Rather, it is something far more foundational and relevant to 
balancing considerations: the definition of risk itself.  
                                            
111 A risk management standard is essentially a guide for how to approach managing risks 
systemically, and generally consists of a set of principles, a framework, and processes. Examples 
of more common standards include ISO 31000:2009; IRM/Alarm/AIRMIC 2002; ISO/IEC 
31010:2009; COSO 2004; and OCEG “Red Book” 2.0: 2009. Institute of Risk Management, “Risk 
Management Standards,” accessed June 26, 2015, https://www.theirm.org/knowledge-and-
resources/risk-management-standards/ 
112 International Organization for Standardization, ISO 31000:2009, Risk Management—
Principles and Guidelines (Geneva: International Organization for Standardization, 2009).  
113 Grant Purdy, “ISO 31000:2009—Setting a New Standard for Risk Management: 
Perspective,” Risk Analysis 30, no. 6 (2010): 881–886, doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01442.x.  
114 International Organization for Standardization, ISO 31000:2009; Matthew Leitch, “ISO 
31000:2009—The New International Standard on Risk Management,” Risk Analysis 30, no. 6 
(2010): 887–892.  
115 Current efforts by the SORM to adopt ISO 31000 as the risk management standard for the 




Risk is typically defined in terms of a downside, or as a hazard, a threat, or 
a vulnerability. This downside understanding of risk is especially apparent in the 
domain of homeland security. The Department of Homeland Security DHS Risk 
Lexicon defines risk as the “potential for an unwanted outcome [emphasis added] 
resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood 
and the associated consequences.”116 
The downside risks are relatively easy to understand in the disclosure of 
COOP information, which I have categorized in my work as three general types: 
primary, secondary, and opportunistic. I define them as follows:  
1. In primary disruption an actor obtains continuity information through 
open records requests at the federal and/or state levels, compiles 
relevant information regarding personnel, vulnerabilities, and 
contingencies, and initiates a causative event for disruption. 
2. In secondary disruption an actor obtains continuity information 
through open records requests at the federal and/or state levels 
and acts in response to an event (e.g., taking advantage of a 
natural disaster, or a non-affiliated, third-party attack). 
3. In opportunistic disruption an actor obtains continuity information 
through proactive publication by a government entity as a general 
transparency initiative, rather than a direct request, and that 
information is then used to incite, initiate, or exacerbate 
disruption.117 
However, understanding the plausible downside scenarios should not end 
the inquiry when seeking to balance secrecy and transparency tensions. There 
are dangers in a one-dimensional analysis based on downside concerns. The 
questions we ask and the solutions we design may be tacitly linked only to 
                                            
116 The DHS Risk Lexicon also includes an extended definition that defines risk as the 
“potential for an adverse outcome assessed as a function of threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences associated with an incident, event, or occurrence [emphasis added]” Department 
of Homeland Security, DHS Risk Lexicon, s.v. “risk,” 2010 edition.  
117 These categories describe the plausible scenarios that have framed my professional 
discussions and legislative testimony regarding COOP exposures, primarily during the 84th 
Legislative Session in Texas in 2015 but also dating to the passage of the original 2007 
legislation mandating that all Texas state agencies produce and maintain continuity plans. Texas 
Legislature Online, “S.B. No. 908, an Act.”  
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traditional risk management treatments, which deemphasizes innovative or 
generative solutions that may have upsides and ignores the underlying value of 
information disclosure.118 This type of binary consideration is especially apparent 
in the presumed secrecy/transparency dichotomy and the pendulum-like swing 
from secrecy to disclosure. 
Rather than traditional risk approaches, ISO Guide 73:2009 defines risk as 
the “effect of uncertainty on objectives [emphasis added].”119 Unlike that of DHS 
and other risk management definitions, the ISO definition is generalized and 
neutrally focused on uncertainty. While Leitch claims that the ISO definition of 
risk may be so broad as to be unclear, suggesting that a more mathematical 
precision should be striven for,120 Purdy counters that it is precisely this breadth 
that is necessary, explaining: 
The ISO 31000 definition of risk shifts emphasis from past 
preoccupations with the possibility of an event (something 
happens) to the possibility of an effect and, in particular, an effect 
on objectives. 
When risk is defined like this, it reveals more clearly that managing 
risk is, quite simply, a process of optimization that makes the 
achievement of objectives more likely. Risk treatment is then 
concerned with changing the magnitude and likelihood of 
consequences, both positive and negative, to achieve a net 
increase in benefit. Controls then are the outcomes of risk 
treatment, whose purpose is to modify risk.121 
                                            
118 DHS defines enterprise risk management as a: “…comprehensive approach to risk 
management that engages organizational systems and processes together to improve the quality 
of decision making for managing risks that may hinder an organization’s ability to achieve its 
objectives.” This approach is consistent with DHS’s conceptualization of risk as something that 
“hinders” objectives, and identifies the purpose of risk management as making decisions that 
specifically address downsides. Texas Legislature Online, “S.B. No. 908, an Act.”  
119 International Organization for Standardization, ISO Guide 73, Risk Management—
Vocabulary (Geneva: International Organization for Standardization, 2009).  
120 Leitch, “ISO 31000:2009,” 887–892.  
121 Purdy, “ISO 31000:2009.”  
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Most government risk management policy is focused on events and 
circumstances that “are likely to bring the greatest harm.”122 This understanding 
of risk is not intended to concentrate efforts on upsides or opportunity or to focus 
on effects rather than events. In other words, we are only seeing one side of the 
story. 
3. Generativity 
To move beyond rhetoric and traditional antithetical balancing models 
between secrecy and transparency in government, I approached the balancing 
strategy first by reconsidering the nature of risk, including both positive and 
negative outcomes. The traditional risk management focus on the downside may 
be best described by what Barrett and Fry, building on the work of Cooperrider, 
call a “deficit discourse.”123 Deficit discourse focuses on the negative, and such 
an approach prevents us “from being creative, innovative, and collaborative in 
the corporate and social arenas that most need renewal or transformation.”124 
The authors claim that deficit discourse leads to the following potentially 
dysfunctional effects: 
1. Fragmentation (a reliance upon expertise, based on a primarily 
problem-solving mindset). 
2. Invisibility of possibility (hopelessness, or a focus on expediency 
versus opportunity). 
3. Self-fulfilling deficit prophesies (moving in the direction of the 
discourse). 
4. Over-dependence on experts and hierarchy (stifling new thought or 
creativity). 
                                            
122 Department of Homeland Security, Risk Management Fundamentals (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011).  
123 Frank Barrett and Ronald Fry, Appreciative Inquiry: A Positive Approach to Building 
Cooperative Capacity (Chagrin Falls, OH: Taos Institute, 2005), Kindle edition. The authors 
expanded upon David Cooperrider, “Appreciative Inquiry: A Methodology for Advancing Social 
Innovation” (PhD. Diss., Case Western, 1985).  
124 Barrett and Fry, Appreciative Inquiry, Kindle location, 262.  
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5. Exhaustion and visionless voice (focusing on problems creates 
stress and diminishes curiosity). 
6. Spirals of separation (blame).125 
In many ways, these effects seem to track what we commonly describe as 
bureaucracy. Instead, to avoid these pitfalls, Barrett and Fry recommend a 
generative process126 called appreciative inquiry in which the focus is “crafting 
questions that support a system’s capacity to apprehend, anticipate, and 
heighten positive potential.”127 Such an approach is necessitated in considering 
protective security because risk is not only the potential for a negative outcome 
but also an opportunity for a positive outcome.  
4. Solutions 
To address these issues, I proposed legal protections specifically for 
COOP that differ from other jurisdictions by utilizing a risk balanced framework 
that considers what specific information has a public benefit (positive effect) 
under the premise of transparent government, and what information has a 
component appropriate for withholding (negative effect) under protective security. 
The open records statutory implementation is framed as follows: 
Sec. 552.156. Exception: Confidentiality of Continuity of Operations 
Plan. (a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, the following 
information is excepted from disclosure under this chapter: 
(1) a continuity of operations plan developed under Section 
412.054, Labor Code; and 
(2) all records written, produced, collected, assembled, or 
maintained as part of the development or review of a continuity of 
operations plan developed under Section 412.054, Labor Code. 
                                            
125 Ibid., Kindle location 345–409.  
126 Gervase R. Bushe, “Generative Process, Generative Outcome: The Transformational 
Potential of Appreciative Inquiry,” in Organizational Generativity: The Appreciative Inquiry Summit 
and a Scholarship of Transformation (Advances in Appreciative Inquiry, Vol. 4), ed. David L. 
Cooperrider, Danielle P. Zandee, Lindsey N. Godwin, Michael Avital & B. Boland, 89–113 (Bingly, 
UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2013).  
127 Barrett and Fry, Appreciative Inquiry, Kindle location 446.  
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(b) Forms, standards, and other instructional, informational, or 
planning materials adopted by the office to provide guidance or 
assistance to a state agency in developing a continuity of 
operations plan under Section 412.054, Labor Code, are public 
information subject to disclosure under this chapter. 
(c) A governmental body may disclose or make available 
information that is confidential under this section to another 
governmental body or a federal agency. 
(d) Disclosing information to another governmental body or a 
federal agency under this section does not waive or affect the 
confidentiality of that information.128 
The risk balancing model results the entirety of the completed COOP plan 
and attendant records, in both development and review, wholly confidential 
(eliminating classification requirements for withholding). The exemption is defined 
with particularity and is unambiguous. This is specific exemption.129  
In turn, this protection of sensitive data is balanced by the requirement 
that forms, standards, and other instructional, informational, or planning materials 
used by the state remain in the public domain (eliminating redaction 
requirements for disclosure). It is further linked to oversight, reporting, and 
accountability requirements by the State Office of Risk Management. This is 
mediated transparency.130  
These two elements, form the basis for the secrecy/transparency risk 
balancing solution in Texas. The risk balancing model for arriving at these 
specific solutions proposed in the next chapter. 
                                            
128 Texas Legislature Online, “H. B. NO. 1832,” accessed July 24, 2016, 
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/84R/billtext/html/HB01832F.htm. As a related concern often 
raised in confidentiality considerations, but not directly applicable to the subject matter here, 
these provisions also address information sharing and confidentiality retention with state and 
federal partner entities.  
129 To further ensure specificity, in Texas the provision is included in both the open 
government law (Chap. 552, Texas Government Code) as a delineated exception, as well as 
included as a referential confidentiality provision in legislation applicable directly to the State 
Office of Risk Management (Chap. 412, Texas Labor Code). See Appendix B, § C. 
130 For an overview of mediated transparency, or transparency by proxy, see Hansen, 
Christensen, and Flyverbom, “Introduction,” 121–123.  
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V. APPLICATION: DESIGN AND RECOMMENDATION OF 
MODEL 
Problems are best solved not on the level where they appear to 
occur but on the next level above them. 
—David Hawkins131 
 
It may be expediently tempting to think of secrecy and transparency as 
opposites, or alternatively, to acknowledge any oppositional relationship as a sort 
of philosophical yin and yang. Yet, excepting the extremities of rhetoric, neither 
secrecy nor transparency can be so easily categorized. As described by Wing-
Tsit Chan: 
In simple terms, the [yin and yang] doctrine teaches that all things 
and events are products of two elements, forces, or principles: yin, 
which is negative, passive, weak, and destructive, and yang, which 
is positive, active, strong, and constructive.132 
Thus, we see in application of the preceding discussion that what we are 
balancing is not the singular or exclusionary values of the concepts of secrecy 
and transparency (which are each themselves complex admixtures), but rather 
the subset of the positive risk aspects or the opportunities of each.133 In 
                                            
131 According to Hawkins, “Problems are best solved by transcending them and looking at 
them from a higher viewpoint. At the higher level, the problems automatically resolve themselves 
because of that shift in point of view, or one might see there was no problem at all.” David R. 
Hawkins, Healing and Recovery (Sedona, AZ: Veritas Publishing, 2009), 176.  
132 The frequency of discussions of the yin/yang concept from individuals responding in 
conversation and correspondence regarding balancing considerations lends some brief 
discussion here, at minimum, to include and put the concept in context within the instant 
arguments. Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), 244. 
133 I argue that there is, in fact, a yin and yang to balance, but it is far deeper than the secrecy 
and transparency terms themselves. This is the purpose of portions of Chapter II in describing the 
polysemic constructs inherent in the terminology. While another area of study altogether, it is 
important here to also acknowledge as an underlying linguistic recognition that words are imbued 
with expanded meaning by their very use—they become symbols and metaphors, incorporating 
all manner of objectives and beliefs. Karl E. Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995); Dvora Yanow Constructing Race and Ethnicity (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2003).  
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summary, this is the foundation of the model that follows: through an application 
of a new definition of risk and the technique of risk balancing, it is possible to 
move perceived opposition from between the concepts to between the 
anticipatory effects of those concepts and to create a mechanism for the 
unambiguous expression of a balancing theory.  
A. RISK BALANCING MODEL DESIGN 
As applied to balancing secrecy (distinguished here as a mechanism for 
the effect/outcome of security) and transparency (distinguished here as a 
mechanism for the effect/outcome of accountability), as well as building on the 
inherent structure of ISO 31000 and other standards, there are four aspects of 
the risk balancing model proposed: principles, framework, process, and 
outcomes. 
1. Principles 
The principles are basic characteristics of a system and the foundation 
from which the rest of a model is built, like the roots of a tree. Incorporated in the 
risk balancing model proposed here is an adoption by reference of the 11 general 
risk management principles underlying the ISO 31000 standard: 
1. Risk management creates and protects value.  
2. Risk management is an integral part of all organizational 
processes. 
3. Risk management is part of decision making.  
4. Risk management explicitly addresses uncertainty.  
5. Risk management is systematic, structured, and timely. 
6. Risk management is based on the best available information.  
7. Risk management is tailored.  
8. Risk management takes human and cultural factors into account.  
9. Risk management is transparent and inclusive.  
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10. Risk management is dynamic, iterative, and responsive to change.  
11. Risk management facilitates continual improvement of the 
organization.134 
By expanding the application of risk management approaches to 
balancing considerations in secrecy and transparency objectives between 
complex intersections of multiple organizations—as constituencies135—the 
proposed model incorporates one additional principle: risk management reduces 
uncertainty by maximizing positive outcomes. 
In this way, the existing ISO 31000 framework and processes may be 
used to expand to balancing considerations between multiple groups on a wide 
array of larger political, social, philosophical, and practical issues, including 
continuity of operations planning and the secrecy/transparency tension. This 
principle supports three key elements of the overall balancing model discussed 
herein: reducing ambiguity, emphasizing generative solution thinking, and 
expanding toward a broader focus of protective security for continuity of 
operations planning. 
2. Framework 
The framework is the general structure of a system and supporting body of 
the whole, like the bole of a tree. In considering the balancing of secrecy and 
transparency of government continuity plans, applying a risk management 
framework allows for the use of a wealth of risk identification and evaluation tools 
and techniques available in the domain,136 and it provides for consistent and 
repeatable techniques for balancing considerations across jurisdictions (and 
                                            
134 International Organization for Standardization, ISO 31000:2009. 
135 Rather than risk management focusing solely on the implementing entity, this model 
expands the principles to incorporate consideration of constituencies, including but not limited to 
government as a whole, individual agencies, partners, legislators, the public, and experts and 
advocates in the range of security and transparency domains. 
136 A few of those techniques of potential benefit include strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analyses; heat mapping; and a multitude of other approaches 
and variants well outside the scope of the instant focus. See, generally, David Vose, Risk 
Analysis: A Quantitative Guide (Trenton, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008).  
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specific applications). The ISO 31000 standard, with its expanded definition of 
risk, allows for the balancing of both positive and negative effects of considered 
treatments, and it is ideal for this application. While the intent of this thesis is not 
to incorporate a full analysis and description of the ISO 31000 framework itself, in 
summary, it includes five elements: 
1. Mandate and commitment. 
2. Design of framework for managing risk. 
3. Implementing risk management. 
4. Monitoring and review of the framework.  
5. Continual improvement of the framework.137 
In essence, the framework describes the interrelationships between risk 
management activities as a cyclical and ongoing process of iteration and mutual 
interdependency. This framework ensures continual attention, and therefore 
responsiveness to changing circumstance, rather than relying upon static 
analysis and decision making.138 Such an approach is especially relevant in 
considering the potential responsiveness of any proposed risk balancing model 
to changing social and political conditions, including the possibility of both 
deliberate acts (such as terrorist attacks, sabotage/espionage, targeted 
disruptions) and non-deliberate events (such as natural disasters, climate-related 
effects, social expectations, economic and political repercussions).  
3. Process 
Processes are the actions within a system, moving outward and through 
one another like the multiple branches of a tree. As with principles and 
framework, building upon the ISO 31000 model begins with a description of the 
general risk management process: 
                                            
137 International Organization for Standardization, ISO 31000:2009. 
138 Aftergood, “Reducing Government Secrecy.”  
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1. Communication and consultation. 
2. Establishing the context. 
3. Risk assessment (consisting of risk identification, risk analysis, and 
risk evaluation). 
4. Risk treatment. 
5. Monitoring and review.139 
This process system, like the framework discussed above, is cyclical and 
an ongoing process of iteration and mutual interdependency. The process is 
arguably sufficiently flexible to accommodate the balancing analysis proposed, 
but to be specific to the additional principle included above, the risk treatment 
options (discussed below) would also then include the potential for risk 
balancing.  
Under an expanded definition of risk, not limited to events or to threats, 
hazards, perils, or vulnerabilities, the available distinct risk treatments are already 
significantly expanded within ISO 31000. Traditional risk treatment options 
typically include only four main risk treatments, described by Dorfman as 
avoidance, mitigation (“controlling” in DHS terms), transfer, and/or retention 
(“accepting” in DHS terms).140 As described by the ISO standard, those options 
are substantially extended to include: 
1. Avoiding the risk by deciding not to start or continue with the activity 
that gives rise to the risk. 
2. Taking or increasing the risk in order to pursue an opportunity. 
3. Removing the risk source. 
4. Changing the likelihood. 
5. Changing the consequences. 
                                            
139 International Organization for Standardization, ISO 31000:2009. 
140 See Mark S. Dorfman, Introduction to Risk Management and Insurance (9th ed.) 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2007).  
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6. Sharing the risk with another party or parties (including contracts 
and risk financing). 
7. Retaining the risk by informed decision.141 
The proposed model would further expand this treatment set, then, by including 
an additional risk treatment option of balancing risk to maximize positive effect.   
4. Outcomes 
The outcomes are the results of a system, both culminating and recursive 
as essential to sustaining the system as a whole, like the leaves of a tree. There 
are multiple levels of outcome in the proposed model from the macro to the 
granular. First, the model supports and relies upon an inclusive generative 
approach through appreciative inquiry for determining aspirational end states 
(positive potential), based on a redefinition of risk as a being both positive and 
negative effect. Second, the model supports a consideration of protective 
security as a concept for the balancing of secrecy and transparency through the 
application of a risk management framework. Third, the model allows for 
procedural solutions that, when taken together, provide a viable risk balancing 
treatment. Specific to the analysis of balancing secrecy and transparency in 
continuity of operations plans in Texas, those solutions are specific exemption 
and mediated transparency.  
As described here, specific exemption provides precise and unambiguous 
protection of continuity of operations plans via statutory exception. Whether built 
in to open records statutes as a direct exclusion, or in other law as a referential 
exception, specific exemption addresses the constructs outlined in Chapter II. It 
does so by acknowledging the existence of the information, negating vagueness 
and uncertainty respecting classification or redaction, and increasing 
completeness and viability of continuity plans through confidence in the 
confidentiality of included sensitive information. In addition, mediated 
transparency supports these security-based goals and increases opportunity for 
                                            
141 International Organization for Standardization, ISO 31000:2009.  
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public knowledge and confidence. It does so by ensuring that a third party is 
auditing and substantiating the appropriateness and completeness of 
government resiliency efforts in continuity planning as a representative of the 
broader body public. This approach requires reporting to that public both the 
standards upon which validation determinations are made (expectations), as well 
as the actual compliance and performance of government actors (accountability). 
B. BENEFITS OF THE MODEL 
Taken together, the application of the principles, framework, processes, 
and outcomes of the proposed model therefore result in a protective security 
approach that balances secrecy and transparency by ensuring that two primary 
goals of those concepts, security and accountability, are simultaneously 
achieved, while also resulting in efficiency and increased efficacy. Thus, positive 
effect is ideally maximized, while negative risk is reduced, for all constituencies, 
using a risk balancing approach targeted to achieve that specific result. The three 
most important benefits identified here are uniformity, dynamism, and 
extendibility.  
(1) Uniformity 
Among other positive attributes, the benefits of any standardization are 
quality and repeatability.142 Specifically in the domain of sensitive information 
withholding and disclosure, the ambiguity and variances between jurisdictional 
implementations and bases advocates strongly for a uniform approach that can 
be applied objectively and consistently, in particular with regard to the much 
larger societal and political expectations of secrecy and transparency. This 
approach itself can meet certain aims of transparency in enhancing public trust. 
                                            
142 For other business, consumer, and government benefits of standardization, see generally 
International Organization for Standardization, “Benefits of International Standards,” accessed 
September 2, 2016, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/benefitsofstandards.htm.  
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(2) Dynamism 
The risk management methods advocated herein are designed to be agile 
and responsive, and this means that current environment monitoring and 
constant feedback are the hallmarks of a system of risk identification, analysis, 
evaluation, and treatment. It necessarily also means that the proposed outputs 
are not prescribed. As a result, the model can be applied across multiple 
domains and jurisdictional realities, facilitating tailored solutions to the specifics 
of the environment in which it is applied. 
(3) Extendibility 
The proposed model is not constrained by its construction solely to the 
secrecy and transparency balancing consideration or COOP. While outside the 
delimited scope of the analysis and application, this model, like ISO 31000, is 
designed to be scalable and extendable. Thus, other balancing considerations in 
other domains may also be addressed utilizing the model. In any domain where 
multiple positive outcomes are present, oppositeness may be more properly 
understood as opposition. Unlike antithesis, this latter state may be resolved 
through balancing. This includes but is not limited to concerns as varied and 
specific as policy, legislation, economics, and funding.143  
C. RECOMMENDATION 
Based on the research herein and the author’s experience in Texas, this 
thesis recommends that federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local governments 
refocus considerations of secrecy and transparency through a protective security 
approach and a uniform risk balancing model. By implementing this 
recommendation and utilizing the proposed model, subject to appropriate 
modifications respecting existing jurisdictional law, I argue that government 
                                            
143 One readily accessible example might be the DHS/FEMA threat and hazard identification 
and risk assessment (THIRA) process, wherein significant funding determinations may be made 
with notable emphasis on downside (negative) risks. See Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, “Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment,” accessed August 26, 2016, 
https://www.fema.gov/threat-and-hazard-identification-and-risk-assessment.  
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should be able to strike an appropriate balance between providing detailed public 
information, while also protecting sensitive information contained in continuity 
plans.  
I do not argue that the specifics of the Texas implementation in Chapter IV 
are the best practice or the most complete implementation available, nor that it 
should be replicated in other jurisdictions without full analysis and application of 
the matters identified here. While statutory exemption and mediated 
transparency are the outputs from my own analysis and application of the model, 
the model itself does not prescribe this specific solution. The outputs of the 
model are dependent upon inquiry. The generative process and engagement of 
the model allows for other viable solutions to be identified, appropriate to the 
circumstances and environment already in place in other jurisdictions. Wholesale 
change of entire government structures is not required for implementation of this 
model but a change in thinking is. 
Thus, it is the model used for this calculus that is the focus of these 
recommendations. As amended, the risk management structures and practices 
outlined in ISO 31000 should be strongly considered in the United States at the 
federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial levels to address the inherent tension 
between secrecy and transparency theory in the modern democratic application. 
In addition, absent specific protection under existing law, they should protect the 
vulnerabilities, sensitivities, strategies, personnel, and resources needed to 








I have argued that by understanding the fundamental constructs, and thus 
the relevant objectives, of secrecy and transparency, it is possible to formulate a 
targeted solution to the issue of confidentiality and disclosure of continuity of 
operations plans by using a consistent and flexible risk management model. As 
noted, there is very little specific academic research on the specific issue of 
balancing secrecy and transparency of continuity of operations plans, and the 
thesis is necessarily targeted to the purpose of generating a beginning point for 
the discussion of possible approaches, to provide an example of use, and to 
finding objective replicable bases for that balancing. This is the proposed model.  
In designing and proposing this model I have addressed how balancing 
secrecy and transparency in continuity planning may be achieved. In doing so, 
my focus here is thus constrained. However, I would be remiss if I did not 
acknowledge my deeper reasons for doing so. In closing, I return to a necessary 
component of that analysis: why. 
Beyond the evident calculus of analysis to practical application, my 
broader intentions in producing this thesis, despite the necessary limitations 
identified at the outset, are threefold:  
• First, to encourage further scholarship related to the use of 
expanded risk management techniques in problem-solving for 
significant national and homeland security matters;  
• Second, to advance the boundaries and challenges for the general 
discipline of risk management; and  
• Third, to contribute to ensuring both ongoing security and the 
advancement of freedoms and self-determination in the United 
States. 
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It is to this last point that I devote these final words. In advocating for a 
balancing method that produces the most possible positive outcomes for the 
broadest constituencies, I am not concerned only with secrecy or with 
transparency, but also for what those concepts ultimately represent in this 
country.  
The theory of our political system is that the ultimate sovereignty is 
in the people, from whom springs all legitimate authority. 
—Thomas Cooley144 
As I framed the tension at the outset, we are justified in the assumption of 
the necessity of controlling certain types of information for the security of the 
state and safety of the people. We are equally justified in the expectation that 
despotism, corruption, and collusion of and by state actors must be countered 
through oversight of the public as the ultimate sovereign. Yet, making 
government open and accessible need not come at the expense of reasonable 
and adequate protective security mechanisms, nor should protectionism or fear 
outweigh the role of the people in a vital American democracy.145  
It has been a guiding principle behind this analysis that balance is not only 
advisable, it is required and essential. It is that very balancing that constitutes our 
political and social experiment writ large. The inherent tensions between 
oppositional forces are not meant to be removed, nor should they be. To do so, 
on either account, achieves only tyranny in the guise of expediency. It is in the 
balancing that tension becomes tensile strength. It is my final hope that this 
thesis contributes, in some small part, to that strength. 
                                            
144 Thomas M. Cooley, “Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest upon the 
Legislative Power of the States of the American Union…#28,” 1908, https://books.google.com/
books?id=nRUTAAAAYAAJ, 28.  
145 As Aftergood succinctly observes, “The alternative to indiscriminate secrecy is not 
indiscriminate openness.” Nor, obviously, its converse. Aftergood, “Reducing Government 
Secrecy,” 415.  
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APPENDIX A. SAMPLING OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL 
LAWS RESPECTING CONTINUITY PLANNING AND OPEN 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
The research notes here are a sampling of information from other states 
and territories with regard to continuity of operations requirements and applicable 
open government statutes. This information is provided as context for 
understanding the complexity and differentiation of jurisdictional applications, and 
is not represented here as conclusive or complete. Where appropriate, statutory 
references and links are provided within the note summaries. 
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State or Territory 
COOP Agency Link 
COOP or Closely Analogous 
Statute 
Confidentiality Statute for COOP or 







No statutorily-required COOP 
plans found for state 
government as a whole. Code 
of AL. § 29–3-1 re: continuity 
of operation of the legislature 
via Emergency Interim 
Succession Act.  
Alabama Dept. Public Health 
and AEMA Joint Memo to All 









State of Alabama Emergency 
Operations Plan:  
http://ema.alabama.gov/
filelibrary/Alabama_EOP.pdf 
Alabama State Hazard 





Preparedness Flu and All-
Article 3 Inspection and Copying of 
Records, Code of Ala. § 36–12-40. 
Citizens’ rights—Exceptions. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, records 
concerning security plans, procedures, 
assessments, measures, or systems, 
and any other records relating to, or 
having an impact upon, the security or 
safety of persons, structures, facilities, 
or other infrastructures, including without 
limitation information concerning critical 
infrastructure (as defined at 42 U.S.C.S. 
§ 5195c(e) as amended) and critical 
energy infrastructure information (as 
defined at 18 C.F.R. § 388.113(c)(1) as 
amended), the public disclosure of 
which could reasonably be expected to 
be detrimental to the public safety or 
welfare, and records the disclosure of 
which would otherwise be detrimental to 
the best interests of the public shall be 
exempted from this section. 
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State or Territory 
COOP Agency Link 
COOP or Closely Analogous 
Statute 
Confidentiality Statute for COOP or 
Closely Analogous Statute Comments/Continuations 
Hazard Emergency Memo of 
4/10/2009 from Ala. governor 
Directs all state entities to use 
FEMA Circular 1 as guidance 






Alaska Stat. § 44.99.007 
Emergency transfer of seat of 
government Alaska Stat. § 
26.20.025 Creation and duties 
of the Alaska division of 
homeland security and 
emergency management.  
A § 26.23.040. Homeland 
security duties of the Alaska 
div of homeland security and 
emergency management (a) 
The Alaska division of 
homeland security and 
emergency management shall 
prepare and maintain a state 
emergency plan and keep it 
current. The plan may include 
provisions for (5) 
recommendations for (C) 
other preventive and 
preparedness measures 
designed to eliminate or 
reduce disasters or their 
impact; (10) coordination of 
Alaska Stat. § 40.25.120 Public records; 
exceptions; certified copies: exception 
(10) records or information pertaining to 
a plan, program, or procedures for 
establishing, maintaining, or restoring 
security in the state, or to a detailed 
description or evaluation of systems, 
facilities, or infrastructure in the state, 
but only to the extent that the production 
of the records or information (A) could 
reasonably be expected to interfere with 
the implementation or enforcement of 
the security plan, program, or 
procedures; (B) would disclose 
confidential guidelines for investigations 
or enforcement and the disclosure could 
reasonably be expected to risk 
circumvention of the law; or (C) could 
reasonably be expected to endanger the 
life or physical safety of an individual or 
to present a real and substantial risk to 
the public health and welfare; 
§. 26.23.040 (con’t) (7) establish a 
register of persons with types of 
training and skills important in 
disaster prevention, preparedness, 
response, and recovery; 
(8) prepare, for issuance by the 
governor, orders, proclamations, and 
regulations as necessary or 
appropriate in coping with disasters; 
(9) cooperate with the federal 
government and any public or 
private agency or entity in achieving 
any purpose of this chapter and in 
implementing programs for disaster 
prevention, preparedness, response, 
and recovery; 
§ 26.23.040 § 44.99.007. 
Emergency transfer of seat of 
government When, due to an 
emergency resulting from the effects 
of enemy attack or an imminent 
enemy attack, it becomes imprudent, 
inexpedient, or impossible to 
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State or Territory 
COOP Agency Link 
COOP or Closely Analogous 
Statute 
Confidentiality Statute for COOP or 
Closely Analogous Statute Comments/Continuations 
the state emergency plan with 
the disaster plans of the 
federal government; (11) other 
matters necessary to carry out 
the purposes of this chapter. 
(d) The state emergency plan 
or any part of it may be 
incorporated in regulations or 
orders of the Alaska division 
of homeland security and 
emergency management. 
Regulations and orders of the 
Alaska division of homeland 
security and emergency 
management have the force 
and effect of law. (e) The 
Alaska division of homeland 
security and emergency 
management shall (6) plan 
and make arrangements for 
the availability and use of any 
private facilities, services, and 
property and, if necessary and 
if in fact used, provide for 
payment for use under terms 
and conditions agreed upon 
by the parties; (con’t in 
comments) 
conduct the affairs of state 
government at the normal location of 
the state capital, the governor shall, 
as often as the exigencies of the 
situation require, declare by 
proclamation an emergency 
temporary location(s) for the seat of 
government at a place or places, 
inside or outside the state, that 
would not normally be considered 
military target sites and that the 
governor may consider advisable 
under the circumstances. The 
governor shall take such action and 
issue such orders as may be 
necessary for an orderly transition to 
the emergency temp location or 
locations. The temp location or 
locations shall remain the 
emergency seat of government until 
the emergency is declared to be 
ended by the governor and the seat 
of government is returned to its 
normal location. 
Alaska Division of Homeland 
Security and Emergency 
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Arizona  
https://azcoop.gov/ 
Under Arizona (AZ) Executive 
Order 2013–06 Continuity of 
Operations and Continuity of 
Government Planning, each 
state agency is required to 





Arizona State (A.R.S.) 
Constitution. Art. IV, Pt. 2, § 
25; A.R.S. § 38–381 et seq re: 
county and state legislative 
operation only. 




§ 25. Continuity of 
governmental operations in 
emergency 
§ 25. The legislature, in order 
to insure continuity of State 
and local governmental 
operations in periods of 
emergency resulting from 
disasters caused by enemy 
attack, shall have the power 
A.R.S. §39-121 et seq. AZ public 
records statutes. §39-126. Federal risk 
assessments of infrastructure; 
confidentiality: Nothing in this chapter 
requires the disclosure of a risk 
assessment that is performed by or on 
behalf of a federal agency to evaluate 
critical energy, water or 
telecommunications infrastructure to 
determine its vulnerability to sabotage or 
attack. §41-4255. [AZ DHS’s security 
allocation and expenditure legislative 
and governor’s] report: “The department 
may redact sensitive information 
contained in the report if necessary” 
[from copy of AZ DHS’s copy of this 
report provided to AZ secretary of state].  
A.R.S. §41-1801 Definitions for critical 
infrastructure and related info which 
includes emergency response plans.  
§41-4273. Reporting requirements; 
confidentiality for fuel facilities. 
 
A.R.S. Chapter 41 AZ Dept. of 
Homeland Security, § 41–4254. 
Department duties: The department 
shall: 8. Conduct preparedness 
training exercises to put state 
disaster plans into practice and 
identify shortcomings in the plans. 9. 
Assist in the development of regional 
response plans, including 
collaborative efforts with other 
states. 10. Partner with and involve 
the private sector in preparedness 




“We assist agencies in developing 
and maintaining their COOP 
program using a FEMA guidance 
compliant COOP planning and 
review process. As part of the 
process the Continuity of Operations 
Planning Program staff will provide 
updates and will periodically review 
state agencies’ COOP plans to 
ensure they are current, effective 
and responsive in maintaining 
organizational readiness.” 
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and the immediate duty to: 
1. Provide for prompt and 
temporary succession to the 
powers and duties of public 
offices, of whatever nature 
and whether filled by election 
or appointment, the 
incumbents of which may 
become unavailable for 
carrying on the powers and 
duties of such offices. 
2. Adopt such other measures 
as may be necessary and 
proper for insuring the 
continuity of governmental 
operations. 
In the exercise of the powers 
hereby conferred, the 
legislature shall in all respects 
conform to the requirements 
of this constitution except to 
the extent that in the judgment 
of the legislature so to do 
would be impracticable or 






A.C.A. § 21–1-302 (2015) 
Legislative intent re:  
Additional officers who can 
exercise the powers and 
discharge the duties of 
governor; Emergency interim 
A.C.A. § 25–19-101 et seq. AR FIOA. 
A.C.A. § 25–19-105 Examination and 
copying of public records only exempts 
risk and vulnerability/security 
assessments and emergency response 
and recovery records for Ark Dept. 
The AR COOP program home page 




COOP for Arkansas link: 
65 
State or Territory 
COOP Agency Link 
COOP or Closely Analogous 
Statute 
Confidentiality Statute for COOP or 
Closely Analogous Statute Comments/Continuations 
succession to state and 
political subdivisions 
government offices; special 
emergency judges 
§ 25–4-105. Department of 
Information Systems—
General powers and duties 
include Implementing systems 
to ensure the security of state 
data and state data 
processing assets, to provide 
for disaster recovery and 
continuity of operations to the 
state agencies served. 
 
Human Services (b) (17) and water 
utilities (b)(18). § 25–19-103 Definitions: 
(9) “Vulnerability assessment” means an 
assessment of the vulnerability of a 
public water system to a terrorist attack 
or other intentional acts intended to 
substantially disrupt the ability of the 
public water system to provide a safe 
and reliable supply of drinking water as 
required by the Public Health Security 
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 














CA Gov Code § 8560. 
“Emergency plans;’ “State 
Emergency Plan” include 
COOP/CA Gov Code § 8609: 
may use volunteers in 
emergency plan 
implementation 
CA Gov Code § 6254 Records exempt 
from disclosure requirements including: 
(aa) A document prepared by or for a 
state or local agency that assesses its 
vulnerability to terrorist attack or other 
criminal acts intended to disrupt the 
public agency’s operations and that is 
for distribution or consideration in a 
closed session; (ab) Critical 
infrastructure information, as defined in 
§ 131(3) of Title 6 of the United States 
Code, that is voluntarily submitted to the 
California Emergency Management 
Agency for use by that office, including 
the identity of the person who or entity 
that voluntarily submitted the 
Continuity Planning Guidance (2015) 













Continuity planning publication 
66 
State or Territory 
COOP Agency Link 
COOP or Closely Analogous 
Statute 
Confidentiality Statute for COOP or 











C.R.S. § 24–33.5-1609 
requires Colorado DPS to 
adopt rules for state agency 
development of COOPs using 
FEMA circulars 65, 66, and 67 
as guidelines. C.R.S. § 24–
33.5-704 requires each dept. 
that admins a publicly-funded 
safety net program to develop 
a COOP. Colorado DPS 
COOP rules: 8 CCR 1507–40 
& 41. 8 CCR 1507–40. 
Continuity of State 
Government Operations.  
 
Authority to promulgate rules 
and regulations 
The Div. of Homeland 
Security and Emergency 
Management (DSHEM) is 
authorized by the provisions 
of § 24–33.5-1609, C.R.S., to 
adopt rules and regulations for 
the continuity of state 
government operations to 
provide guidance to state 
C.R.S. 24–72-204 Allowance or denial 
of inspection—grounds—procedure—
appeal—definitions 
(2) (a) (VIII) (A) The custodian may deny 
the right of inspection of the following 
records, unless otherwise provided by 
law, on the ground that disclosure to the 
applicant would be contrary to the public 
interest: “Specialized details of security 
arrangements.” Note: “security 
arrangements” is not defined under the 
§ 24–72-202. entitled Definitions. 
§ 24–33.5-1604. Duties and powers of 
the division [Division of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management] 
(II) The terrorism preparedness plans 
constitute specialized details of security 
arrangements for purposes of § 24–72-
204 (2) (a) (VIII). 
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departments and agencies in 
developing viable and 
executable contingency plans 
for continuity of operations. In 
adopting such rules and 
regulations the director shall 
use as general guidelines the 
plans published by the FEMA, 
and in the rules promulgated 
thereunder. 
Purpose 
A. These rules and 
regulations provide for the 
creation and adoption of the 
planning guidance necessary 
for state agencies to use in 
developing viable and 
executable continuity of 







CT. Constitution. Art. XI., Sec. 
3 (2011) § 3: In order to insure 
continuity in operation of state 
and local governments in a 
period of emergency resulting 
from disaster caused by 
enemy attack, the general 
assembly shall provide by law 
for the prompt and temporary 
succession to the powers and 
duties of all public offices, the 
incumbents of which may 
become unavailable for 
Conn. Ann. Statutes FIOA Title 1, 
Chapter 14. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1–210 
Access to public records. Exempt 
records. (b) Nothing in the FIOA shall... 
require disclosure of:(19) Records when 
there are reasonable grounds to believe 
disclosure may result in a safety risk, 
including the risk of harm to any person, 
any government-owned or leased 
institution or facility or any fixture or 
appurtenance and equipment attached 
to, or contained in, such institution or 
facility, except that such records shall be 
(con’t) (C) by the executive director 
of the Joint Committee on Legislative 
Management, with respect to 
records concerning the Legislative 
Department. As used in this section, 
“government-owned or leased 
institution or facility” includes, but is 
not limited to, an institution or facility 
owned or leased by a public service 
company, as defined in § 16–1, a 
certified telecommunications 
provider, as defined in § 16–1, a 
water company, as defined in § 25–
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carrying on their powers and 
duties. https://www.cga.ct.gov/
asp/Content/constitutions/
CTConstitution.htm Title 28 of 
the General Statutes of 
Connecticut entitled Civil 
preparedness and emergency 
services contains emergency 
management statutes but 
there is no mention of 
“continuity.” 
disclosed to a law enforcement agency 
upon the request of the law enforcement 
agency. Such reasonable grounds shall 
be determined (A) (i) by the 
commissioner of administrative services, 
after consultation with the chief 
executive officer of an executive branch 
state agency, with respect to records 
concerning such agency; and (ii) by the 
commissioner of emergency services 
and public protection, after consultation 
with the chief executive officer of a 
municipal, district or regional agency, 
with respect to records concerning such 
agency; (B) by the chief court 
administrator with respect to records 
concerning the Judicial Department; and 
(con’t in comments) 
 
32a, or a municipal utility that 
furnishes electric, gas or water 
service, but does not include an 
institution or facility owned or leased 
by the federal government, and 
“chief executive officer” includes, but 
is not limited to, an agency head, 
department head, executive director 
or chief executive officer. Such 
records include, but are not limited 
to: (i) Security manuals or reports; 
(viii)  
Emergency plans and emergency 
preparedness, response, recovery 
and mitigation plans, including plans 
provided by a person to a state 
agency or a local emergency 
management agency or official; and 
State Agency All Hazards Continuity 
of Operations Plan (COOP) 
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Del. Constitution. art XVII, § 1 
(2015) 
§ 1. Continuity of state and 
local governmental operations 
in periods of emergency 
resulting from disasters 
caused by enemy attack 
§ 1. The General Assembly, in 
order to insure continuity of 
state and local governmental 
operations in periods of 
emergency resulting from 
disasters caused by enemy 
attack, shall have the power 
and the immediate duty (1) to 
provide for prompt and 
temporary succession to the 
powers and duties of public 
offices whose succession is 
not otherwise provided for in 
this constitution, of whatever 
nature and whether filled by 
election or appointment, the 
incumbents of which may 
become unavailable for 
carrying on the powers and 
duties of such offices, and (2) 
to adopt such other measures 
as may be necessary and 
proper for insuring the 
continuity of governmental 
operations. In the exercise of 
Title 29, CH 100 Delaware Freedom of 
Info Act. Del. 29 Del. C. § 10002. 
Definitions (l) “Public record” is 
information of any kind. For purposes of 
this chapter, the following records shall 
not be deemed public: a. The following 
records, which, if copied or inspected, 
could jeopardize the security of any 
structure owned by the state or any of its 
pol subdivisions, or could facilitate the 
planning of a terrorist attack, or could 
endanger the life or physical safety of an 
individual: 1. Response procedures or 
plans prepared to prevent or respond to 
emergency situations, the disclosure of 
which would reveal vulnerability 
assessments, specific tactics, specific 
emergency procedures or specific 
security procedures. 4. Records 
prepared to prevent or respond to 
emergency situations identifying or 
describing the name, location, 
pharmaceutical cache, contents, 
capacity, equipment, physical features 
or capabilities of individual medical 
facilities, storage facilities, or 
laboratories established, maintained or 
regulated by the state or any of its pol 
subdivisions. 
 
Ex Ord Nos 199 DEGR 1, June 2013 
& 157 DEGR 1, December 2009: 6. 
That each executive department or 
agency shall develop plans to 
ensure continuity of operations 
during times of emergency, 
consistent with the requirements in 
the Plan or as may be promulgated 
by the Secretary through the 
Delaware Emergency Management 
Agency to ensure its ability to carry 
out essential government functions 
in the aftermath of a disaster or 
emergency. Title 29 § 7701. re: 
emergency relocation of 
government; 5. Those portions of 
records assembled, prepared or 
maintained to prevent, mitigate or 
respond to criminal acts, the public 
disclosure of which would have a 
substantial likelihood of threatening 
public safety. 
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the powers hereby conferred 
the general assembly shall in 
all respects conform to the 
requirements of this 
constitution except to the 
extent that in the judgment of 
the general assembly so to do 
would be impracticable or 






Fla. Stat. § 252.365 requires 
each agency have “a 
comprehensive and effective 
program to ensure continuity 
of essential state functions 
under all circumstances.” Title 
IV. Fla. Stat. Chapter 22 
Emergency Continuity of 
Government. Provides for 
emergency interim state and 
local government successors 
and judges only after an 
attack on the US. Office” 
includes all state and local 
offices. Fla. Constitution. Art. 
II, § 6 (2015) § 6. Enemy 
attack. In periods of 
emergency resulting from 
enemy attack the legislature 
shall have power to provide 
for prompt and temporary 
succession to the powers and 
duties of all public offices the 
incumbents of which may 
Fla. Stat. § 252.905 (2015) Title XVII 
§ 252.905. Emergency planning 
information; public records exemption. 
[Repealed October 2, 2019] 
(1) Any information furnished by a 
person or a business to the division for 
the purpose of being provided 
assistance with emergency planning is 
exempt from § 119.07(1) and § 24(a), 
Art. I of the state constitution.  
This exemption applies to information 
held by the division before, on, or after 
the effective date of this exemption. 
(2) This section is subject to the Open 
Government Sunset Review Act in 
accordance with s. 119.15, and shall 
stand repealed on October 2, 2019, 
unless reviewed and saved from repeal 
through reenactment by the legislature.  
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/
index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&
Fla. Stat. § 110.171: Telework may 
also be used as part of an agency’s 
continuity of operations plan where 
appropriate. Fla. Jud. Cir. Admin 
Ords, i.e., 15th Cir AO 2.205-6/09 In 
Re: Court Disaster and Emergency 
Procedures “Contemporaneous with 
the implementation of this order, the 
Court shall activate its Continuity of 
Operations Plan (‘COOP’).” 2nd and 
6th Jud Dist. also have similar 
COOP Admin Ords. Note that the 
term “person” is not defined within 
Part II containing § 252.905 
pertaining to Emergency Planning 
and Community Right to Know. 
However, “person” is defined in part 
IV pertaining to Accidental Release 
Prevention and Risk Management 
Planning as: “252.936 Definitions. As 
used in this part, the term:(11) 
“Person” means an individual, 
corporation, partnership, association, 
state or any agency or institution 
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become unavailable to 
execute the functions of their 
offices, and to adopt such 
other measures as may be 
necessary and appropriate to 
insure the continuity of 
governmental operations 
during the emergency. In 
exercising these powers, the 
legislature may depart from 
other requirements of this 
constitution, but only to the 




thereof, municipality, political 
subdivision of the state, and any 
agency, department, or 
instrumentality of the United States, 
and any officer, agent, or employee 
thereof, and, for the purposes of s. 






Ga. Constitution. Art. III, § VI, 
Para. II (2015) (a) Without 
limitation of the powers 
granted under Paragraph I, 
the General Assembly shall 
have the power to provide by 
law for: (4) The continuity of 
state and local governments 
in periods of emergency 
resulting from disasters 
caused by enemy attack 
including but not limited to the 
suspension of all 
constitutional legislative rules 
during such emergency. 
O.C.G.A. § 38–3-52: all official 
acts required by law to be 
performed by any officer or 
agency are valid in an 
O.C.G.A. § 50–18-72 entitled “When 
Public Disclosure Not Required” does 
not specifically include COOP-type 
nondisclosure provision. However, 
COOP plans may be included under the 
following: (25) (A) Records the 
disclosure of which would compromise 
security against sabotage or criminal or 
terrorist acts and the nondisclosure of 
which is necessary for the protection of 
life, safety, or public property, which 
shall be limited to the following: 
(i) Security plans and vulnerability 
assessments for any public utility, 
technology infrastructure, building, 
facility, function, or activity in effect at 
the time of the request for disclosure or 
pertaining to a plan or assessment in 
(Con’t) (iv) Any plan, blueprint, or 
other material which if made public 
could compromise security against 
sabotage, criminal, or terroristic acts; 
and 
(v) Records of any government 
sponsored programs concerning 
training relative to governmental 
security measures which would 
identify persons being trained or 
instructors or would reveal 
information described in divisions (i) 
through (iv) of this subparagraph. 
(C) As used in division (i) of 
subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, 
the term “activity” means deployment 
or surveillance strategies, actions 
mandated by changes in the federal 
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emergency (include manmade 
or natural causes or enemy 
attack) while at a temporary 
location or locations for the 
seat of government. Georgia 
Continuity of Government 






effect at such time; 
(ii) Any plan for protection against 
terrorist or other attacks that depends 
for its effectiveness in whole or in part 
upon a lack of general public knowledge 
of its details; (Con’t in comments) 
threat level, motorcades, 
contingency plans, proposed or 
alternative motorcade routes, 
executive and dignitary protection, 
planned responses to criminal or 
terrorist actions, after-action reports 
still in use, proposed or actual plans 
and responses to bioterrorism.  
Link to Georgia Emergency 








HRS § 127A-12 Emergency 
management powers, in 
general (b) The governor may 
exercise the following powers 
pertaining to emergency 
management: (16) Order and 
direct government agencies, 
officials, officers, and 
employees of the State, to 
take such action and employ 
such measures for law 
enforcement, medical, health, 
firefighting, traffic control, 
warnings and signals, 
engineering, rescue, 
construction, emergency 
housing, other welfare, 
hospitalization, transportation, 
 
HRS §92F-13. Government records; 
exceptions to general rule. This part 
shall not require disclosure of:  
(3) Government records that, by their 
nature, must be confidential in order for 
the government to avoid the frustration 
of a legitimate government function; 
§ 130–1. Emergency seat of state 
government—in case of actual or 
threatened enemy attack. Hawaii 
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water supply, public 
information, training, and 
other emergency functions as 
may be necessary, and utilize 
the services, materials, and 
facilities of the agencies and 
officers. All such agencies and 
officers shall cooperate with 
and extend their services, 
materials, and facilities to the 
governor as the governor may 
request; (19) Take any and all 
steps necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the 
purposes of this chapter 
notwithstanding that those 
powers in § 127A-13(a) may 
only be exercised during an 
emergency period.  
HRS § 127A-5. County 
emergency management 
agency requires county line of 
succession; § 107–25. Hawaii 
state building codes; 
requirements based upon 
“essential government 
facilities requiring COOP;” 
HRS § 342J-34 Standards for 
treatment, storage, or disposal 
facilities allows government to 
establish rules for COOP in 
hazmat waste. 
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Idaho Code (IC) § 67–5503. 
Definitions (a) “Emergency 
resources management plan” 
shall mean that plan prepared 
by the Idaho emergency 
resources planning 
committee, approved by fed 
office of emergency planning 
and adopted by the governor, 
which sets forth the 
organization, admin, and 
functions for the emergency 
management by the state 
government of essential 
resources and economic 
stabilization within the state. 
Such plan shall provide an 
emergency org and 
emergency admin policies and 
procedures for the 
conservation, allocation, 
distribution, and use of 
essential resources available 
to the state following a civil 
defense emergency such as 
an attack upon the US. IC § 
46–1006. Powers and duties 
of chief and bureau (2) The 
bureau shall prepare, maintain 
and update a state disaster 
plan based on the principle of 
self-help at each level of 
government. The plan may 
IC § 74–105. Records exempt from 
disclosure law enforcement records, 
investigatory records of agencies, 
evacuation and emergency response 
plans, worker’s comp.  
(4) (b) Records of buildings, facilities, 
infrastructures and systems held by or in 
the custody of any public agency only 
when the disclosure of such info would 
jeopardize the safety of persons or the 
public safety. Such records may include 
emergency evacuation, escape or other 
emergency response plans, vulnerability 
assessments, operations and security 
manuals, plans, blueprints or security 
codes. For purposes of this section 
“system” shall mean electrical, HVAC 
and telecomm systems. 










Idaho COOP and emergency operations 
plan template link 
http://bhs.idaho.gov/Pages/Plans/
(con’t) Idaho Constitution. Art. III, § 
27 Continuity of state and local 
governmental operations—provides 
COOP line of succession for state 
and local government in case of 
actual or threatened attack and 
power to “adopt such other 
measures as may be necessary and 
proper for so insuring the 
government COOP.”  
IC § 59–1402 Declaration of Policy—
provides emergency interim 
succession powers for continuity of 
government in case of attack.  
§ 67–414. Declaration of policy—for 
special provisions for COOP of 
legislature. IC § 46–1008.  
The governor and disaster 
emergencies (5) In addition to any 
other powers conferred upon the 
governor by law, the governor may: 
(b) Utilize all resources of the state, 
including, but not limited to, those 
sums in the disaster emergency 
account as she or he shall deem 
necessary to pay expenses incurred 
during a declared state of disaster 
emergency; (c) Transfer the 
direction, personnel, or functions of 
state depts. and agencies or units 
thereof for the purpose of performing 
or facilitating emergency services; 
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provide for: (k) Coordination of 
the state disaster plan with the 
disaster plans of the fed 
government. (6) The bureau 
shall: (d) Plan and make 
arrangements for the 
availability and use of any 
private facilities, services, and 
property and, if necessary and 
if in fact used, provide for 
payment for use under terms 
and conditions agreed upon; 
(f) Cooperate with the fed 
government and any public or 
private agency or entity in 
achieving any purpose of this 
act and in implementing 
programs for disaster 
prevention, preparation, 





(d) Subject to any applicable 
requirements for compensation 
under § 46–1012, IC, commandeer 
or utilize any private property, real or 
personal, if he finds this necessary 
to cope with the disaster emergency;  
§ 67–104. Validity of acts performed 
at emergency temporary location. 
During such time as the seat of 
government remains at such 
emergency temporary location(s), all 
official acts now or hereafter 
required by law to be performed at 
the seat of government by any 
officer, agency, department, or 
authority of this state, including the 
convening and meeting of the 
legislature in regular, extraordinary, 
or emergency session, shall be as 
valid and binding when performed at 
such emergency temporary location, 
or locations, as if performed at the 






§ 20 ILCS 3305 et seq. 
Emergency Management 
Agency Act Requires each 
emergency services and 
disaster agency to prepare an 
emergency operations plan 
among other requirements. 
Illinois COOP Plan info links: 
5 ILCS 140 et seq. Ill. FOIA. § 5 ILCS 
140/7. Exemptions—(v) Vulnerability 
assessments, security measures, and 
response policies or plans that are 
designed to identify, prevent, or respond 
to potential attacks upon a community’s 
population or systems, facilities, or 
installations, the destruction or 
§ 5 ILCS 275/1 et seq. Emergency 
Interim Succession Act. § 20 ILCS 
3305/1 et seq. Illinois Emergency 
Management Agency Act. § 5 ILCS 
160/15b Essential records—
Requires each head of a state 
agency to “Determine what records 
are “essential” for post-emergency 
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contamination of which would constitute 
a clear and present danger to the health 
or safety of the community, but only to 
the extent that disclosure could 
reasonably be expected to jeopardize 
the effectiveness of the measures or the 
safety of the personnel who implement 
them or the public. Information exempt 
under this item may include such things 
as details pertaining to the mobilization 
or deployment of personnel or 
equipment, to the operation of 
communication systems or protocols, or 
to tactical operations. § 5 ILCS 140/7.5. 
Statutory Exemptions (i) Information 
contained in a local emergency energy 
plan submitted to a municipality in 
accordance with a local emergency 
energy plan ordinance that is adopted 
under § 11–21.5-5 of the Illinois 
Municipal Code [65 ILCS 5/11-21.5-5]. 
government operations and provide 
for their protection and preservation” 
and usability. § 5 ILCS 195/1 et seq. 
Emergency Seat of Government 
Act—in case of actual or threatened 
attack provides for validity of 





IC § 10–14-2-4 Functions of 
State Emergency 
Management Agency for all 
state efforts for preparedness 
for, response to, mitigation of, 
and recovery from 
emergencies and disasters. 
IC 10–14-3-7 authorize and 
provide coordination of 
activities, cooperation and 
provide a disaster 
I.C. § 5–14-3-1 Ind. Publ. Records Act 
(IPRA). 5–14-3-4. Exceptions (b) (19) A 
record or a part of a record, the public 
disclosure of which would have a 
reasonable likelihood of threatening 
public safety by exposing a vulnerability 
to terrorist attack. A record described 
under this subdivision includes:  
(B) vulnerability assessments;  
(C) risk planning documents;  
(§ 5–14-3-4 con’t) (A) A record 
assembled, prepared, or maintained 
to prevent, mitigate, or respond to an 
act of terrorism under IC 35–47-12-1 
or an act of agricultural terrorism 
under IC 35–47-12-2. 
(B) Vulnerability assessments. 
(C) Risk planning documents. 
(D) Needs assessments. 
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management system relating 
to disaster recovery; Burns 
Ind. Code Ann. IC 10–14-3-9. 
Emergency operations plan 
(a) The agency shall prepare 
and maintain a current state 
emergency operations plan. 
The plan may provide for the 
following: (12) Other 
necessary matters. 5–15-5.1-
12. Critical records program 
requires state and local 
government to identify and 
protect through dispersal, 
duplication, or secure vault 
storage records that are 
essential to the continuity of 
state and local government 
operations. Ind. Monroe Circ. 
Ct. Rules Manual Rule LR53-
AR00-0100. Executive 
organization. B. Presiding 
Judge of Board of Judges. 
shall: 11. Establish and 
maintain a plan for continuity 
of operations. IC § 4–1-3-1 et 
seq. re: all acts valid during 
government relocation caused 
by emergency from 
threatened or actual enemy 
attack. 
(D) needs assessments (more); 
§ 5–14-3-4 Exceptions to right to inspect 
public records—Time limitation on 
confidentiality of records—Destruction of 
public records. 
(b) Except as otherwise provided by 
subsection (a), the following public 
records shall be excepted from § 3 of 
this chapter at the discretion of a public 
agency: 
(19) A record or a part of a record, the 
public disclosure of which would have a 
reasonable likelihood of threatening 
public safety by exposing a vulnerability 
to terrorist attack. A record described 
under this subdivision includes the 
following: (con’t in comments) 
. 
(E) Threat assessments. 
(F) Intelligence assessments. 
(G) Domestic preparedness 
strategies. 
(J) Infrastructure records that 
disclose the configuration of critical 
systems such as communication, 
electrical, ventilation, water, and 
wastewater systems. 
Iowa  Title 1, Subtitle 12 Iowa Code 
(IC) §29C.8 Powers and 
Title 1, Subtitle 9 IC Ch. 22 Examination 
of Public Records. §22.7 Confidential 
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duties of director of Dept. of 
Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management 
include preparing an 
emergency plan and 
management program that 
includes recovery. §29C.10 
Emergency management 
coordinator is responsible for 
development of emergency 
plan and serves on EM 




20112.pdf   
Iowa Admin Rules for Iowa 
Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management 
Chapter 605 recognizes the 
agency’s duty of 
“preparedness” in § 605 IAC 
1.1. The term “preparedness” 
includes “Continuity of 
Government” under the 
definition “Emergency 
Management” in § 605 IAC 
1.2 definitions for Chapter 
605. 
records. 45. The critical asset protection 
plan or any part of the plan prepared 
pursuant to § 29C.8 and any information 
held by the department of homeland 
security and emergency management 
that was supplied to the department by a 
public or private agency or organization 
and used in the development of the 
critical asset protection plan to include, 
but not be limited to, surveys, lists, 
maps, or photographs. However, the 
director shall make the list of assets 
available for examination by any person. 
50. Information concerning security 
procedures or emergency preparedness 
information developed and maintained 
by a government body for the protection 
of governmental employees, visitors to 
the government body, persons in the 
care, custody, or under the control of the 
government body, or property under the 
jurisdiction of the government body, if 
disclosure could reasonably be 
expected to jeopardize such employees, 
visitors, persons, or property. a. 
vulnerability assessments, security and 






Kan. Constitution. Art. 15, § 
13 Continuity of state and 
local governmental 
K.S.A. § 45–221. Certain records not 
required to be open; (a) (12) Records of 
emergency or security information or 
(con’t) K.S.A. § 48–1202 Statement 
of policy. Because of the existing 
possibility of attack upon the United 
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any general or special 
provision of this constitution, 
the legislature, in order to 
insure continuity of state and 
local governmental operations 
in periods of emergency 
resulting from disasters 
caused by enemy attack, shall 
have the power and the 
immediate duty (1) to provide 
for prompt and temporary 
succession to the powers and 
duties of public offices, of 
whatever nature and whether 
filled by election or 
appointment, the incumbents 
of which may become 
unavailable for carrying on the 
powers and duties of such 
offices, and (2) to adopt such 
other measures as may be 
necessary and proper for 
insuring the continuity of 
governmental operations 
including, but not limited to, 
the financing thereof. In the 
exercise of the powers hereby 
conferred the legislature shall 
in all respects conform to the 
requirements of this 
constitution except to the 
extent that in the judgment of 
the legislature so to do would 
procedures of a public agency, or plans, 
drawings, specifications or related 
information for any building or facility. 
States of unprecedented size and 
destructiveness, and in order, in the 
event of such an attack, to assure 
continuity of government through 
legally constituted leadership, 
authority and responsibility in offices 
of the government of the state and 
its political subdivisions; to provide 
for the effective operation of 
governments during an emergency; 
and to facilitate the early resumption 
of functions temporarily suspended, 
it is found and declared to be 
necessary to provide for additional 
officers who can exercise the powers 
and discharge the duties of 
governor; to provide for emergency 
interim succession to governmental 
offices of this state and its political 
subdivisions in the event the 
incumbents thereof (and their 
deputies, assistants or other 
subordinate officers authorized, 
pursuant to law, to exercise all of the 
powers and discharge the duties of 
such offices hereinafter referred to 
as deputies) are unavailable to 
perform the duties and functions of 
such offices; and to provide for 
special emergency judges who can 
exercise the powers and discharge 
the duties of judicial offices in the 
event regular judges are unavailable. 
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be impracticable or would 





Kansas Response Plan 2014 
at pg. 27–28: All state 
agencies are responsible for 
“Routinely updating and 
maintaining a continuity of 
operations plan (COOP).” 





Dec. 2007 3 page Charter 
establishing COOPing Committee for 






KRS § 39A.220. Agency 
emergency operations 
procedures. 
(1) Each agency, board, or 
commission of state 
government, unless the 
requirement is waived, in 
writing, by the director, shall 
develop agency emergency 
operations procedures which 
are consistent with and which 
meet the requirements of the 
KY Emergency Operations 
Plan. The agency emergency 
operations procedures shall 
be updated not less than 
yearly. 
KRS § 61.878. Certain public records 
exempted from inspection except on 
order of court—Restriction of state 
employees to inspect personnel files 
prohibited (1) The following public 
records are excluded (except upon court 
order)…(m) 1. Public records the 
disclosure of which would have a 
reasonable likelihood of threatening the 
public safety by exposing a vulnerability 
in preventing, protecting against, 
mitigating, or responding to a terrorist 
act and limited to:  
a. Criticality lists resulting from 
consequence assessments; b. 
Vulnerability assessments; c. 
Antiterrorism protective measures and 
(con’t) (4) Each agency, board, or 
commission of state government 
shall train its employees with regard 
to the contents of the agency 
emergency operations procedures, 
and shall give any additional training 
necessary to implement the 
procedures during times of 
emergency or disaster. 
(5) Each agency, board, or 
commission of state government 
shall, upon request of the director, 
send an employee of the agency 
with full authority to take any action 
on behalf of the agency to the State 
Emergency Operations Center, area 
offices of the division, state 
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(2) Each agency, board, or 
commission of state 
government shall take those 
measures necessary to 
ensure that it can continue to 
operate during times of 
disaster or emergency, that it 
can protect its vital records, 
and that it has designated at 
least four persons, preferably 
by title, who may act for the 
agency, and for its major 
component operations, during 
an emergency or disaster if 
the primary person with the 
power to make necessary 
decisions is unavailable for 
any reason. 
(3) In carrying out the 
provisions of subsections (1) 
and (2) of this section, each 
agency, board, or commission 
of state government shall 
follow the general planning 
guidance of the division and 
the requirements of admin 
regs promulgated by the 
division. (con’t in comments) 
 
plans; d. Counterterrorism measures 
and plans; e. Security and response 
needs assessments.  
State EOP August 2014 @ pg 34: 
http://kyem.ky.gov/sitecontacts/
Documents/State%20EOP.pdf 
It is the policy of Ky to respond to 
emergency and to ensure essential 
functions. To achieve, Ky has estalished 
a continuity of government (COG) plan. 
The exec, legislative and judicial 
branches will each establish a COOP 
that are supported by, and interface 
with, subordinate agency and 
departmental COOPs plans. The KYEM 
Planning Branch maintains the 
Commonwealth’s COG Plan. 
http://kyem.ky.gov/programs/Pages/
State-ESP-and-EOP.aspx 
command posts or other designated 
location during periods of emergency 
or disaster. 
(6) As used in this section, agency, 
board, or commission means all 
agencies, unless the requirement is 
waived, in writing, by the director, 
listed in KRS 12.020, other state 
bodies created by executive order of 
the governor, the Legislative 
Research Commission, and the 
Court of Justice and its agencies. 
Title V 39A.010. Legislative intent—
Necessity creates Division of 
Emergency Management in part to 
“ensure the continuity and 
effectiveness of government in time 
of emergency, disaster, or 
catastrophe.”  
Chapter 39D Continuity of 
Government KRS § 39D.010. 
Temporary seat of state 
government—Acts valid and binding. 
39D.050. Preservation of essential 
state public records—Duties of 
Archives and Records Commission 
The state Archives and Records 
Commission shall establish a system 
for the preservation of essential state 
public records necessary for the 
continuity of governmental functions 
in the event of an emergency, 
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§ 29:726. Governor’s Office of 
Homeland Security and 
Emergency Preparedness; 
authority and responsibilities. 
E. The office shall…(24) 
Review annually the state 
continuity of government plan  
(25) Study the feasibility of 
pre-bidding of contracts to 
provide for disaster response 
services such as but not 
limited to transportation 
services for evacuation 
purposes, housing or temp 
and long-term shelter for 
evacuees, provision of 
emergency food supplies, 
water and ice, and debris 
removal and enter into such 
contracts deemed to be in the 
best interest of the state to 
preserve and protect life, 
health, safety, and property of 
all citizens. 
La. Constitution. Art. XII, § 11. 
Continuity of government. The 
legislation shall provide for 
orderly and temp continuity of 
state government, in periods 
of emergency, until normal 
processes of government can 
LA Rev Stat §29:725.2. Confidentiality of 
cert records. A. (1) Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law to the contrary, 
records in the custody of the governor’s 
Office of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Prep containing cert security 
sensitive info in R.S. § 44:3.1 and § 
44:3.2 shall be confidential. (2) Such 
nondisclosure shall not apply to officers 
or employees of state, federal, or local 
government in carrying out their 
responsibilities as provided by 
applicable law. B. The provisions of this 
section shall not prevent any person 
from examining and copying any books, 
records, papers, accounts, or other 
documents of the governor’s Office of 
Homeland Sec and Emergency Preps, 
except as provided in Subsection A of 
this section. Such records shall not be 
subject to the provisions of R.S. § 44:5. 
C. If a public record is applied for during 
an imminent threat of a disaster or 
emergency or during a disaster or 
emergency, the office shall immediately 
notify the requestor as to the reasons 
why such record shall not be 
immediately available. Title 44, Ch. 1. 
Public records La. R.S. § 44:4.1. 
Exceptions (none applicable): LA Rev 
Stat § 44:3.1 (see column left bottom) 
§3.1. Certain records pertaining to 
La. R.S. § 24:62 Declaration of 
policy re: Emergency interim 
legislative succession to ensure 
continuity of government in time of 
attack. La. R.S. § 49:852. Statement 
of policy—to assure continuity of 
government in case of attack. La. 
R.S. § 49:206. Temporary absence 
of governor and lieutenant governor, 
order of those who shall act as 
governor. Link to COOP plan:  
http://gohsep.la.gov/RESOURCES/
OVERVIEW/PUBLICATIONS  
COOP plan is only applicable to 
counties and municipalities but see 
@ pg. 1 “In Louisiana, State 
agencies that have Emergency 
Support Function responsibilities are 
required by governor’s ex order to 
develop and maintain a COOP plan.” 




Governor’s Ex Ord August 20, 2014, 
40 Louisiana Register (LR) 1454, § 
5: The head of each agency, and 
origin identified in § 4 (most of state 
government) of this order shall 
designate both an emergency 
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be requested in accordance 
with the constitution and laws 
of the state; for the prompt 
and temp succession to the 
powers and duties of public 
offices when incumbents 
become unavailable to 
perform their functions.  
§ 44:3.1. Certain records 
pertaining to terrorist-related 
activity. Nothing in this Ch. 
shall require disclosure of 
records containing security 
procedures, criminal 
intelligence info pertaining to 
terrorist-related activity, or 
threat or vulnerability 
assessments created, 
collected, or obtained in the 
prevention of terrorist-related 
activity, include physical 
security info, proprietary info, 
operational plans, and the 
analysis of such info, or 
internal security info. 
terrorist-related activity.  
§3.2. Proprietary and trade secret info. 
coordinator and an alternate 
coordinator to act on the 
department’s behalf during an 
emergency, and furnish the director 
with their names and all phone 
numbers. The head shall also 
designate a COOP coordinator who 
will prepare and maintain plans, 
procedures, arrangements, and 
agreements to ensure that the org 
will continue to carry out its mission 
in an emergency or disaster. Nearly 
identical Ex Ords with a few different 
names for similar agencies at 34 LR 
1779 Ex Ord BJ 08–32 Sept 20, 
2008; 32 LR 1383 Ex Ord KBB 06–
34 August 20, 2006; 31 LR 1932 Ex 





1 M.R.S. § 762 Powers—
During the period when the 
public business is being 
conducted at the emergency 
temporary location, or 
locations, the governing body 
and other officers of a political 
1 M.R.S. § 402 Definitions. 3. Public 
Records. The term “public records” 
means…except: L. Records describing 
security plans, security procedures or 
risk assessments prepared specifically 
for the purpose of preventing or 
preparing for acts of terrorism, but only 
Me. Constitution. Art. IX, § 17. 
Continuity of Government in case of 
enemy attack. § 17. Notwithstanding 
any general or special provision of 
this constitution, the legislature, in 
order to insure continuity of state 
and local governmental operations in 
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subdivision of this state shall 
have and possess and shall 
exercise, at such location, or 
locations, all of the executive, 
legislative and judicial powers 
and functions conferred upon 
such body and officers by or 
under the laws of this state. 
Such powers and functions 
may be exercised in the light 
of the exigencies of the 
emergency situation without 
regard to or compliance with 
time consuming procedures 
and formalities prescribed by 
law and pertaining thereto, 
and all acts of such body and 
officers shall be as valid and 
binding as if performed within 
the territorial limits of their 
political subdivision. 
to the extent that release of information 
contained in the record could reasonably 
be expected to jeopardize the physical 
safety of government personnel or the 
public. Information contained in records 
covered by this paragraph may be 
disclosed to the Legislature or, in the 
case of a political or administrative 
subdivision, to municipal officials or 
board members under conditions that 
protect the information from further 
disclosure. For purposes of this 
paragraph, “terrorism” means conduct 
that is designed to cause serious bodily 
injury or substantial risk of bodily injury 
to multiple persons, substantial damage 
to multiple structures whether occupied 
or unoccupied or substantial physical 
damage sufficient to disrupt the normal 
functioning of a critical infrastructure; 
periods of emergency resulting from 
disasters caused by enemy attack, 
shall have the power and the 
immediate duty to provide for prompt 
and temporary succession to the 
powers and duties of public offices, 
of whatever nature and whether filled 
by election or appointment, the 
incumbents of which may become 
unavailable for carrying on the 
powers and duties of such offices, 
and to adopt such other measures 
as may be necessary and proper for 
insuring the continuity of 
governmental operations including 
but not limited to the financing 
thereof. In the exercise of the 
powers hereby conferred the 
legislature shall in all respects 
conform to the requirements of this 
constitution except to the extent that 
in the judgment of the Legislature so 
to do would be impracticable or 
would admit of undue delay. Link to 
governor’s COOP task force 2002  
http://www.state.me.us/newsletter/
April2002/governor.htm  





State or Territory 
COOP Agency Link 
COOP or Closely Analogous 
Statute 
Confidentiality Statute for COOP or 





See comments section—NO 
COOP plan statutes found for 
state government as a whole. 
But see Gov’s Ex Ord 
requiring COOP plans for 




Ex Ord 01.01.2013.06 
Maryland Emergency 
Preparedness Program 
(MEPP) requires in part that 
“Each state agency shall: 
Develop and maintain 
documents necessary to 
support the MEPP, as 
requested by MEMA (Md 
Emergency Management 
Agency) and/or MSP, 
including, at a minimum, 
continuity of operations plans 
(COOP) that are updated bi–
annually.” 
Public Information Act Md. Public Safety 
Code Ann. § 4–352. Information related 
to emergency management (a) In 
general.—Subject to subsections (b) 
and (c) of this section, a custodian may 
deny inspection of: (1) response 
procedures or plans prepared to prevent 
or respond to emergency situations, the 
disclosure of which would reveal 
vulnerability assessments, specific 
tactics, specific emergency procedures, 
or specific security procedures; (3) 
records that: (i) are prepared to prevent 
or respond to emergency situations; (b) 
Circumstances under which denial 
permissible. The custodian may deny 
inspection of a part of a public record 
under subsection (a) of this section only 
to the extent that the inspection would: 
(1) jeopardize the security of any 
building, structure, or facility; (2) 
facilitate the planning of a terrorist 
attack; or (3) endanger the life or 
physical safety of an individual. § 4–351. 
Investigation; intelligence information; 
security procedures (b) Circumstances 
under which denial permissible. A 
custodian may deny inspection by a 
person in interest only to the extent that 
the inspection would: (7) endanger the 
life or physical safety of an individual. 
§ 14–110.1 Emergency plans for 
human service facilities. (c) 
Procedures to be included in plan. 
An emergency plan shall include 
procedures that will be followed 
before, during, and after an 
emergency to address: (4) the 
continuity of operations, including: (i) 
procuring essential goods, 
equipment, and services; and (ii) 
relocation to alternate facilities. § 
14–110.3. Emergency plans for 
kidney dialysis centers (c) 
Procedures to be included in plan. 
An emergency plan shall include 
policies and procedures that will be 
followed before, during, and after an 
emergency to address: (4) the 
continuity of operations, including 
procedures to secure access to 
essential goods, equipment, and 
dialysis services. Md. Rule 16–101 
Administrative responsibility. § 14–
112. Emergency expenditures; use 
of existing resources (a) Emergency 
expenditures. (1) Expenditures 
necessitated by emergencies shall 
first be made using money regularly 
appropriated to state and local 
agencies. (2) If the governor finds 
that regularly appropriated money is 
inadequate to cope with an 
emergency, the Board of Public 
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Works may make contingency 
money available in accordance with 
the state budget. (c) Use of existing 
resources. (1) In carrying out this 
subtitle, the governor, director, and 
executive officers or governing 
bodies of the political subdivisions 
shall use the services, equipment, 
supplies, and facilities of existing 
agencies and units of the state and 
the political subdivisions to the 





ALM Spec L ch. S140, § 1 
Form of Compact. The 
purpose of this compact is to 
provide for mutual assistance 
between the states entering 
into this compact in managing 
any emergency disaster that 
is duly declared by the 
governor of the affected state, 
whether arising from natural 
disaster, technological hazard, 
manmade disaster, civil 
emergency aspects of 
resources shortages, 
community disorders, 
insurgency or enemy attack. 
Article III. Party State 
Responsibilities. 
A. It shall be the responsibility 
of each party state to 
ALM GL ch. 66, § 10 Public Inspection. 
[Effective until January 1, 2017]; § 10. 
Public Record Request Procedure. 
[Effective January 1, 2017] (no 
appropriate FOIA-type exceptions that 
could cover any COOP plan found in 
Mass. statutes) Not related to records 
but relevant: ALM GL ch. 30A, § 21. 
Open Meeting Law Executive Session. 
(a) A public body may meet in executive 
session only for the following purposes: 
4. To discuss the deployment of security 





Mass. Comprehensive Emergency 
Management Plan/Dec 2013 @ pp. 4–
16: “[a]ll state agencies within the 
ALM Spec L ch. S31, § 20A 
Designated Substitutes for 
Commissioners and Department 
Heads. The commissioner or head of 
each executive or administrative 
department of the commonwealth, 
including the state secretary, the 
attorney general, the treasurer and 
receiver-general, and the auditor, 
and the director or head of each 
division in each such department, 
shall designate, by name or position, 
five persons in her or his respective 
department or division who shall 
exercise, successively, his or her 
duties in the event of his or her 
absence or disability. Each such 
designation shall be subject to 
approval by the governor and council 
and shall be in effect until revoked 
by the officer who made such 
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formulate procedural plans 
and programs for interstate 
cooperation in the 
performance of the 
responsibilities listed in this 
article. In formulating such 
plans, and in carrying them 
out, the party states, insofar 
as practical, shall: 
1. Review individual state 
hazards analyses and, to the 
extent reasonably possible, 
determine all those potential 
emergencies the party states 
might jointly suffer, whether 
due to natural disaster, 
technological hazard, 
manmade disaster, 
emergency aspects of 
resources shortages, civil 
disorders, insurgency, or 
enemy attack; 
2. Review party states’ 
individual emergency plans 
and develop a plan that will 
determine the mechanism for 
the interstate management 
and provision of assistance 
concerning any potential 
emergency; 
see also ALM Spec L ch. S31, 
§ 4. Powers and duties of 
Executive Branch have developed 
internal COOPs in order to ensure that 
essential services and functions 
continue during and after an emergency 
with a minimum of disruption. 
designation. Persons designated 
under this section to perform the 
duties of a department or division 
head in her or his absence or 
disability shall perform such duties 
only in succession to persons so 
authorized under any other provision 
of general or special law. ALM 
Constitution Amend Art. LXXXIII. 
General Court Authorized to Provide 
for Continuity of Government in 
Periods of Emergency. The general 
court shall have full power and 
authority to provide for prompt and 
temporary succession to the powers 
and duties of public offices, of 
whatever nature and whether filled 
by election or appointment, the 
incumbents of which may become 
unavailable for carrying on the 
powers and duties of such offices in 
periods of emergency resulting from 
disaster caused by enemy attack, 
and to adopt such other measures 
as may be necessary and proper for 
insuring continuity of the government 
of the commonwealth and the 
governments of its political 
subdivisions. 
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§ 30.407a. Emergency 
management div; 
establishment (etc.); (2) The 
division shall prepare and 
maintain a Michigan 
emergency management plan 
that is a comprehensive plan 
that encompasses mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and 
recovery for this state. § 
30.408. Emergency 
management coordinator; 
employment or appointment; 
duties; annexes to emergency 
management plan; 
cooperation of state agencies. 
§ 8. (1) The director of each 
department of state 
government, and those 
agencies of state government 
required by the Michigan 
emergency management plan 
to provide an annex to that 
plan, shall serve as 
emergency management 
coordinator for their respective 
departments or agencies. 
Each director may appoint or 
employ a designated rep as 
emergency management 
coordinator, Each department 
or agency emergency 
MCLS § 15.243. Exemptions from 
disclosure; public body (PB) as school 
district; withholding of information 
required by law or in possession of 
executive office. Sec. 13. (1) A PB may 
exempt from disclosure (u) Records of a 
PB’s security measures, including 
security plans, security codes and 
combinations, passwords, passes, keys, 
and security procedures, to the extent 
that the records relate to the ongoing 
security of the PB. (y) Records or 
information of measures designed to 
protect the security or safety of persons 
or property, whether public or private, 
including, but not limited to, building, 
public works, and public water supply 
designs to the extent that those designs 
relate to the ongoing security measures 
of a PB, capabilities and plans for 
responding to a violation of the Michigan 
anti-terrorism act, chapter LXXXIII-A of 
the Michigan penal code, 1931 PA 328, 
MCL 750.543a to 750.543z, emergency 
response plans, risk planning 
documents, threat assessments, and 
domestic preparedness strategies, 
unless disclosure would not impair a 
PB’s ability to protect the security or 
safety of persons or property or unless 
the public interest in disclosure 
outweighs the public interest in 
Con’t Act 442 of 1976 Freedom of 
Information Act MCLS § 15.232 § 
15.232. Definitions. (d) “Public body” 
means any of the following: (ii) An 
agency, board, commission, or 
council in the legislative branch of 
the state government. MCLS 
Constitution. Art. IV, § 39. Continuity 
of government in emergencies. Sec. 
39. In order to insure continuity of 
state and local governmental 
operations in periods of emergency 
only, resulting from disasters 
occurring in this state caused by 
enemy attack on the United States, 
the legislature may provide by law 
for prompt and temporary 
succession to the powers and duties 
of public offices, of whatever nature 
and whether filled by election or 
appointment, the incumbents of 
which may become unavailable for 
carrying on the powers and duties of 
such offices; and enact other laws 
necessary and proper for insuring 
the continuity of governmental 
operations. Notwithstanding the 
power conferred by this section, 
elections shall always be called as 
soon as possible to fill any vacancies 
in elective offices temporarily 
occupied by operation of any 
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management coordinator shall 
act as liaison between her or 
his department or agency and 
the emergency management 
div of the department in all 
matters of emergency 
management, include the 
activation of the Michigan 
emergency management plan. 
Each department or agency of 
state government specified in 
the Michigan emergency 
management plan shall 
prepare and continuously 
update an annex to the plan 
providing for the delivery of 
emergency management 
activities by that agency... The 
emergency management 
coordinator shall represent the 
agency head in the drafting 
and updating. 
 
nondisclosure in the particular instance. legislation enacted pursuant to the 
provisions of this section.  
See also (applicable to state 
agencies) Local Continuity Planning 
Handbook 2012, Planning and 
Program Development Section 
Michigan Department of State Police 
Emergency Management & 

















Minn. Stat. § 12.09 Duties of 
Division of Emergency 
Management Subd. 2. State 
emergency plan. The division 
shall develop and maintain a 
comprehensive state 
emergency operations plan 
and emergency management 
program in accord with § 
Minn. Stat. § 13.37 General Nonpublic 
Data Subdivision 1. Definitions. As used 
in this section, the following terms have 
the meanings given them. (a) “Security 
info” means government data the 
disclosure of which the responsible 
authority determines would be likely to 
substantially jeopardize the security of 
info, possessions, individuals or property 
Minn. Constitution., Art. V, Sec. 5. 
Succession to offices of governor 
and lieutenant governor. In case a 
vacancy occurs from any cause 
whatever in the office of governor, 
the LT governor shall be governor 
during such vacancy. The 
compensation of the LT governor 
shall be prescribed by law. The last 
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12.21, subdivision 3, clause 
(2), and ensure that other 
state emergency plans that 
may be developed are 
coordinated and consistent 
with the comprehensive state 
emergency operations plan. 
Subd. 10. Emergency 
management training. 
Minn. Stat. § 12B.25 Eligibility 
Criteria; Considerations 
Subdivision 1. Payment 
required; eligibility criteria. 
The director, serving as the 
governor’s authorized 
representative, may enter into 
grant agreements with eligible 
applicants to provide state 
financial assistance made 
available as a result of a 
disaster that satisfies all of the 
following criteria: 
Minn. Stat. § 12.11 State 
Director; Personnel 
Subdivision 1. Division 
created in Department of 
Public Safety.  
A Division of Emergency 
Management is established 
within the Department of 
Public Safety under the 
supervision and control of the 
against theft, tampering, improper use, 
attempted escape, illegal disclosure, 
trespass, or physical injury. “Security 
information” includes checking account 
numbers, internet communication 
service accounts info or similar accounts 
info, and global positioning system 
locations. Minn. Stat. § 13.43 Personnel 
Data Subd. 17. Continuity of 
operations—Personal home contact 
information may be used to ensure that 
an employee can be reached in the 
event of an emergency or other 
disruption affecting COO of a 
government entity. An employee’s 
personal home contact information may 
be shared with another government 
entity in the event of an emergency or 
other disruption to ensure COO of either 
government entity. 
elected presiding officer of the 
senate shall become LT governor in 
case a vacancy occurs in that office. 
In case the governor is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of 
her or his office, the same devolves 
on the lieutenant governor.  
The legislature may provide by law 
for the case of the removal, death, 
resignation, or inability both of the 
governor and lieutenant governor to 
discharge the duties of governor and 
may provide by law for continuity of 
government in periods of emergency 
resulting from disasters caused by 
enemy attack in this state, including 
but not limited to, succession to the 
powers and duties of public office 
and change of the seat of 
government. Link to 11/21/13 
governor’s Ex Ord 13–13 assigning 
emergency response & COOP 
duties to state agencies: 
https://mn.gov/governor/assets/EO-
13-13.pdf_tcm1055-93864.pdf   
Ex Ord 15–14 Implementation of and 
putting DPS in charge of MN 
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governor and a state director 
of emergency management. 
The commissioner of public 
safety shall appoint the state 
director, who shall not hold 
any other state office. 
2015 Emergency Ops Plan (COOP 
@ pg BP 16–18): 
https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/hsem/
all-hazards-planning/Documents/
2015-meop-official.pdf   
Each agency must designate 
member of Homeland Security 
Advisory Committee (HSAC) per Ex 







Miss. Code Ann. § 33–15-14. 
Preparation and maintenance 
of state comprehensive 
emergency management plan 
(1) The agency is responsible 
for maintaining a 
comprehensive statewide 
program of emergency 
management. The agency is 
responsible for coordination 
with efforts of the fed 
government with other 
departments and agencies of 
state government, with county 
and municipal governments 
and school boards and with 
private agencies that have a 
role in emergency 
management. (2) In 
Miss. Code Ann. § 25–61-11 Records 
exempted or privileged by law [Effective 
until January 1, 2016, this section will 
read:] The provisions of this chapter 
shall not be construed to conflict with, 
amend, repeal or supersede any 
constitutional or statutory law or decision 
of a court of this state or the United 
States which at the time of this chapter 
is effective or thereafter specifically 
declares a public record to be 
confidential or privileged, or provides 
that a public record shall be exempt 
from the provisions of this chapter.  
Effective from and after January 1, 
2016, this section will read: The 
provisions of this chapter shall not be 
construed to conflict with, amend, repeal 
or supersede any constitutional law, 
(con’t) (iii) Include a post disaster 
response and recovery component 
that includes specific regional and 
interregional planning provisions and 
promotes intergovernmental 
coordination of post disaster 
response and recovery activities. 
This component must provide for 
post disaster response and recovery 
strategies according to whether a 
disaster is minor, major or 
catastrophic. The post disaster 
response and recovery component 
must, at a minimum: establish the 
structure of the state’s post disaster 
response and recovery org; establish 
procedures for activating the state’s 
plan; set forth policies used to guide 
post disaster response and recovery 
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performing its duties under 
this article, the agency shall: 
(a) Work with the governor, or 
his/her representative, in 
preparing a state 
comprehensive emergency 
management plan of this 
state, which shall be 
integrated into and 
coordinated with the 
emergency management 
plans of the federal 
government and of other 
states to the fullest possible 
extent, and to coordinate the 
preparation of plans and 
programs for emergency 
management by the political 
subdivisions of the state, such 
local plans to be integrated 
into and coordinated with the 
emergency plan and program 
of this state. The plan must 
contain provisions to ensure 
that the state is prepared for 
emergencies and minor, major 
and catastrophic disasters, 
and the agency shall work 
closely with local governments 
and agencies and orgs with 
emergency management 
responsibilities in preparing 
and maintaining the plan. The 
State Comprehensive 
state or federal statutory law, or decision 
of a court of this state or the United 
States which at the time of this chapter 
is effective or thereafter specifically 
declares a public record to be 
confidential or privileged, or provides 
that a public record shall be exempt 
from the provisions of this chapter. 
Emergency management plan link:  
http://www.msema.org/emergency-
plans/state-cemp/ 
activities; describe the chain of 
command during the post disaster 
response and recovery period; 
describe initial and continuous post-
disaster response and recovery 
actions; identify the roles and 
responsibilities of each involved 
agency and org; provide for a 
comprehensive communications 
plan; establish procedures for 
monitoring mutual aid agreements; 
provide for rapid impact assessment 
teams; ensure the availability of an 
effective statewide urban search and 
rescue program coordinated with the 
fire services; ensure the existence of 
a comprehensive statewide medical 
care and relief plan administered by 
the State Dept. of Health; and 
establish systems for coordinating 
volunteers and accepting and 
distributing donated funds and 
goods. (vii) Establish guidelines and 
schedules for annual exercises that 
evaluate the ability of the state and 
its political subdivision to respond. 2. 
The agency shall prepare an interim 
post-disaster response and recovery 
component that substantially 
complies with the provisions of this 
paragraph (a). (j) Review periodically 
emergency operating procedures of 
state agencies and recommend 
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Emergency Management Plan 
will be operations oriented 






Title 5 § 44.010. R.S. Mo. 
Definitions (13) “Planning,” 
activities of the state and local 
emergency management 
agency in the formulation of 
emergency management 
plans to be used in time of 
emergency; § 44.022. Powers 
and duties of governor 1. The 
governor shall have general 
direction and control of the 
state emergency management 
agency, and shall be 
responsible for the carrying 
out of the provisions of § 
44.010 to § 44.130.  
Link to Missouri state agency 
COOP planning as found 
under “publications” link at 
SEMA All-Hazard Planning 




that Missouri relies heavily on 
FEMA documents and 
publications for both COOP 
and emergency management. 
§ 109.180 R.S. Mo. Public records open 
to inspection—refusal to permit 
inspection, penalty Except as otherwise 
provided by law, all state, county and 
municipal records kept pursuant to 
statute or ordinance shall at all 
reasonable times be open for a personal 
inspection by any citizen of Missouri, 
and those in charge of the records shall 
not refuse the privilege to any citizen.  
Any official who violates the provisions 
of this section shall be subject to 
removal or impeachment and in addition 
shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor and upon conviction shall 
be punished by a fine not exceeding one 
hundred dollars, or by confinement in 
the county jail not exceeding 90 days, or 
by both the fine and the confinement.  
§ 109.280. Agency heads may 
determine nature and form of records—
confidential records to be so treated 
Nothing in §109.200 to §109.310 shall 
be construed to divest agency heads of 
the authority to determine the nature 
and form of the records required in the 
administration of their several 
departments, or to compel the removal 
of records deemed necessary by them 
Mo. Constitution. Art. III, § 46(a) 
(2015) § 46(a). Emergency duties 
and powers of assembly on enemy 
attack. The General Assembly, in 
order to insure continuity of state 
and local governmental operations in 
periods of emergency only resulting 
from disasters occurring in this state 
caused by enemy attack on the US, 
shall have the power to such extent 
as the General Assembly deems 
advisable. In the event there occurs 
in this state a disaster caused by 
enemy attack on the US, the 
General Assembly shall immediately 
convene in the City of Jefferson or in 
such place as designated by joint 
proclamation of the highest presiding 
officers of each house, and shall 
have power (1) To provide by 
legislative enactment for prompt and 
temporary succession to the powers 
and duties of public offices, of 
whatever nature and whether filled 
by election or appointment, the 
incumbents of which may become 
unavailable for carrying on the 
powers and duties of such offices, 
and (2) To adopt by legislative 
enactment such other legislation as 
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 in the performance of their statutory 
duties.  
Any records made confidential by law 
shall be so treated in the state or local 
records center and archives. 
may be necessary and proper for 
insuring the continuity of 
governmental operations.  
Notwithstanding the power conferred 
by this section of the constitution, 
elections shall always be called as 
soon as possible to fill any elective 
vacancies in any office temporarily 
occupied by operation of any 
legislation enacted pursuant to the 






§ 10–3-601 MCA Citation of 
part. This part may be cited as 
“The Continuity in 
Government Act.”  
§ 10–3-602 Filling vacancy in 
governorship. § 10–3-603–
605 re: filling other vacancies. 
§ 10–3-606 Quorum 
requirement § 10–3-607 & 
608 Relocating seat of state & 
local government § 10–3-609 
part inoperative upon 
convening of legislature 
Montana Continuity of 





Ex Summary: “Dept. of 
HB 123 eff 10/1/15 2–6—MCA 
Definitions (1) “Confidential info” 
includes info that is: (c) necessary to 
maintain the security and integrity of 
secure facilities or info systems owned 
by or serving the state; and (d) 
designated as confidential by statute or 
through judicial decisions, findings, or 
orders. (4) “Essential record” means a 
public record immediately necessary to: 
(a) respond to an emergency or 
disaster; (b) begin recovery or 
reestablishment of operations during 
and after an emergency or disaster; (11) 
“Public info” means info…except for 
confidential info that must be protected 
against public disclosure under 
applicable law. § 3. Access to public 
information safety and security 
exceptions (2) A public officer may w/
hold from public scrutiny info relating to 
HB 123 eff 10/1/15 2–6—MCA 
Protection and Storage of Essential 
Records. (1) To provide for the 
continuity and preservation of civil 
government, each public officer shall 
designate certain public records as 
essential records. The list must be 
continually maintained by the public 
officers to ensure its accuracy. Each 
public officer shall collaborate with 
the appropriate continuity of 
government programs to ensure 
essential records are identified and 
maintained. (2) Each public officer 
shall ensure essential records are 
efficiently and effectively secured. 
Each public officer shall look to the 
guidance provided by the state 
records committee or the local 
government records committee in 
choosing appropriate methods to 
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Administration is lead agency 
for continuity of government.” 
Montana Emergency 




On page 20: “State agencies 
will have their own 
comprehensive emergency 
management programs to: 
Establish procedures for 
continuity of government.” 
individual or public safety or the security 
of public facilities, including public 
schools, jails, correctional facilities, 
private correctional facilities, and 
prisons, if release of the info jeopardizes 
the safety of facility personnel, the 
public, students in a public school, or 
inmates of a facility. A public officer may 
not withhold from public scrutiny any 
more info than is required to protect 
individual or public safety or the security 
of public facilities. 
 
protect, store, back up, and recover 
essential records. § 2–16-513 
Succession in case of termination or 
incapacitation of primary successors. 
(1) If, because of an enemy attack 
upon the United States, the 
governor, lieutenant governor, 
president pro tempore of the senate, 
and speaker of the house are killed 
or rendered unable to serve as 
governor, the senior member of the 
legislature shall act as governor. § 
3–5-405 Change of place of holding 
court in emergency. Mont. 
Constitution, Art. III § 2 Continuity of 
government. The seat of government 
shall be in Helena, except during 
periods of emergency resulting from 
disasters or enemy attack. The 
legislature may enact laws to insure 
the continuity of government during 
a period of emergency without 
regard for other provisions of the 
constitution. They shall be effective 
only during the period of emergency 






R.R.S. Neb. § 81–829.40. 
Governor; Powers and Duties. 
(6) the governor may: (a) 
Suspend the provisions of any 
regulatory statute prescribing 
the procedures for conduct of 
R.R.S. Neb. § 84–712.05. Records 
which may be w/held from the public; 
enumerated. (8) Info solely pertaining to 
protection of the security of public 
property and persons on or within public 
property, such as specific, unique 
R.R.S. Neb § 72–701.05. 
Emergency seat of state 
government; designation, when; 
plans and preparations; governor; 
adopt. (2) Prior to any such 
attack…planning and prep may 
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government-plan state business or the ords, 
rules, or regulations of any 
state agency if strict 
compliance with the 
provisions of any statute, ord, 
rule, or regulation would in 
any way prevent, hinder, or 
delay necessary action in 
coping with the disaster, 
emergency, or civil defense 
emergency; (b) Utilize all 
available resources of the 
state government and of each 
political subdivision of the 
state as are reasonably 
necessary to cope with the 
disaster, emergency, or civil 
defense emergency; (c) 
Transfer the direction, 
personnel, or functions of 
state agencies or units thereof 
for the purpose of performing 
emergency management. 
 R.R.S. Neb. § 81–829.42 
governor’s emergency 
program; established (5) 
When a state of emergency is 
proclaimed…shall have 
authority to expend funds for 
purposes including (b) 
Employing for the duration 
additional personnel and 
procuring all necessary 
vulnerability assessments or specific, 
unique response plans, either of which 
is intended to prevent or mitigate 
criminal acts the public disclosure of 
which would create a substantial 
likelihood of endangering public safety 
or property; computer; guard schedules; 
lock combinations; or public utility 
infrastructure specifications or design 
drawings the public disclosure of which 
would create a substantial likelihood of 
endangering public safety or property, 
unless otherwise provided by state or 
federal law.  







include…(c) storing and stockpiling, 
at or near the tentative location(s), of 
essential supplies and equip, and 
vital records or duplicates thereof 
which would be necessary to permit 
the continuity of the governmental 
operations of the state in an 
emergency. R.R.S. Neb § 84–1102. 
Declaration of policy. Because of the 
existing possibility of an attack of 
unprecedented size and 
destructiveness upon the US; and in 
order, in the event of such an attack, 
to assure continuity of government 
through legally constituted 
leadership, authority, and 
responsibility in offices of 
government of the state and in the 
governments of all political 
subdivisions in the state; to provide 
for the eff operations of governments 
during an emergency; and to 
facilitate the early resumption of 
functions temporarily suspended; the 
Legislature finds and declares it to 
be necessary to provide for 
emergency interim succession to 
governmental offices of all types of 
this state and of its various political 
subdivisions in the event the 
incumbents thereof are or become 
unavailable to perform the functions 
and duties of such offices; and to 
enable the governing bodies or the 
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appliances, supplies, and 
equipment; (c) Performing 
services for and furnishing 
materials and supplies to state 
government agencies and 
local governments with for 
performance of any duties 
enjoined by law upon such 
agencies and local 
governments which they are 
unable to perform because of 
extreme climatic phenomena 
and receiving reimbursement 
in whole or in part from such 
agencies and local 
governments able to pay 
therefor under such terms and 
conditions as may be agreed. 
electors of political subdivision in the 
state to invoke the provisions of § 
84–1101 to § 84–1116 therein. Ne. 
Constitution. Art. III, § 29. Legislative 
authority in emergency due to 
enemy attack upon US. (d) The 
determination, selection, 
reproduction, preservation, and 
dispersal of public records 
necessary to the continuity of 
governmental operations in the 
event of enemy attack or imminent 
threat thereof; and (e) Such other 
measures and procedures as may 
be necessary and proper for insuring 
the COOP in the event of enemy 







Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. Title 19 § 
239C.250. Response plans of 
political subdivisions: 
Confidentiality. § 239C.260 
Plan for continuation of state 
and local governmental 
operations in event of 
catastrophic emergency. This 
statute is for line of 
succession and vacancy 
appointments but has been 
interpreted as requiring full 
COOP plans for state and 
local governments but the 
statute referenced as 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 239.010. Public 
books and public records open to 
inspection; confidential info in public 
books and records; 1. Except as 
otherwise provided in this section and 
[400 statutes listed] and unless 
otherwise declared by law to be 
confidential, all public books and public 
records of a governmental entity must 
be open at all times during office hours 
to inspection by any person, and may be 
fully copied or an abstract or 
memorandum may be prepared from 
those public books and public records. § 
239C.210 Confidentiality of certain docs, 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 239C.010. 
Legislative declaration. The 
legislature hereby declares that: 6. It 
is within the public interest that the 
legislature enact provisions to: (c) 
Ensure the continuity of government 
in the event of a terrorist attack. § 
239C.260. Plan for continuation of 
state and local governmental 
operations in event of catastrophic 
emergency. 2. In the event that this 
state or a portion of this state is 
stricken by a catastrophic 
emergency of such magnitude that, 
in the opinion of the governor or, in 
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authority, § 239C.250, only 
refers to pol subdivisions. see 
e.g., pg. 12 of Nevada’s 




Nevada COOP contractor: 
https://nevada.boldplanning.c
om  
§ 239C.250. Response plans 
of political subdivisions: 
Confidentiality. 2. The 
response plan required by 
subsection 1 must include: (h) 
Plans for the continuity of the 
operations and services of the 
political subdivision, which 
plans must be consistent with 
the provisions of NRS 
239C.260.  
records or other items of info upon 
declaration of governor; penalties; 
decennial review. A document, record or 
other item of info described in 
subsection 2 that is prepared and 
maintained for the purpose of preventing 
or responding to an act of terrorism is 
confidential, not subject to subpoena or 
discovery, 2. The types of documents, 
records or other items of information 
subject to executive order pursuant to 
subsection 1 are as follows: (g) 
Vulnerability assessments and 
emergency response plans of utilities, 
public entities and private businesses in 
this state. 
the absence of the governor, the 
lieutenant governor, the existing 
provisions of the Nevada 
Constitution and the statutes of this 
State relating to the filling of 
vacancies in office are not able to 
provide for a sufficiently expedient 
continuity of government and 
temporary succession of power as a 
result of vacancies in office created 
by the catastrophic emergency, the 
provisions of subsections 3 to 11, 
inclusive, apply. Nev. Constitution. 
Art. 4, § 37 Continuity of government 
in case of enemy attack; succession 
to public offices; legislative quorum 
requirements; relocation of seat of 
government. The legislation in order 
to insure continuity of state and local 
governmental operations in periods 
of emergency resulting from 
disasters caused by enemy attack, 
shall have the power and the 
immediate duty to provide for 
immediate and temporary 
succession to the powers and duties 
of public offices…and to adopt such 
other measures as may be 
necessary and proper for insuring 
the continuity of governmental 
operations, include changes in 
quorum requirements in the 
legislature and the relocation of the 
seat of government. In the exercise 
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of the powers hereby conferred, the 
legislature shall conform to the 
requirements of this constitution 
except to the extent that in the 
judgment of the legislature so to do 
would be impracticable or would 
admit of undue delay. 







RSA Title 1, 21-P:5-a. director 
of homeland security and 
emergency management. II. 
The director of homeland 
security and emergency 
management, under the 
supervision of the 
commissioner and the 
governor, shall devote full 
time and attention to 
overseeing the state-level 
planning, preparation, 
exercise, response to and 
mitigation of terrorist threats 
and incidents and natural and 
human-caused disasters. He 
or she shall serve as the 
state’s primary contact with 
the federal Dept. of Homeland 
Security, and shall have 
authority to oversee and 
coordinate planning, 
response, and recovery efforts 
of all state agencies to 
terrorist events and natural 
and human-caused disasters 
RSA Title VI 91-A:5 Exemptions. The 
following governmental records are 
exempted from the provisions of this 
chapter: VI. Records pertaining to 
matters relating to the preparation for 
and the carrying out of all emergency 
functions, including training to carry out 
such functions, developed by local or 
state safety officials that are directly 
intended to thwart a deliberate act that is 
intended to result in widespread or 
severe damage to property or 
widespread injury or loss of life. N.H. 












RSA Title I, 4:47 4:47. Emergency 
Management Powers. The governor 
shall have emergency management 
authority as defined in RSA 21-P:35, 
V, and pursuant to such authority 
may exercise emergency 
management powers including: II. 
The power to provide for emergency 
lines of succession to such 
appointive offices in the state 
government as the governor in his or 
her discretion deems to be 
necessary to insure reasonable 
continuity of state government in the 
event of a disaster. N.H. 
Constitution. Pt. Second, Art. 5-a Art. 
5-a. [Continuity of Government in 
Case of Enemy Attack.] 
Notwithstanding any general or 
special provision of this constitution, 
the general court, in order to insure 
continuity of state and local 
government operations in periods of 
emergency resulting from disasters 
caused by enemy attack, shall have 
the power and the immediate duty to 
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and wide-scale threats to 
public safety. He or she shall 
collaborate with the 
department of health and 
human services and shall 
coordinate the efforts of other 
state agencies in preventing 
and responding to epidemics 
and other significant threats to 
the public health. All state 
agencies shall and are 
authorized to cooperate with 
the director in carrying out his 
or her duties as enumerated 
in this section. § 21-P:5-b. 
Chief of Policy and Planning. 
The commissioner of safety 
shall nominate a chief of 
policy and planning for 
appointment by the governor, 
with the consent of the 
council. The chief of policy 
and planning shall serve at 
the pleasure of the 
commissioner and shall be 
qualified to hold that position 
by reason of education and 
experience and shall perform 
such duties as are assigned. 
P.pdf 
On pg. 22: Each state agency will 
maintain provisions for…continuity of 
operations and government and 
preservation of records. 
On pg. 30: “Bureau of Emergency 
Management (BEM) will assist and 
coordinate with all state agencies 
developing, maintaining & exercising a 
COOP Plan outlining how essential 
services and functions will be 
maintained during emergencies 
/disasters.” 
provide for prompt and temporary 
succession to the powers and duties 
of public offices, of whatever nature 
and whether filled by election or 
appointment, the incumbents of 
which may become unavailable for 
carrying on the powers and duties of 
such offices, and to adopt such other 
measures as may be necessary and 
proper for insuring the continuity of 
governmental operations including 
but not limited to the financing 
thereof. In the exercise of the 
powers hereby conferred the general 
court shall in all respects conform to 
the requirements of this constitution 
except to the extent that in the 
judgment of the general court so to 
do would be impracticable or would 
admit of undue delay. New 





New Jersey  
http://www.state.nj.us/
Only NJ COOP plan in statute 
is for Hi Ed see comments 
and confidentiality PIA 
sections N.J. Stat. § App.A:9-
N.J. Stat. Title 47. Public Records § 
47:1A-1.1 Definitions. A government 
record shall not include the following 
information, which is deemed to be 
N.J. Stat. § 18A:3B-69. Emergency 
operations plan for institution of 
higher education. The governing 
board of institution shall develop and 
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njoem/index.html 43.1 State Emergency 
Operations Plan the State 
Office of Emergency 
Management shall adopt, no 
later than 12 months following 
the effective date of this act, a 
state emergency operations 
plan, including rules, 
regulations, and guidelines, 
that shall be reviewed and 
updated at least every two 
years. a. These plans shall 
include, but not be limited to, 
provisions which shall be 
developed in consultation 
with: Department of 
Agriculture & Department of 
Health and Senior Services. 
N.J. Stat. § App.A:9-68 Duties 
of task force…formulate 
proposals for plans relative to 
domestic security, 
development, implementation, 
and management of 
responses to terrorist attack or 
technological disaster, 
disaster remediation, recovery 
and response functions.  
NJ Directive 151 [sic—
Labeled 51] of 11/03/10 
signed by director of NJ Office 
of Emergency Management 
requires each state agency to 
confidential for the purposes of 
P.L.1963, c.73 (C.47:1A-1 et seq.) as 
amended and supplemented: 
emergency or security information or 
procedures for any buildings or facility 
which, if disclosed, would jeopardize 
security of the building or facility or 
persons therein; security measures and 
surveillance techniques which, if 
disclosed, would create a risk to the 
safety of persons, property, electronic 
data or software; N.J. Stat. Subtitle 2.§ 
18A:3B-69. Emergency operations plan 
for institutions of higher education e. 
Any plan prepared pursuant to this 
section shall not be considered a 
government record as defined in § 1 of 
P.L.1995, c.23 (C.47:1A-1.1) and shall 
not be available for public inspection, 
copying, or the purchase of copies. (§ 
18A:3B-69 con’t in comments).  
coordinate an emergency operations 
plan to ensure the continuity of 
essential institution functions under 
all circumstances. The plan shall: (1) 
ID a baseline of prep for all potential 
emergencies, include pandemics, to 
establish a viable capability to 
perform essential functions during 
any emergency that disrupts normal 
operations; and (2) be coordination 
with state and local authorities 
include the State Office of 
Emergency Management, local 
LEOs, county and local health 
officers, county offices of emergency 
management, and other…b. The 
plan shall include: ID of essential 
functions, programs, & personnel; 
procedures; delegation of authorities 
and lines of succession; ID of alt 
facilities and related infrastructure, 
include communications; ID & 
protection of vital records and 
databases; and schedules and 
procedures for periodic tests, 
training, and exercises. The plan 
shall be consistent with the local 
emergency operations plan of the 
muni in which the institution is 
located. c. The governing board of 
the institution shall adopt and submit 
for review an emergency operations 
plan to…w/in 6 months of this act. 
The governing board shall review, 
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develop and maintain a 
COOP to ensure it can fulfill 
its responsibilities under the 
NJ State Emergency Ops 
Plan. The NJ Office of 
Emergency Management is 




Note: Lots of dead links at NJ 
OEM 
update, & resubmit the plan to the 
offices every five years. If an 
emergency incident occurs. during 
the five-year period, the plan shall be 
reviewed immediately. d. The Office 
of Homeland Security and 
Preparedness, the State Office of 
Emergency Management, the Dept. 
of Health, & the Sec of Higher 
Education shall review the 
emergency operations plan 
submitted by an institution of higher 
education per subsection c. and, 
when necessary, shall in 
coordination with other state 
agencies make recommendations for 
improving the plan…N.J. Stat. § 
52:14A-2 Declaration of policy 
Because of the existing possibility of 
attack upon the US…emergency 
interim succession.  
N.J. Constitution., Art. IV, Sec. VI, 
Para 4. Succession to powers and 
duties of pub officers during periods 
of emergency CO government OP. 
New Mexico  
http://www.nmdhsem.or
g/ 
N.M. Stat. Ann. Ch. 9, Art. 28 
Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management 
Dept. Act § 9–28-5 
Department duties. The 
department shall: E. establish 
security standard for state 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14–2-1. Right to 
inspect public records; exceptions.  
A. Every person has a right to inspect 
public records of this state except:  
(7) tactical response plans or 
procedures prepared for or by the state 
N.M. Stat. Ann. §12-11-2. 
Declaration of policy. The legislature 
declares that the possibility of an 
enemy attack of unprecedented 
destructiveness made possible by 
recent techno developments, and 
which may result in the death or 
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facilities and for protection of 
their occupants and develop 
plans for the continuity of 
state government operations 
in the event of a threat or act 
of terrorism or other natural or 
man-made disaster; G. 
coordinate state agency and 
local government plans for 
prevention, preparedness and 
response with a focus on an 
all-hazards approach; NM All-
Hazard Emergency Operation 









Note that the NM COOP 
planner position is within the 
“Preparedness Bureau” per 
the staff directory 
http://www.nmdhsem.org/
Staff_Directory.aspx 
or a political subdivision of the state, the 
publication of which could reveal specific 
vulnerabilities, risk assessments or 
tactical emergency security procedures 
that could be used to facilitate the 
planning or execution of a terrorist 
attack.  
inability [inability] to act on the part of 
a large number of the officers of the 
exec and judicial branches of state 
and local government, make it 
necessary to assure the continuity 
and effective operations of the exec 
and judicial offices of state and local 
government by providing for 
advance naming of officers to fill 
temp vacancies in certain offices, 
and that it is the legislative intent to 
provide that continuity in the Disaster 
Succession Act [12-11-1 NMSA 
1978]. § 2 [Powers generally; 
disaster emergency procedure.] 
N.M. Constitution. Art. IV, Sec. 2 
[Powers generally; disaster 
emergency procedure.] In addition to 
the powers herein enumerated, the 
legislature shall have all powers 
necessary to the legislature of a free 
state, including the power to enact 
reasonable and appropriate laws to 
guarantee the continuity and 
effective operations of state and 
local government by providing 
emergency procedure for use only 
during periods of disaster 
emergency. A disaster emergency is 
defined as a period when damage or 
injury to persons or property in this 
state, caused by enemy attack, is of 
such magnitude that a state of 
martial law is declared to exist in the 
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state, and a disaster emergency is 
declared by the chief exec officer of 
the U.S. and the chief exec officer of 
this state, and the legislature has not 
declared by joint resolution that the 
disaster emergency is ended. Upon 
the declaration of a disaster 
emergency the chief exec of the 
state shall within 7 days call a 
special session of the legislature 
which shall remain in continuous 
session during the disaster 
emergency, and may recess from 
time to time for [not] more than 3 
days. 




No state law COOP type 
statutes found. 
NY CLS Pub O § 87. Access to agency 
records 2. Each agency shall, in 
accordance with its published rules, 
make available for public inspection and 
copying all records, except that such 
agency may deny access to records or 
portions thereof that: (f) if disclosed 
could endanger the life or safety of any 
person; NY CLS Pub Ord, Article 6 
Freedom of Information Law, § 86. 
Definitions as used in this article, unless 
the context requires otherwise: 5. 
“Critical infrastructure” means systems, 
assets, places or things, whether 
physical or virtual, so vital to the state 
that the disruption, incapacitation or 
destruction of such systems, assets, 
places or things could jeopardize the 
NY CLS, Ch. 131, Art. I, § 3 
Definitions 5. “Civil defense;’ 
provisions for the continuity of state 
and local governments; and, when 
appropriate, the non-military 
evacuation of civil population); NY 
CLS, Ch. 131, Art. III, § 21 Powers 
and Duties of Commission. Because 
of the existing danger of disasters of 
unprecedented size and 
destructiveness resulting from attack 
and in order to insure that the 
preparations of the state will be 
adequate to deal with such disasters 
and generally to provide for the civil 
defense, and to assist other states 
and the federal government to 
achieve these objectives throughout 
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health, safety, welfare or security of the 
state, its residents or its economy. § 89. 
General provisions relating to access to 
records; certain cases 5. (1-a) A person 
or entity who submits...may, identify 
records that contain critical infrastructure 
info and request that the 
agency…except such info from 
disclosure. 
the nation, the commission shall 
have the following powers and 
perform the following duties: 3. 
Adopt, promulgate, supplement, 
rescind, modify and make effective a 
comprehensive plan for the civil 
defense of the state, including but 
not limited to provisions for: C. 
Continuity of Government. n. 
Continuity of government of the state 
and of political subdivisions of the 
state. NY CLS Constitution Art III, § 
25 § 25. [Succession to powers and 
duties of public offices during 
emergency] Notwithstanding any 
other provision of this constitution, 
the legislature, in order to insure 
continuity of state and local 
governmental operations in periods 
of emergency caused by enemy 
attack or by disasters (natural or 
otherwise), shall have the power and 
the immediate duty (1) to provide for 
prompt and temporary succession to 
the powers and duties of public 
offices, of whatever nature and 
whether filled by election or 
appointment, the incumbents of 
which may become unavailable for 
carrying on the powers and duties of 
such offices, and (2) to adopt such 
other measures as may be 
necessary and proper for insuring 
the continuity of governmental 
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operations. Nothing in this article 
shall be construed to limit in any way 
the power of the state to deal with 
emergencies arising from any cause. 





No NC COOP plan statutes 
but see N.C. Gen. Stat Ch. 
166a. N C Management 
Emergency Act incl. § 166A-
19.12. Powers of Division of 
Emergency Management: The 
Division Emergency 
Management shall (1) 
Coordinate activities of all 
State agencies for emergency 
management within the State, 
include planning, organizing, 
staffing, equipping, training, 
testing, and activating and 
managing the State 
Emergency Response Team 
and emergency management 
programs. (2) Prep and 
maintenance of state plans for 
emergencies. The state plans 
or any parts thereof may be 
incorporated into department 
regulations and into exec 
orders of the governor. (6) 
training programs (8) 
Coordination of the use of any 
private facilities, services, and 
property. 
§132-1.7. Sensitive public security info  
(a) Public records, as defined in G.S. 
132–1, shall not include info containing 
specific details of public security plans & 
arrangements or the detailed plans & 
drawings of public buildings & 
infrastructure facilities. (b) Public 
records as defined in G.S. 132–1 do not 
include plans to prevent or respond to 
terrorist activity, to the extent such 
records set forth vulnerability & risk 
assessments, potential targets, specific 
tactics, or specific security or emergency 
procedures, the disclosure of which 
would jeopardize the safety of 
governmental personnel or the general 
public or the security of any 
governmental facility, building, structure, 
or info storage system. (c) Info relating 
to the general adoption of public security 
plans & arrangements, and budgetary 
info concerning the authorization or 
expenditure of public funds to implement 
public security plans & arrangements, or 
for the construction, renovation, or repair 
of public buildings and infrastructure 
facilities shall be public records.  
§ 132–1.6. Emergency response plans. 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-1000 
Division of Emergency Management 
of the Dept. of Public Safety (b) The 
Division of Emergency Management 
shall have the following powers and 
duties: (2) To exercise the powers 
and duties conferred on it by 
Chapter 166A of the General 
Statutes. (3) To exercise any other 
powers vested by law. § 166A-19.10. 
Powers of the governor. § 166A-
19.11. Powers of the Secretary of 
Public Safety. § 166A-19.30. 
Additional powers of the governor 
during state of emergency. (a) In 
addition to any other powers 
conferred upon the governor by law, 
during a gubernatorial or legislatively 
declared state of emergency, the 
governor shall have the following 
powers: (1) To utilize all available 
state resources as reasonably 
necessary to cope with an 
emergency, include the transfer and 
direction of personnel or functions of 
state agencies or units thereof for 
the purpose of performing or 
facilitating emergency services. (c) 
In addition…(2) Give to all 
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NC 2006 COOP Planning 
Manual (include instructions 




30 N.C. Reg. 717 Ex Ord 78 
Sept 1, 2015: COOP Planning 
required for all NC state 





See also prior executive 
orders requiring COOP for all 
NC state agencies: 22 N.C. 
Reg. 1 Ex Ord No. 118 July 2, 
2007; 21 N.C. Reg. 1 Ex Ord 
No. 102 July 3, 2006. 
 
Emergency response plans adopted by 
an institution of University of NC, a 
community college, or a public hospital 
as per G.S. 159–39 & the records 
related thereto are not public records & 
are not subject to inspection & exam 
under G.S. 132–6. 
 
participating state and local agencies 
and officers such directions as may 
be necessary to assure coordination 
among them. 
See also Chapter 129. Public 
Buildings and Grounds § 147–33.2. 
Emergency war powers of the 
governor. 
NC 2010 COOP Plan [Intended 
mainly for EM COOP and @ pg 1 
“example that other state agencies 
might use in preparing their own 
[COOP] plans”// also pg F-1 












North Dakota  
http://www.nd.gov/des/
planning/ 
North Dakota (ND) Central 
Code (Cent. Code) § 37–17.1-
06. State division of homeland 
security. The division of 
ND Cent. Code, § 44–04-18.10 (2015) 
44–04-18.10. Disclosure of public 
records. 1. A public entity may not deny 
a request for an open record on the 
ND Constitution. Art. XI, § 7 
[Emergency governmental 
operations] The legislative assembly, 
in order to ensure continuity of state 
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homeland security must have 
professional, technical, 
secretarial, and clerical 
employees as necessary for 
the performance of its 
functions. The director of the 
division shall fix the 
compensation of the staff in 
conformity with state merit 
system regulations and may 
make such expenditures 
within the appropriations 
therefor, or from other funds 
made available to the director 
for purposes of emergency 
management, as may be 
necessary to carry out the 
purposes of this chapter. ND 
Cent. Code, § 37–17.1-05. 
The governor and disasters or 
emergencies—Penalty. 6. In 
addition to any other powers 
conferred upon the governor 
by law, the governor may: b. 
Utilize all available resources 
of the state government as 
reasonably necessary to 
manage the disaster or 
emergency and of each 
political subdivision of the 
state.  
N.D. Cent. Code, Tit. 54, Ch. 
54–48 Notes (2015) Chapter 
ground that the record also contains 
confidential or closed information. 2. 
Subject to subsection 3 of § 44–04-18, if 
confidential or closed information is 
contained in an open record, a public 
entity shall permit inspection and receipt 
of copies of the information contained in 
the record that is not confidential or 
closed, but shall delete, excise, or 
otherwise withhold the confidential or 
closed information. 
§ 44–04-18. Access to public records—
Electronically stored information. § 44–
04-30. Records of fire departments and 
rural fire protection districts confidential. 
2. Standard operating procedures 
written for emergency response, pre-fire 
action plans, plans of a building, 
pipeline, electrical system, or any other 
infrastructure plan in the hands of a fire 
department or rural fire protection district 
are exempt from § 44–04-18. 
and local governmental operations in 
periods of emergency resulting from 
disasters caused by enemy attack, 
shall have the power and immediate 
duty (1) to provide for prompt and 
temporary succession to the powers 
and duties of public offices, of 
whatever nature and whether filled 
by election or appointment, the 
incumbents of which may become 
unavailable for carrying on the 
powers and duties of such offices, 
and (2) to adopt such other 
measures as may be necessary and 
proper for ensuring the continuity of 
governmental operations including, 
but not limited to, waiver of 
constitutional restrictions upon the 
place of transaction of governmental 
business, upon the calling of 
sessions of the legislative assembly, 
length of sessions, quorum and 
voting requirements, subjects of 
legislation and appropriation bill 
requirements, upon eligibility of 
legislators to hold other offices, 
residence requirements for 
legislators, and upon expenditures, 
loans or donations of public moneys. 
In the exercise of the powers hereby 
conferred the legislative assembly 
shall in all respects conform to the 
requirements of this constitution 
except to the extent that in the 
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54–48 Continuity of 
Government, Legislative 
Assembly Notes [Repealed by 
S.L. 1985, ch. 579, § 1] 
judgment of the legislative assembly 
so to do would be impracticable or 
would admit of undue delay. History: 
Source: Art. amd. 75, approved June 







ORC Ann Chapter 5502: 
Dept. of Public Safety § 
5502.01 General duties of 
department. (D) The 
department shall administer 
the laws governing the state 
emergency management 
agency and shall enforce all 
additional duties and 
responsibilities as prescribed 
in the Revised Code related to 
emergency management 
services. ORC Ann. § 5502.21 
Definitions. “Emergency 
preparedness” including, 
without limitation: (2) The 
development of necessary 
plans and standard operating 
procedures for mitigation, 
preparation, response, and 
recovery purposes, including, 
without limitation, the 
development of supporting 
agreements and MOUs.  
§ 5502.22 Emergency 
management agency 
ORC § 149.43 Availability of public 
records. (A) As used in this section: (2) 
“Confidential law enforcement 
investigatory record” means any record 
that pertains to a law enforcement 
matter of a criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, 
or administrative nature, but only to the 
extent that the release of the record 
would create a high probability of 
disclosure of any of the following: (d) 
Info that would endanger the life or 
physical safety of law enforcement 
personnel, a crime victim, a witness, or 
a confidential info source. § 149.433 
Exemption of security and infrastructure 
records. (A) As used in this section: 
(3) “Security record” means: (a) used for 
protecting or maintaining the security of 
a public office against attack, 
interference, or sabotage; (b) …or 
respond to acts of terrorism, including: 
(i) record containing specific and unique 
vulnerability assessments or specific 
and unique response plans either of 
which is intended to prevent or mitigate 
acts of terrorism… (B) A record kept by 
ORC Ann. § 121.22 Meetings of 
public bodies to be public; 
exceptions. (G)…members of a 
public body may hold an executive 
session only on…any of the 
following matters: (6) Details relative 
to the security arrangements and 
emergency response protocols for a 
public body or a public office, if 
disclosure of the matters discussed 
could reasonably be expected to 
jeopardize the security of the public 
body or public office; § 4765.08 
Statewide Plan; plan for regulation 
during disasters; coordination with 
emergency operations plan. The 
state board of emergency med, fire, 
and transportation services shall 
prepare a statewide emergency med 
services plan and shall revise the 
plan as necessary. Oh. Constitution. 
Art. II, § 42 Continuity of government 
operations in emergency caused by 
enemy attack. The General 
Assembly shall have the power and 
the immediate duty to pass laws to 
provide for prompt and temporary 
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established; cooperation with 
other agencies; use of fed 
funds. § 5502.25 Rules for 
emergency management. § 
5502.28 Cooperation by state 
and local agencies; national 
incident management system 
adopted. (B) Every agency for 
emergency management 
established pursuant to 
sections 5502.21 to 5502.51 
of the revised code and every 
political subdivision that has 
established a program for 
emergency management 
under § 5502.271 of the 
revised code, and the officers 
thereof, shall execute and 
enforce any emergency 
management orders and rules 
issued or adopted by the 
director of public safety. 
a public office that is a security record or 
an infrastructure record is not a public 
record under § 149.43 of the Revised 
Code and is not subject to mandatory 
release or disclosure under that section. 
(con’t in comments) 
 
succession to the powers and duties 
of public offices, of whatever nature 
and whether filled by election or 
appointment, the incumbents of 
which may become unavailable for 
carrying on the powers and duties of 
such offices and to pass such other 
laws as may be necessary and 
proper for insuring the continuity of 
governmental operations in periods 
of emergency resulting from 
disasters caused by enemy attack. 
As enacted, Nov. 7, 1961. Title 1: 
State Government Chapter 161: 
Emergency Interim Government 
ORC Ann § 161.02 Effective only in 
the event of attack. § 161.01 to 
161.29, inclusive, of the Revised 
Code shall be in effect only in the 
event that an attack upon the United 
States, as defined in § 161.01 of the 
Revised Code, has occurred, and 
shall remain in effect until terminated 






63 Okl. St.§ 683.4. Okla Dept. 
of Emergency Management—
Powers and duties of director 
D. The director, subject to the 
direction and control of the 
governor, shall be the 
executive head of the 
department and shall serve as 
Oklahoma Open Records Act 51 Okl. St. 
§ 24A.28. Confidential info—Exceptions 
A. The following info may be kept 
confidential: 5. Info technology of a 
public body or public official but only if 
the info specifically identifies: f. business 
continuity and disaster planning, or 
response plans. D. 1. Public educational 
Title 63. Public Health and Safety Ch 
25. Emergency Interim Exec and 
Judicial Succession Act 63 Okl. St. § 
685.1–685.11. Okl. Constitution. Art. 
V, § 63. COOP in periods of 
emergency The legislature, in order 
to insure state and local COOP in 
periods of emergency resulting from 
111 
State or Territory 
COOP Agency Link 
COOP or Closely Analogous 
Statute 
Confidentiality Statute for COOP or 
Closely Analogous Statute Comments/Continuations 
the chief advisor to the 
governor on emergency 
management and shall: 2. 
Coordinate the activities of all 
organizations for emergency 
management within the state; 
4. Develop and maintain a 
comprehensive all-hazards 
mitigation plan for this state; 
5. Implement the Oklahoma 
Hazard Mitigation Program; 
63 Okl. St. § 683.8. Powers 
and Duties of Governor E. In 
addition to prevention 
measures included in the 
state and local comprehensive 
plans and programs for 
emergency management, the 
governor shall consider on a 
continuing basis steps that 
could be taken to mitigate the 
harmful consequences of 
emergencies and natural 
disasters. At the governor’s 
direction and pursuant to any 
other authority specified by 
law, state agencies, including 
floodplain management, fire 
prevention, air quality, public 
works, land use shall make 
studies of matters related to 
potential to mitigate 
emergency and natural 
institutions may keep confidential 
campus security plans. An institution or 
agency may in its discretion release info 
in the security plan in order to design or 
implement the plan. 25 Okl. St. § 307 
(2015) Executive sessions. B. Executive 
sessions of public bodies will be 
permitted only for the purpose of: 9. 
Discussing the following: e.g., info 
technology of the public body but only if 
the discussion specifically identifies: (6) 
business continuity and disaster 
planning, or response plans; Note that 
the 2009 plan is shown on the OK EM 





“OK Emergency Operations Plan 2009 
@ page BP5 2 &ESF #5.6., 7.3, 8.4”All 
state agencies shall establish internal 
rules of succession to insure continuity 
of government (COG) and COOP during 
times of disaster.” 
disasters caused by enemy attack or 
resulting from the imminent threat of 
such disasters, shall have the power 
and the immediate duty (1) to 
provide for prompt and temp 
succession to the powers and duties 
of public offices, of whatever nature 
and whether filled by election or 
appointment, the incumbents of 
which may become unavailable for 
carrying on the powers and duties of 
such offices; and (2) to adopt such 
other measures as may be 
necessary and proper for so insuring 
the COOP. In the exercise of the 
powers hereby conferred, the 
legislature shall in all respects 
conform to the requirements of this 
constitution. Title 74. State 
Government Ch 3a. Okla Homeland 
Security Act 74 Okl. St. § 51.1. Okla 
Office of Homeland Security. § 
687.3. Duties of Dept. of Emergency 
Management A. Whenever a 
disaster makes it imprudent or 
impossible to conduct the affairs of 
state government at its seat in Okla 
City, the governor may proclaim 
temp locations for the seat of state 
government at any place he deems 
advisable, either inside or outside of 
the state. The governor may issue 
necessary orders for orderly 
transition of the affairs of 
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disasters. The governor shall 
make such recommendations 
to the legislature, to pol 
subdivisions and to other 
appropriate public and private 
entities as may facilitate 
measures for mitigation of the 
harmful consequences of 
emergencies and natural 
disasters. 
government to any temp emergency 
or man-made disaster location, 
which remains the seat of state 
government until the Legislature 
establishes a new location, or until 
the emergency or man-made 
disaster is declared ended by the 
Legislature and the seat is returned 
to its normal location in Okla City. B. 
Any official act or meeting required 
to be performed at the seat of state 
government is valid when performed 
at a temp emergency or man-made 





Title 32 ORS § 401.052 
Responsibilities of Office of 
Emergency Management. (1) 
The Office of Emergency 
Management is established in 
the Oregon Military Dept (2) 
The office shall be responsible 
for: (a) Coordinating and 
facilitating private sector and 
governmental efforts to 
prevent, prepare for, respond 
to and recover from 
emergencies; and (b) 
Coordinating exercises and 
training, planning, 
preparedness, response, 
mitigation and recovery 
activities with state and local 
emergency services agencies 
ORS § 192.501 Public records 
conditionally exempt from disclosure. 
The following public records are exempt 
from disclosure under ORS § 192.410 to 
§ 192.505 unless the public interest 
requires disclosure in the particular 
instance: (18) Specific operational plans 
in connection with an anticipated threat 
to individual or public safety for 
deployment and use of personnel and 
equipment, prepared or used by a public 
body, if public disclosure of the plans 
would endanger an individual’s life or 
physical safety or jeopardize a law 
enforcement activity. (23) Records or 
information that would reveal or 
otherwise identify security measures, or 
weaknesses or potential weaknesses in 
security measures, taken or 
Title 32 ORS § 401.052 
Responsibilities of Office of 
Emergency Management. (1) The 
Office of Emergency Management is 
established in the Oregon Military 
Dept. (2) The office shall be 
responsible for: (a) Coordinating and 
facilitating private sector and 
governmental efforts to prevent, 
prepare for, respond to and recover 
from emergencies; and (b) 
Coordinating exercises and training, 
planning, preparedness, response, 
mitigation and recovery activities 
with state and local emergency 
services agencies and orgs. (3) The 
office shall prepare a statewide 
emergency management plan and 
update the plan from time to time as 
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and orgs. (3) The office shall 
prepare a statewide 
emergency management plan 
and update the plan from time 
to time as necessary.401.088 
Interagency agreements. The 
director of the Office of 
Emergency Management may 
enter into interagency 
agreements with other state 
agencies that the director 
determines are necessary to 
carry out the duties of the 
Office of Emergency 
Management. 
401.092 Duties of director; 
federal fire management 
assistance declaration; 
rules.(1) The director of the 
Office of Emergency 
Management is responsible 
for coordinating and 
facilitating exercises and 
training, emergency planning, 
preparedness, response, 
mitigation and recovery 
activities with the state and 
local emergency services 
agencies and orgs, and shall, 
with the approval of the 
Adjutant General or as 
directed by the governor: (a) 
Make rules; (b) Coordinate 
recommended to be taken to protect: (a) 
An individual; (b) Buildings or other 
property; (c) Information processing, 
communication or telecommunication 
systems, including the information 
contained in the systems; or (d) Those 
operations of the Oregon State Lottery 
the security of which are subject to study 
and evaluation under ORS 461.180 (6). 
necessary.401.088 Interagency 
agreements. The director of the 
Office of Emergency Management 
may enter into interagency 
agreements with other state 
agencies that the director 
determines are necessary to carry 
out the duties of the Office of 
Emergency Management. 
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emergency services 
activities;(f) staff a state 
emergency ops center; (i) 
Establish task forces and 
advisory groups to assist. 
(con’t in comments) 












Title 4. Admin Part I. Gov’s 
Office Chapter 6. Subch MM. 
Continuity of Government 
Office 4 PA. Code § 6.481. 
Mission Continuity of 
Government Steering 
Committee is to ensure the 
ability of the commonwealth to 
continue to provide essential 
services during an emergency 
through its support of the 
Continuity of Government 
Office. § 6.482 (2015) § 
6.482. Responsibilities. The 
Commonwealth Continuity of 
Government Steering 
Committee shall do the 
following: (1) Assess the level 
of continuity of government 
preparedness among 
commonwealth agencies. (2) 
Assess the ability of the 
executive, judicial and 
legislative branches to 
coordinate and continue the 
effective functioning of 
government during an 
65 P.S. § 67.708. Exceptions for public 
records (b) (1) A record, the disclosure 
of which: (ii) would be reasonably likely 
to result in a substantial and 
demonstrable risk of physical harm to or 
the personal security of an individual. 
(2) A record maintained by an agency in 
connection with the military, homeland 
security, national defense, law 
enforcement or other public safety 
activity that, if disclosed, would be 
reasonably likely to jeopardize or 
threaten public safety or preparedness 
or public protection activity or a record 
that is designated classified by an 
appropriate federal or state military 
authority. 
(3) A record, the disclosure of which 
creates a reasonable likelihood of 
endangering the safety or the physical 
security of a building, public utility, 
resource, infrastructure, facility or 
information storage system, which may 
include:  
(i) documents or data relating to 
Note that the Penn laws are divided 
into the Code and the Statutes, 
much like Texas Code and Texas 
Vernon’s Civil Statutes. Title 35, Part 
V, Chapter 73, 35 Pa. C.S. § 7313. 
Powers and Duties. The agency 
shall have the following powers and 
duties: (1) To prepare, maintain and 
keep current Pennsylvania 
Emergency Management Plan for 
the prevention and minimization of 
injury and damage caused by 
disaster, prompt and effective 
response to disaster and disaster 
emergency relief and recovery. The 
plan may include provisions for: (i) 
Preparedness standards established 
by the FEMA. (iii) Assistance to 
commonwealth agencies, local 
government officials, schools and 
custodial child care facilities in 
designing emergency management 
plans and training programs. (iv) 
Organization of labor, chains of 
command, continuity of government 
in emergency situations and 
emergency ops principles. See also 
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emergency. (3) Approve and 
promote the annual priorities 
of the Continuity of 
Government Office (Office) for 
ensuring the coordination and 
maintenance of 
commonwealth operations 
during emergencies and 
disruptions. (4) Provide 
guidelines, oversight and 
policy direction for improving 
continuity of government and 
operations by the office. § 
6.476. Cooperation by state 
agencies. Agencies under the 
governor’s jurisdiction shall 
cooperate with and provide 
assistance and support as 
needed by the Office of 
Homeland Security and the 
governor’s dept. chief of staff 
for public safety to carry out 
its functions effectively. 
Ex Ord 205.41 COOP 
Program 2/16/2011. Requires 
all state agencies to have a 





computer (IT); (ii) lists of infrastructure, 
(iii) building plans or infrastructure 
records that expose or create 
vulnerability; (4) IT record reasonably 
likely to jeopardize computer security. 
 
Emergency Interim Executive and 
Judicial Succession Act of 1959 71 
P.S. § 779.2 (approved 1959) and 
Title 46, Ch. 1 Legislature, 
Emergency Succession 46 P.S. § 
145.2 (approved 1959), Title 53, Part 
III, Chapter 11, Subchapter C. 
Emergency Succession of Officers 
(in municipalities), 53 Pa.C.S. § 
1132 (approved 1996); Ex Ord 
2012—5 April 30, 2012: Establishes 
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R.I. Gen. Laws Title 30. 
Military Affairs and Defense 
“Rhode Island Emergency 
Management Act” § 30–15-7. 
Governor’s General Powers. 
The governor shall be 
responsible for carrying out 
the provisions of this chapter 
and shall be primarily 
responsible for emergency 




Facilities. (d) The director 
shall be responsible to the 
governor for carrying out the 
program for disaster 
preparedness of this state. § 
30–15-10. Financing—
Disaster emergency funding 
board established. (b) 
composed of the president of 
the senate, the speaker of the 
house, and the chairpersons 
of the senate and house 
finance committees. (c) If the 
governor finds that the 
demands placed upon these 
funds in coping with a 
particular disaster are 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 38–2-2. Definitions. As 
used in this chapter: (4) “Public record” 
or “public records”… the following 
records shall not be deemed public: (F) 
Scientific and technological secrets and 
the security plans of military and law 
enforcement agencies, the disclosure of 
which would endanger the public welfare 
and security. 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 30–15.1-1. 
Declaration—Transition of affairs 
Whenever a disaster, or anticipated 
disaster necessitates, the governor 
shall declare an emergency 
temporary location for the seat of 
government as advisable under the 
circumstances. § 30–15.1-2. Validity 
of acts performed at emergency 
location—shall be as valid and 
binding when performed at the 
emergency temporary location.  
Code of RI Rules (CRIR) 10 010 001 
Emergency Ops Plan signed by 
governor 1 October 1987. Requires 
state and local governments to have 
an Emergency Ops Plan that 
includes provisions for “continuity of 
government.” Continuity of 
government is defined to include line 
of succession and preservation of 
records. 
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unreasonably great, with the 
concurrence of the disaster 
emergency funding board, he 
or she may make funds 
available by transferring and 
expending moneys 
appropriated for other 
purposes or may borrow for a 
term not to exceed two years 
from the United States 
government or any other 
private source.  




S.C. Code Ann. TITLE 25. 
Military, Civil Def and Vets 
Affairs CH. 1. Military Code 
Article 4. S. C. Emergency 
Management DIV § 25–1-420 
(2014) S. C. Emergency 
Management Division of 
Office of Adjutant General; 
admin; duties. (a) coordinating 
all state, county, & muni 
agencies in developing a state 
emergency plan; (b) 
conducting a statewide prep 
program (c) establishing and 
maintaining a state 
emergency ops center (d) 
disseminating emergency info 
(e) establishing an incident 
management system 
incorporating the principles of 
the NIMS. § 25–1-430. 
S.C. Code Ann.§ 30–4-30. Right to 
inspect or copy public records; fees; 
notification as to public availability of 
records; presumption upon failure to 
give notice; records to be available 
when requestor appears in person. (a) 
Any person has a right to inspect or 
copy any public record of a public body, 
except as otherwise provided by § 30–4-
40, in accordance with reasonable rules 
concerning time and place of access. § 
30–4-40. Matters exempt from 
disclosure. (a) (4) Matters specifically 
exempted from disclosure by statute or 
law. § 30–4-45. Information concerning 
safeguards and off-site consequence 
analyses; regulation of access; 
vulnerable zone defined. (A) nuke and 
hazmat (B)The director of each agency 
that is the custodian of information, the 
unrestricted release of which could 
S.C. Emergency Ops Plan Basic 
Plan 2011 at page 43 and pages 67–
69: It is the policy of the State of SC, 
in concert with FEMA Emergency 
Preps Procedures, to have in place a 
comprehensive program to ensure 
continuity of mission essential state 
emergency functions under all 
circumstances. (See the SC State 
Emergency Response Team COOP 
Plan, 2008) To support this policy 
the SC Emergency Management 
Division has implemented the COOP 
Program. http://scemd.org/files/
Plans/SCEOP11/Basic%20Plan.pdf 
NOTE PER KM: good luck on finding 
the SC COOP web page.  
S.C. Hazard Mitigation Plan 2013 At 
pg 284 where disaster mitigation 
emergency management 
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Definitions. (a) “Emergency 
preparedness” means the 
extraordinary actions of 
government in preparing for 
and carrying out all functions 
and operations, required to 
prevent, minimize, and repair 
injury and damage resulting 
from a disaster of any origin. § 
25–1-440. Additional powers 
and duties of governor during 
declared emergency. (a) The 
governor is empowered. (4) 
utilize all avail resources of 
state government as 
reasonably necessary to cope 
w/ the emergency; (5) transfer 
the direction, personnel, or 
functions of state 
departments, agencies, and 
commissions, or units thereof, 
for purposes of facilitating or 
performing emergency 
services as necessary or 
desirable; (b) The governor is 
responsible for the 
development and coordination 
of a sys of comprehensive 
emergency management that 
includes: (1) provisions for 
mitigation, prep, response, 
and recovery in anticipated 
and actual emergency 
increase the risk of acts of terrorism may 
identify the info or compilations of info 
by notifying the Atty Gen in writing, and 
shall promulgate regulations in 
accordance with the Administrative 
Procedures Act, § 1–23-110 through § 
1–23-120(a) and § 1–23-130, to regulate 
access to the information in accordance 
with the provisions of this section.  
 
performance, homeland security and 
state funding grants are to be used 






But see also where SC governor’s 
2016 budget requested at pages 18 
& 677 item (28) $250K for COOP 
budget for SC Emergency 








SC Emergency Management 
Division of Adj General Emergency 
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§ 34–48A-11. Comprehensive 
plan prepared by adjutant 
general for emergency 
management of state. The 
secretary is directed to 
prepare a comprehensive plan 
and program for the 
emergency management of 
this state. The plan and 
program shall be integrated 
into and coordinated with the 
emergency management 
plans of the federal 
government and of other 
states to the fullest possible 
extent, and shall coordinate 
the prep of plans and 
programs for emergency 
management by the political 
subdivisions of this state, 
which shall be integrated into 
and coordinated with the 
emergency management plan 
and program of this state to 
the fullest possible extent. § 
34–48A-12. Contents of 
Comprehensive Plan for 
Emergency Management of 
Stat [sic]. The secretary [DPS] 
may. (1) Procure supplies and 
equipment; (2) Cooperate with 
the federal government, or 
S.D. Codified Laws § 34–48A-18. 
Confidentiality of contact lists and 
related info. The info provided pursuant 
to §§ 34–48A-13 to § 34–48A-18 
[various emergency management 
contact lists], inclusive, shall remain 
confidential and may only be used for 
emergency purposes. § 1–27-1.5. 
Records exempt from disclosure—
Personal data. The following records are 
not subject to § 1–27-1, 1–27-1.1, and 
1–27-1.3: (8) Info solely pertaining to 
protection of the security of public or 
private property and persons on or 
within public or private property, such as 
specific, unique vulnerability 
assessments or specific, unique 
response plans, either of which is 
intended to prevent or mitigate criminal 
acts, emergency management or 
response, or public safety, the public 
disclosure of which would create a 
substantial likelihood of endangering 
public safety or property; (17) Any 
emergency or disaster response plans 
or protocols, safety or security audits or 
reviews, or lists of emergency or 
disaster response personnel or material; 
any location or listing of weapons or 
ammunition; nuclear, chemical, or 
biological agents; or other military or law 
(con’t) § 34–48-2. Request for 
assistance NIMS. In addition to the 
provisions of chapter 1–24 and 
chapter § 34–48A, any public 
agency or covered entity may 
request assistance from any other 
public agency or covered entity in 
order to preserve and protect the 
public health, safety, and welfare. 
The requesting agency and the 
deploying agency shall utilize the 
incident command sys of the NIMS. 
§ 34–48-6. Personnel of deploying 
public agency retain authority, gain 
authority of similarly situated 
personnel of receiving agency. All 
personnel deployed by the deploying 
agency or covered entity retain all 
authority of the deploying agency or 
covered entity and are entitled to act 
with all authority available to similarly 
situated personnel of the agency or 
covered entity receiving assistance. 
S.D. Constitution. Article III, § 29 
Legislative powers in emergency 
from enemy attack. Notwithstanding 
any general or special provisions of 
the constitution, in order to insure 
continuity of state and local 
governmental operations in periods 
of emergency resulting from 
disasters caused by enemy attack, 
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any agency thereof, and to 
enter into agreements with 
any state of the U.S. or 
subdivisions thereof or with 
any private agency therein for 
the procurement of food, fuel, 
supplies, and equipment 
necessary for civilian use; (3) 
Provide for the distribution 
thereof to the inhabitants of 
this state in a manner 
consistent with the needs and 
requirements of the civil 
population; and(4) Institute 
training programs and public 
info programs, and take all 
other preparatory steps 
including the partial or full 
mobilization of emergency 
management orgs in advance 
of actual disaster, to ensure 
the furnishing of adequately 
trained and equipped forces of 
emergency management 
personnel in time of need. 
(con’t in comments) 
enforcement equipment or personnel. the legislature shall have the power 
and the immediate duty (1) to 
provide for prompt and temporary 
succession to the powers and duties 
of public offices, and (2) to adopt 
such other measures as may be 
necessary and proper for insuring 
the continuity of governmental 
operations. S.D. Codified Laws § 1–
30-1 Declaration of policy. Because 
of the existing possibility of attack 
upon the U.S. of unprecedented size 
and destructiveness, and in order, in 




§ 58–2-101. Chapter 
definitions. 
“Agency” means the 
Tennessee emergency 
management agency (TEMA) 
(11) Emergency services 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 10–7-504. 
Confidential records—Exceptions. (m) 
(1) Information and records that are 
directly related to the security of any 
government building shall be maintained 
as confidential and shall not be open to 
public inspection. For purposes of this 
§ 58–2-108. Designation of 
emergency services coordinators. 
(a) At the direction of the governor, 
the head of each executive 
department and independent agency 
shall select from within such 
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coordinator” or “ESC” is 
responsible for coordinating 
with the agency on 
emergency prep issues, 
preparing and maintaining 
emergency prep and post 
disaster response and 
recovery plans for their 
agency, maintaining rosters of 
personnel to assist in disaster 
operations, and coordinating 
appropriate training for 
agency personnel; (D) 
Recovery from emergencies 
by providing for the rapid and 
orderly start of restoration and 
rehabilitation of persons and 
property affected; and (F) 
Assistance in anticipation, 
recognition, appraisal, 
prevention, and mitigation of 
emergencies which may be 
caused or aggravated by 
inadequate planning for, and 
regulation of, public and 
private facilities and land use; 
(25) “TEMP” means Tenn 
emergency management plan. 
§ 58–2-106. Emergency 
management responsibilities 
and powers. 
(a) TEMA is responsible for 
subsection (m), “government building” 
means any building that is owned, 
leased or controlled, in whole or in part, 
by the state of Tennessee or any 
county, municipality, city or other 
political subdivision of the state of 
Tennessee. Such information and 
records include, but are not limited to: 
(B) Security plans, including security-
related contingency planning and 
emergency response plans; (C) 
Assessments of security vulnerability; 
(D) Information and records that would 
identify those areas of structural or 
operational vulnerability that would 
permit unlawful disruption to, or 
interference with, the services provided 
by a governmental entity; 
department or agency a person to be 
designated as the emergency 
services coordinator (ESC) for the 
department or agency together with 
an alternate ESC. 
(b) The ESC is responsible for 
coordinating with TEMA and 
reporting to that agency on 
emergency preparedness issues, 
preparing and maintaining 
emergency preparedness and post-
disaster response and recovery 
plans for their agency, maintaining 
rosters of personnel to assist in 
disaster operations, and coordinating 
appropriate training for agency 
personnel. 
(c) These individuals shall be 
responsible for ensuring that each 
state facility, such as a prison, office 
building, or university, has a disaster 
preparedness plan that is reviewed 
by the applicable local emergency 
management agency and approved 
by TEMA. October 2011 audit by 
Tenn Comptroller of Tenn EM Agcy 
COOP oversight, 37 pgs: 
http://www.comptroller.tn.gov/
repository/SA/pa11048.pdf   
Note that the link to the Tenn EM 
Plan is not working:  
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maintaining a comprehensive 
statewide program of 
emergency management. The 
agency is responsible for 
coordination with efforts of the 
federal government with other 
departments and agencies of 
state, county &, municipal 
governments and school 
building, and private agencies 
that have a role in emergency 
management. The director of 
the agency shall be the state 
coordinating officer (SCO) and 








§ 412.054. Continuity of 
Operations Plan (COOP)  
(a) Each state agency shall 
work with the office (SORM) 
to develop an agency-level 
COOP that outlines 
procedures to keep the 
agency operational in case of 
disruptions to production, 
finance, admin, or other 
essential operations. The plan 
must include detailed info 
regarding resumption of 
essential services after a 
catastrophe, including: 
Tex Government C. § 552.156. 
Exception: Confidentiality of Continuity 
of Operations Plan (COOP). (a) Except 
as otherwise provided by this section, 
the following information is excepted 
from disclosure under this chapter: (1) a 
continuity of operations plan developed 
under § 412.054, Labor Code; and (2) 
all records written, produced, collected, 
assembled, or maintained as part of the 
development or review of a COOP 
developed under § 412.054, Labor 
Code. (b) Forms, standards, and other 
instructional, informational, or planning 
materials adopted by SORM to provide 
guidance or assistance to a state 
agency in developing a COOP under § 
§ 412.054 (con’t) (2) any records 
written, produced, collected, 
assembled, or maintained as part of 
the development or review of a 
COOP under this section. (d) Forms, 
standards, and other instructional, 
informational, or planning materials 
adopted by the office to provide 
guidance or assistance to a state 
agency in developing a COOP under 
this section are public info subject to 
disclosure under Chapter 552, 
Government Code. (e) A state 
agency may disclose or make 
available info that is confidential 
under this section to another state 
agency, a governmental body, or a 
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(1) coordination with public 
authorities; 
(2) management of media; 
(3) customer service delivery; 
(4) assessing immediate 
financial and operational 
needs; and 
(5) other services as 
determined by the office. 
(b) A COOP that meets the 
requirements of this section 
must be submitted by each 
state agency that is: 
(1) involved in the delivery of 
emergency services as a 
member of the governor’s 
Emergency Management 
Council; 
(2) part of the State Data 
Center program; or 
(3) subject to this chapter or 
Chapter 501. 
(c) Except as otherwise 
provided by this section, the 
following info is confidential 
and is exempt from disclosure 
under Chapter 552, 
412.054, Labor Code, are public info 
subject to disclosure under this chapter. 
(c) A governmental body may disclose 
or make available info that is confidential 
under this section to another 
governmental body or a federal agency. 
(d) Disclosing info to another 
governmental body or a federal agency 
under this section does not waive or 
affect the confidentiality of that info. See 
also Tex. Labor C. § 412.054(c)-(f). 
Continuity of Operations Plan & § 
412.0128. Confidentiality of Information. 
 
federal agency. (f) Disclosing info to 
another state agency, a 
governmental body, or a federal 
agency under this section does not 
waive or affect the confidentiality of 
that info.  
§ 412.011. Powers and Duties of 
Office. (f) The office shall work with 
each state agency to develop an 
agency-level COOP under § 
412.054. 
(g) The office shall make available to 
each agency subject to § 412.054 
guidelines and models for each 
element listed in § 412.054. The 
office shall assist the agency as 
necessary to ensure that: 
(1) agency staff understands each 
element of the COOP developed 
under § 412.054; and 
(2) each agency provides training 
and conducts testing and exercises 
that prepare the agency for 
implementing the plan. 
§ 412.032. Board’s Report to 
Legislature. (a) Based on the 
recommendations of the director, the 
board shall report to each legislature 
relating to: (5) the COOP developed 
by state agencies under § 412.054. 
(5) an evaluation of continuity of 
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Government Code: 
(1) a COOP developed under 
this section; and 
(Con’t in comments) 
operations plans developed by state 
agencies under § 412.054 for 
completeness and viability. 
Utah  
http://dem.utah.gov/ 
Utah Code Ann. § 53–2a-104 
Division [of Emergency 
Management, part of DPS] 
duties—Powers. 
(1) The division shall: (c) 
prepare, implement, and 
maintain programs and plans 
to provide for: (ii) prompt and 
effective response to and 
recovery from disasters; (v) 
assistance to local officials, 
state agencies, and the 
business and public sectors, 
in developing emergency 
action plans; (vii) coordination 
of emergency operations 
plans with emergency plans of 
the federal government; 
See also § 53–2a-801 et seq. 
Title. This part is known as the 
“Emergency Interim 
Succession Act 
§ 63G-2-106. Records of security 
measures. 
The records of a governmental entity or 
political subdivision regarding security 
measures designed for the protection of 
persons or property, public or private, 
are not subject to this chapter [Chapter 
2 Government Records Access and 
Management Act]. These records 
include: 
(1) security plans; 
(2) security codes and combinations, 
and passwords; 
(3) passes and keys; 
(4) security procedures; and 
(5) building and public works designs, to 
the extent that the records or information 
relate to the ongoing security measures 
of a public entity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-305 Protected 
records. 
The following records are protected if 
properly classified by a governmental 
(§ 63G-2-305 con’d) (13) records 
that, if disclosed, would jeopardize 
the security or safety of a 
correctional facility, or records 
relating to incarceration, treatment, 
probation, or parole, that would 
interfere with the control and 
supervision of an offender’s 
incarceration, treatment, probation, 
or parole; 
(48) except to the extent that the 
record is exempt from this chapter 
pursuant to § 63G-2-106, records 
related to an emergency plan or 
program, a copy of which is provided 
to or prepared or maintained by the 
Division of Emergency Management, 
and the disclosure of which would 
jeopardize: 
(a) the safety of the general public; 
or 
(b) the security of: 
(i) governmental property; 
(ii) governmental programs; or 
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entity: 
(12) records the disclosure of which 
would jeopardize the security of 
governmental property, governmental 
programs, or governmental 
recordkeeping systems from damage, 
theft, or other appropriation or use 
contrary to law or public policy; 
(con’t in comments) 
(iii) the property of a private person 
who provides the Division of 
Emergency Management 
information; 
Utah DPS EM Continuity of 
Operation (COOP) Tabletop 
Exercise http://dem.utah.gov/coop/ 
Utah state agency COOP Tabletop 
Exercise to allow agencies to 
discuss and validate COOPs and 
capabilities after a serious incident, 
which causes agencies to activate 








20 V.S.A. § 3a. Emergency 
management division; duties; 
budget 
(a) In addition to other duties 
required by law, the 
emergency management 
division shall: 
(1) Establish and define 
emergency planning zones 
and prepare and maintain a 
comprehensive state 
emergency management 
strategy that includes an 
emergency operations plan, 
establish and define 
emergency planning zones 
and prepare and maintain a 
radiological emergency 
1 V.S.A. § 317. Definitions; public 
agency; public records and documents 
(c) The following public records are 
exempt from public inspection and 
copying: 
(32) With respect to publicly owned, 
managed, or leased structures, and only 
to the extent that release of info 
contained in the record would present a 
substantial likelihood of jeopardizing the 
safety of persons or the security of 
public property, final building plans, and 
as-built plans, including drafts of security 
systems within a facility, that depict the 
internal layout and structural elements of 
buildings, facilities, infrastructures, 
systems, or other structures owned, 
operated, or leased by an agency 
20 V.S.A. § 31 (2016) 
§ 31. State emergency response 
commission; duties 
The commission shall have authority 
to: 
(5) Review and comment on the 
comprehensive state emergency 
operations plan and local emergency 
planning committee response plans. 
(9) Coordinate statewide efforts and 
draft policies regarding planning, 
mitigation, preparedness, and 
response to all-hazards events to be 
approved by the commissioner. 
See also 29 V.S.A. § 171. 
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response plan for use in those 
zones, and prepare an all-
hazards mitigation plan in 
cooperation with other state, 
regional, and local agencies 
for use in such zones and in 
compliance with adopted 
federal standards for 
emergency management. The 
strategy shall be designed to 
protect the lives and property 
including domestic animals of 
persons within this state who 
might be threatened as the 
result of all-hazards and shall 
align state coordination 
structures, capabilities, and 
resources into a unified and 
multi-disciplined all-hazards 
approach to incident 
management. 
(3) Assist the state emergency 
response commission, the 
local emergency planning 
committees and the 
municipally established local 
orgs referred to in § 6 of this 




and coordinating emergency 
response plans. 
before, on, or after the effective date of 
this provision; emergency evacuation, 
escape, or other emergency response 
plans that have not been published for 
public use; and vulnerability 
assessments, operation and security 
manuals, plans, and security codes.  
Responsibility for security 
(e) Under this section, the 
commissioner of buildings and 
general services is responsible for 
the protection of state facilities, the 
lands upon which the facilities are 
situated, and the occupants of those 
facilities, which is vital to sustaining 
the essential services of government 
in an emergency. The commissioner 
shall develop plans for continuity of 
government and continuity of 
operations as an addendum to the 
state emergency operations plan 
maintained by the department of 
public safety, division of emergency 
management and referenced in 
subdivision 8(b)(2) of Title 20. 
See also 20 V.S.A. § 181. Statement 
of policy re: Emergency Interim 
Succession to Offices.// 
http://demhs.vermont.gov/plans/state 
Vt Emergency Ops Plan 2013, @ 
SSF Annex 5 Tab B SEOP 
Operating Guidelines I pg. 17: “Each 
State agency, department and 
organization has a COOP.” This plan 
is activated by the governor, in 
consultation with the commissioners 
of Dept. of Buildings and General 
Services and Dept. of Public Safety. 
The COG contains info from each 
agency COOP, include lines of 
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(4) Provide admin support to 
the state emergency response 
commission. 
Cont in comments 
succession, leadership contact info, 
essential functions, vital records and 













Va. Code Ann. § 44–146.18 
Dept. of Emergency Services 
continued as Dept. of 
Emergency Management; 
admin and operational control; 
coordinator and other 
personnel; powers and duties 
B. The Dept. of Emergency 
Management shall in the 
administration of emergency 
services and disaster prep 
programs: 7. Provide 
guidance and assistance to 
state agencies and units of 
local government in 
developing and maintaining 
emergency management and 
continuity of operations 
(COOP) programs, plans and 
systems; 
§ 44–146.17. Powers and 
duties of governor 
The governor shall have, the 
Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3705.2 Exclusions 
to application of chapter; records 
relating to public safety 4. Plans and info 
to prevent or respond to terrorist activity 
or cyber attacks, the disclosure of which 
would jeopardize the safety of any 
person, including (i) critical infrastructure 
sector or structural components; (ii) 
vulnerability assessments, operational, 
procedural, transportation, and tactical 
planning or training manuals, and staff 
meeting minutes or other records; 
§ 44–146.17:2. Annual statewide drill 
The governor shall conduct an 
annual statewide drill on response to 
a large-scale disaster including, 
electrical power outages. Such drill 
shall include the participation of local 
governments, affected state 
agencies, public utilities, law-
enforcement agencies, and other 
entities as determined by the 
governor. The governor shall submit 
a report to the General Assembly on 
the results of the drill by Nov. 30 of 
each year. The report shall be 
delivered to the chairs of the House 
Committee on Militia, Police and 
Public Safety and the Senate 
Committee on General Laws. 
§ 44–146.28. Authority of governor 
and agencies under her control in 
declared state of emergency 
(b) Public agencies under the 
supervision and control of the 
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following powers and duties: 
(1) S/he may adopt and 
implement the Commonwealth 
of Virginia Emergency Ops 
Plan, which provides for state-
level emergency operations in 
response to any type of 
disaster or large-scale 
emergency affecting Virginia 
and that provides the needed 
framework within which more 
detailed emergency plans and 
procedures can be developed 
and maintained by state 
agencies, local governments 
and other orgs. 
(2) To appoint a state 
coordinator of emergency 
management and authorize 
the appointment or 
employment of other 
personnel as is necessary to 
carry out the provisions of this 
chapter, and to remove, in his/
her discretion, any and all 
persons serving hereunder; 





governor may implement their 
emergency assignments without 
regard to normal procedures (except 
mandatory constitutional 
requirements) pertaining to the 
performance of public work, entering 
into contracts, incurring of 
obligations, employment of temp 
workers, rental of equip, purchase of 
supplies and materials and 
expenditures of public funds. 
§ 44–146.24. Cooperation of public 
agencies 
In carrying out the provisions of the 
chapter, the governor, the heads of 
state agencies, the local directors 
and governing bodies of the pol 
subdivision are directed to utilize the 
services, equip, supplies and 
facilities of existing departments, 
offices, and agencies of the 
Commonwealth and the pol 
subdivisions thereof to the maximum 
extent practicable consistent with 
state and local emergency operation 
plans. The officers and personnel of 
all such departments, offices, and 
agencies are directed to cooperate 
with and extend such services and 
facilities to the governor and to the 
State Dept. of Emergency 
Management upon request. 
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See HB 1047, 2015 AN ACT 
Relating to the state agencies 




Title 38 Militia and Military 
Affairs, Chapter 38.52, 
Emergency Management, 
Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 
38.52.010 Definitions. (17) 
“COOPing” means the internal 
effort of an org to assure that 
the capability exists to 
continue essential functions 
and services in response to a 
comprehensive array of 
potential emergencies or 
disasters. 
§38.52.020. Declaration of 
policy and purpose. 
(f) To provide for the 
prioritization, development, 
and exercise of COOPs by the 
state. 
Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) Chapter 
42.56 Public Records Act, § 42.56.420. 
Security. 
The following info relating to security is 
exempt from disclosure under this 
chapter: 
(1) Those portions of records 
assembled, prepared, or maintained to 
prevent, mitigate, or respond to criminal 
terrorist acts, which are acts that 
significantly disrupt the conduct of 
government or of the general civilian 
population of the state or the U. S. and 
that manifest an extreme indifference to 
human life, the public disclosure of 
which would have a substantial 
likelihood of threatening public safety, 
consisting of: 
(a) Specific and unique vulnerability 
assessments or specific and unique 
response or deployment plans, including 
compiled underlying data collected in 
preparation of or essential to the 
assessments, or to the response or 
deployment plans; and 




In order to provide for the continuity 
and preservation of civil government, 
each elected and appointed officer of 
the state shall designate those public 
documents which are essential 
records of his or her office and 
needed in an emergency and for the 
reestablishment of normal 
operations after any such 
emergency. A list of such records 
shall be forwarded to the state 
archivist on forms prescribed by the 
state archivist. This list shall be 
reviewed at least annually by the 
elected or appointed officer to insure 
its completeness. Any changes or 
revisions following this review shall 
be forwarded to the state archivist. 
Each such elected and appointed 
officer of state government shall 
insure that the security of essential 
records of his or her office is by the 
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§38.52.030 director 
Comprehensive emergency 
management plan. (11) The 
director is responsible to the 
governor to lead the 
development and 
management of a program for 
interagency coordination & 
prioritization of COOP 
planning by state agencies. 
Each state agency is 
responsible for developing an 
organizational COOP that is 
updated and exercised 
annually in compliance with 
the program for interagency 
coordination of COOPing. 
Governor Mar 2013/ COOP 







HB 1047 – eff 7/24/2015 re: 






(b) Records not subject to public 
disclosure under federal law that are 
shared by federal or international 
agencies, and information prepared from 
national security briefings provided to 
state or local government officials 
related to domestic preparedness for 
acts of terrorism; 
most economical means 
commensurate with adequate 
protection. Protection of essential 
records may be by vaulting, planned 
or natural dispersal of copies, or any 
other method approved by the state 
archivist. Reproductions of essential 
records may be by photo copy, 
magnetic tape, microfilm, or other 




The COOP planners are….a 
standing committee of continuity 
professionals established to promote 
the coordination of comprehensive 
and effective continuity activities 
across state agencies and to advise 
the office of the governor on issues 
of state government continuity.  
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W. Va. Code § 15–5-5 (2015) 
General powers of the 
governor. 
In performing her/his duties 
under this article to affect its 
policy and purpose, the 
governor is further authorized 
and empowered: 
(2) To prepare and implement 
a comprehensive plan and 
program for the provision of 
emergency services in this 
state, such plan and program 
to be integrated into and 
coordinated with comparable 
plans of the fed government 
and of other states to the 
fullest possible extent, and to 
coordinate the prep of such 
plans and programs by the pol 
subdivision of this state, such 
plans to be integrated into and 
coordinated with the state 
plan and program to the fullest 
possible extent. 
(3) In accordance with such 
state plan and program, to 
procure supplies and 
equipment, to institute training 
and public info programs, to 
W. Va. Code § 29B-1-4. Exemptions. 
(10) Those portions of records 
containing specific or unique 
vulnerability assessments or specific or 
unique response plans, data, databases 
and inventories of goods or materials 
collected or assembled to respond to 
terrorist acts; and communication codes 
or deployment plans of law-enforcement 
or emergency response personnel; 
(11) Specific intelligence information and 
specific investigative records dealing 
with terrorist acts or the threat of a 
terrorist act shared by and between 
federal and international law-
enforcement agencies, state and local 
law-enforcement and other agencies 
within the Department of Military Affairs 
and Public Safety; 
(14) Security or disaster recovery plans, 
risk assessments, tests or the results of 
those tests; 
§ 15–5A-6. Powers and duties of the 
Office of Emergency Services. 
The Office of Emergency Services, as 
created by article five [§§ 15–5-1 et 
seq.], chapter 15 of the Code of W. Va., 
shall perform the admin duties of the 
state emergency response. The admin 
(cont) (a) Receive, catalogue and 
organize info required to be 
submitted to the commission; 
(b) Utilize existing state response 
orgs, plans and facilities; 
(d) Coordinate with other state 
agencies on training for 1st 
responders and emergency svc 
personnel; 
(e) Respond to requests to the 
commission from the public for info 
pursuant to this act; 
(f) Perform such preliminary analysis 
and collect such information as may 
be required to enable the 
commission to fully review local 
emergency response plans; and 
§ 15–5A-5. Powers and duties of the 
[State Emerge Response] 
commission. 
The commission shall have and may 
exercise the following powers and 
duties: 
(a) Designate emergency planning 
districts; 
(f) Enter into cooperative 
arrangements with other state 
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take all other preparatory 
steps including the partial or 
full mobilization of emergency 
services orgs in advance of 
actual disaster and to ensure 
the furnishing of adequately 
trained and equipped 
emergency services 
personnel in time of need. 
(4) To make such studies and 
surveys of industries, 
resources and facilities in this 
State as may be necessary to 
ascertain the capabilities of 
the state for providing 
emergency services and to 
plan for the most efficient 
emergency use thereof. 
duties to be performed by the Office of 
Emergency Services shall include, but 
shall not be limited to, the following: 
(con’t in comments) 
agencies designating specific 
responsibilities for state agencies to 
implement this article; 
(h) Promulgate rules for public info; 
(i) Promulgate procedural rules for 
confidential info; W. Va COG/COOP 













Wis. Stat. § 323.13. Adjutant 
general; duties and powers. 
(1) Ongoing Duties. The 
adjutant general shall do all of 
the following: 
(a) Serve as the governor’s 
principal assistant for directing 
and coordinating emergency 
management activities. 
(b) Subject to approval by the 
governor, develop and adopt 
a state plan of emergency 
management for the security 
General Organization of the State, 
Except the Judiciary 
Chapter 19. General Duties of Public 
Officials 
Subchapter II Public Records and 
Property 
Wis. Stat. §19.35. Access to records; 
fees. 
(1) Right to Inspection. 
The right to inspect or copy info in a 
record under this paragraph does not 
Wis. Stat. § 323.02. Definitions. 
(2) “Administrator” means the 
administrator of the division. 
(8) “Emergency management” 
means all measures undertaken by 
or on behalf of the state and its 
subdivisions to do any of the 
following: 
(a) Prepare for and minimize the 
effect of a disaster or the imminent 
threat of a disaster. 
(b) Make repairs to or restore 
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of persons and property. In 
developing the plan, the 
adjutant general shall seek 
the advice of the 
administrator, shall seek the 
advice of the department of 
health services with respect to 
the emergency medical 
aspects of the plan, and shall 
seek the advice of the 
department of administration 
with respect to aspects of the 
plan related to computer or 
telecommunication systems. 
The plan shall specify 
equipment and personnel 
standards, and shall require 
the use of the incident 
command system, and specify 
the type of incident command 
system, by all emergency 
response agencies, including 
local health departments, 
during a state of emergency 
declared under s. 323.10 or 
323.11. 
(c) Prescribe and carry out 
statewide training programs 
and exercises to develop 
emergency management 
proficiency, disseminate 
information, and coordinate 
emergency management 
apply to any of the following: 
2. Any record containing personally 
identifiable info that, if disclosed, would 
do any of the following: 
c. Endanger the security, including the 
security of the population or staff, of any 
state prison under § 302.01, jail, as 
defined in § 165.85 (2) (bg), juvenile 
correctional facility, as defined in § 
938.02 (10p), secured residential care 
center for children and youth, as defined 
in § 938.02 (15g), mental health 
institute, as defined in § 51.01 (12), c  
19.62. Definitions. 
In this subchapter: 
(5) “Personally identifiable info” means 
information that can be associated with 
a particular individual through one or 
more identifiers or other info or 
circumstances. 
infrastructure or critical systems that 
are destroyed or damaged by a 
disaster. 
§ 323.12. Governor; Duties and 
Powers. 
(1) Ongoing duties. 
The governor shall do all of the 
following: 
(a) Review orders establishing or 
altering emergency management 
areas. 
(b) Review state emergency 
management plans and 
modifications to the plans. 
See also Chapter 323. Emergency 
Management 
Subchapter V Emergency Location 
and Continuity of Government 
Wis. Stat. § 323.50 to § 323.50 re: 
interim succession of state and local 
officers and locations 
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§ 19–13-104. Powers of 
governor generally; director, 
office of homeland security. 
(c) In performing his/her 
duties under this act, the 
governor may: 
(i) Make, amend and rescind 
the necessary orders, rules 
and regulations to carry out 
this act within the limits of the 
authority conferred upon her/
him herein, with due 
consideration of the plans of 
the federal government. The 
governor may assign to a 
state agency any activity 
concerned with the mitigation 
of the effects of a disaster or 
national emergency of a 
nature related to the existing 
powers and duties of the 
agency, including interstate 
activities, and the agency 
shall undertake and carry out 
the activity on behalf of the 
state; 
(ii) Prepare a comprehensive 
homeland security plan and 
program for this state to be 
integrated into and 
Wyo. Stat. § 16–4-203. Right of 
inspection; grounds for denial; access of 
news media; order permitting or 
restricting disclosure; exceptions. 
(b) The custodian may deny the right of 
inspection of the following records, 
unless otherwise provided by law, on the 
ground that disclosure would be contrary 
to the public interest: 
(vi) To the extent that the inspection 
would jeopardize the security of any 
structure owned, leased or operated by 
the state or any of its pol subdivisions, 
facilitate the planning of a terrorist attack 
or endanger the life or physical safety of 
an individual, including: 
(A) Vulnerability assessments, specific 
tactics, emergency procedures or 
security procedures contained in plans 
or procedures designed to prevent or 
respond to terrorist attacks or other 
security threats; 
(D) Records prepared to prevent or 
respond to terrorist attacks or other 
security threats identifying or describing 
the name, location, pharma cache, 
contents, capacity, equipment, physical 
features, or capabilities of individual 
medical facilities, storage facilities or 
labs established, maintained, or 
§ 19–13-104 (con’t). (iii) In 
accordance with the homeland 
security plan and program for this 
state, procure supplies and 
equipment, institute training 
programs and public info programs 
and take all other preparatory steps 
including the partial or full 
mobilization of homeland security 
orgs in advance of actual disaster, to 
insure the furnishing of adequately 
trained and equipped forces of 
homeland security personnel in time 
of need; 
(iv) Make such studies and surveys 
of the industries, resources and 
facilities in this state as necessary to 
ascertain the capabilities of the state 
and its pol subdivisions for meeting 
homeland security requirements, 
and to plan for the most efficient 
emergency use therefor; § 16–4-
202. Right of inspection; rules and 
regulations; unavailability. 
(d) If a public record exists primarily 
or solely in an electronic format, the 
custodian of the record shall so 
inform the requester. Electronic 
record inspection and copying shall 
be subject to the following: 
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coordinated with the 
homeland security plans of 
the federal government and of 
other states to the fullest 
possible extent, and 
coordinate the preparation of 
plans and programs for 
homeland security by the pol 
subdivision of this state to be 
integrated into and 
coordinated with the 
homeland security plan and 
program of this state to the 
fullest possible extent; 
(Con’t in comments) 




regulated by the state or any of its pol 
subdivisions. 
(new § 16–4-202 con’t in comments) 
(iv) An agency shall not be required 
to allow inspection or copying of a 
record in its electronic format if doing 
so would jeopardize or compromise 
the security or integrity of the original 
record or of any proprietary software 
in which it is maintained; 
(v) Nothing in this section shall 
prohibit the director of the office of 
homeland security from enacting any 
rules pursuant to her/his authority 
under W.S. 19–13-104(d)(v). 
Wy Response Plan Oct 2008: COOP 
















DC Code 2003–35 § 1–15-35. 
Reorg of Plan for the Office of 
Risk Management 
(c) The Risk Management 
Council shall: 
(10) Coordinate internal 
agency emergency response 
plan development and 
maintenance include plans for 
COOP in the event of any 
emergency, and definition of 
interaction points with the 
DC Code § 2–534. Exemptions from 
disclosure. 
(a) The following matters may be 
exempt from disclosure under the 
provisions of this subchapter: 
(13) Information exempt from disclosure 
by § 7–2271.04; 
§ 7–2271.04. Confidentiality of 
proceedings. 
(a) Commission proceedings shall be 
DC Code § 7–2302. Establishment 
of program of public emergency 
preparedness; publication. 
(a) The mayor may establish a 
program of public emergency prep 
that utilizes the services of all 
appropriate agencies (include the 
Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management Agency) and the 
program shall include, but not be 
limited to: 
(1) Development of a DC response 
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external District Emergency 
Response Plan coordinated 
by the Emergency 
Management Agency. 
DDC Code § 7–2205 
§ 7–2205. Powers and Duties. 
The Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management 
Agency is authorized and 
directed, subject to the 
direction and control of the 
mayor of the district: 
(1) To prepare a 
comprehensive plan and 
program for civil defense, 
such plan and program to be 
integrated into and 
coordinated with the civil 
defense plans of the federal 
government, and of nearby 
states and appropriate pol 
subdivisions; 
§ 7–2304. Issuance of 
emergency executive order; 
contents; actions of Mayor 
after issuance. 
(b) Upon the issuance of an 
emergency executive order 
the Mayor may: 
(6) Issue orders or regulations 
closed to the public and shall not be 
subject to § 1–207.42 when the 
Committee is discussing specific public 
and private vulnerability assessments or 
where the information discussed would: 
(1) Reveal a trade secret or privileged or 
confidential commercial or financial 
information; or 
(2) Be detrimental to public safety. 
plan which would: 
(A) Set forth a comprehensive and 
detailed D.C. state program for prep 
against, and assistance following, 
emergencies and major disasters, 
include provisions for assistance to 
individuals, businesses, and affected 
designated subdivisions of the DC; 
and (B) Including provisions for: 
Appointment and training of 
appropriate staffs; formulation of 
necessary regulations and 
procedures; and conduct of required 
exercises; 
(2) Post public emergency 
evaluations; 
(3) Periodic review of programs; and 
(4) Coordination of federal and state 
prep programs. 
(b) Except as provided in subsection 
(c) of this section, the Mayor shall 
publish in the D.C. Register, for 
notice and comment, any program or 
plan for public emergency prep 
prepared pursuant to this chapter. 
The publication shall, at a minimum, 
state the subject matter of the 
program or plan and the specific 
manner in which a complete copy 
can be obtained or reviewed and 
commented upon prior to the 
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State or Territory 
COOP Agency Link 
COOP or Closely Analogous 
Statute 
Confidentiality Statute for COOP or 
Closely Analogous Statute Comments/Continuations 
to control, restrict, allocate, or 
regulate the use, sale, 
production and distribution of 
food, fuel, clothing, and other 
commodities, materials, 
goods, services, and 
resources as required by the 
DC response plan or by any 
federal emergency plan; 
 
transmittal of the plan or program to 
the Council of the DC.  
(c) Any specific response plan, and 
any specific vulnerability 
assessment, either of which is 
intended to prevent or to mitigate an 
act of terrorism, as that term is 
defined in § 22–3152(1), shall be 
exempt from the requirements in 
subsection (b) of this section. 
Guam 10 GCA § 65A001 et seq. The 
Disaster Recovery Relief Act 
of 2002. Only on mention of 
COOP in any Guam statutes: 
§ 20205. Powers and Duties 
of the Chief Technology 
Officer; Generally (10) direct 
the formulation and 
promulgation of policies, 
guidelines, standards and 
specifications for the 
development and 
maintenance of information 
technology and technical 
infrastructure, including, but 
not limited to: 
(F) technical and data 
standards for the connectivity, 
priorities and interoperability 
of technical infrastructure 
used for homeland security, 
5 GCA §§ 10104 & 10108 Limitation on 
Right of Inspection include (b) Records 
of complaints to, or investigations 
conducted by, or records of intelligence 
information, or security procedures or 
information, of an agency or its 
personnel. & (j) Records specifically 
pertaining to security procedures, 
passwords, combinations, access 
codes, electronic or computer user I.D.s, 
policies or procedures on security. 
 
138 
State or Territory 
COOP Agency Link 
COOP or Closely Analogous 
Statute 
Confidentiality Statute for COOP or 
Closely Analogous Statute Comments/Continuations 
public safety and health, and 
systems reliability necessary 
to provide continuity of 
government operations in 
times of disaster or 
emergency. Various and 
dispersed emergency-related 
statutes including hiring of 
additional personnel § 4106 
Personnel Rules. a 
Puerto Rico 25 L.P.R.A. § 172. Statement 
of public policy—creates the 
P.R. Emergency Management 
Agency, to coordinate all P.R, 
federal, municipal and private 
emergency plans and process 
offers of help. 25 L.P.R.A. § 
172e. director—Authorities 
and powers. Emergency 
Management and Disaster 
Admin Powers include powers 
necessary to carry out duties: 
enforce duties, adoption of 
plans, Execute contracts, 
adopt regulations, Organize 
and train groups, Plan for all 
phases of emergency and 
disaster management, etc. § 
172h. Appointment of 
interagency coordinators. 
Agency Emergency 
Coordinators shall (among 
other items) prepare an 
3 L.P.R.A. Chapter 41, § 1001–1013, § 
1002. Admin of Public Doc Program in 
Three Branches of Government and the 
Comptroller. Various Program Admins, 
i.e., P.R. comptroller, through 
regulations (rules), publish lists of public 
but confidential documents not subject 
to inspection. 
25 L.P.R.A. § 162. Statement of 
policy & § 164 Emergency interim 
successors. Establishes a post-
attack emergency line of succession 
for P.R. state agencies and public 
corporations. Unfortunately, Lexis/
Nexis only has Spanish versions of 
P.R. regulations: “Reglamentos 
Administrativos de Puerto Rico.” 
Only the rule titles are searchable as 
the rules are non-searchable pdf 
files—all in Spanish.  








State or Territory 
COOP Agency Link 
COOP or Closely Analogous 
Statute 
Confidentiality Statute for COOP or 
Closely Analogous Statute Comments/Continuations 
emergency recovery plan to 
return the Island to its normal 
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APPENDIX B. SUMMATION OF LAWS POTENTIALLY 
APPLICABLE IN COOP CONFIDENTIALITY OR WITHHOLDING  
The following categorizations of COOP plan confidentiality are 
summarized based on the information and resources identified in Appendix A:  
A. States in Which Confidentiality or Open Record Statutes Would 













B. States Where Confidentiality or Open Record Statutes Might 
Plausibly Exclude COOP-Related Information or Plans from 























New Jersey  
New Mexico  
New York 





South Carolina  









C. States Where Confidentiality or Open Record Statutes Conclusively 
Exclude COOP-Related Information or Plans from Disclosure: 
Texas 
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